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Abstract: 
This thesis develops methods for representing how the contents of theories of meaning 
become conceived by their users. These contents are treated as the range of systematically 
elicited conceptions afforded by a designated corpus of key texts. The approach being taken 
involves first detailing a formal scheme for the components of situations attributed to various 
entities (e.g. ‘your situation’). This scheme is then applied as a framing device to form a tem-
plate which accounts for the shared structure between the mental spaces which embody how 
people conceive different theories of meaning. For the purposes of this task, cognition is 
treated as embodied in the sense that both the form and content of personal conceptualisa-
tions are largely dependent on what both bodily and ecological factors afford. 
The purpose of this approach is to help understand how theories operate when viewed as 
worldly entities within a materialist framework. The significance of such understanding lies in 
enabling analyses and comparisons which account for the effects of material restrictions such 
as how a theory’s presentation must necessarily be selective and how human cognition oper-
ates on models set by precedent. The framework being provided here allows the conceptions 
each individual theory of meaning elicits to be reduced to formal, commensurate models 
which account for differences between typical influences on the conceptions characteristic of 
different demographics such as experts of related fields. Approaching theories of meaning 
from this angle also reveals new avenues of comparison concerning otherwise implicit details. 
One involves theory-internal conditions on the full material identity of meaning-instantiating 
entities. The other concerns the extent of the domains for aggregating applicable influences 
for which a theory accounts and the range of those it may accommodate. 
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Chapter 01: Introduction 
1.1 Statement of Purpose  2 
1.2 Overall Structure   8 
 1.3 Theoretical Framework 20 
The manner in which people relate to theories of meaning is necessarily limited by 
how they conceive these theories’ contents. This thesis provides a perspective to help 
highlight some of the involved material limitations. Theories of meaning – understood 
as models of the emergence of specific kinds of meaning – are treated as the ranges 
of possible conceptions which can be derived from designated corpuses. In this in-
stance, such conceptions can be framed using a schematic structure shared with at-
tributed situations – i.e. the circumstances of appointed entities (‘your situation’). 
The provided perspective is intended to help identify heretofore underappreciated 
details about theories of meaning: how the versions with which people operate are 
subject to cognitively grounded contingencies, how the system-level requirements 
of presented models may complicate the identities of suitable signifiers, and how 
each expression of a theory may only present a limited selection of considerations. 
Such details ought to prove helpful in assessing the relative merits of theories of 
meaning with a fuller understanding of the range of involved considerations. 
Enabling this perspective involves scaffolding in the form of a theoretical framework 
applied in an instrumentalist manner. Promiscuous realism allows for free partitioning 
of reality to fit any classification scheme. Being fallibilist about aperspectival objec-
tivity prompts one to analyse the details of involved perspectives. Treating cognition 
as embodied provides a means to comprehensively source potential influences on 
conceptions and grounds focusing on available interactions and their effects. 
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1.1 Statement of Purpose 
In the abstract of his 2001 paper ‘Controversies and Epistemology’ (Dascal, 2001, p. 
159), Dascal calls out what he perceived as ‘the impasse at which the philosophy 
and history of science in the last couple of decades’. His thesis can be summarised 
as work in these fields having been channelled solely to either discussions or disputes, 
neither of which bears the characteristics of a genuinely productive scientific contro-
versy. Neither amiable solutions to mutually recognised problems nor debates about 
the proper approach between parties who agree on no single issue suffice to push 
a field in new directions according to him. What would instead be needed are issues 
on which parties agree but where their approaches diverge in a manner where asso-
ciated attitudes can be evaluated relative to the mutually recognised issue at hand. 
Should one agree with this general notion that advancement in a field of philosophy 
requires grounding in mutually recognisable issues relative to which differences in 
approach can be evaluated, the means to uncover new venues for such productive 
disagreement hold value as (potential) enablers for further developments. 
In the almost two decades since Dascal’s paper, philosophy of science has 
arguably been revitalised in part by the rise of approaches which can be grouped 
under the title of ‘the pragmatic view on the structure of scientific theories’ (e.g. 
Hacking, 2007; Longino, 2013). The main contrast between prior accounts and this 
approach lies in the recognition of an explanatory role for particularity, whether in 
the form of non-formal influences or the limitations of the specific media being 
used. Hence, parallels can be drawn to how linguistic pragmatics focus on situated 
utterances over general semantic significance as at least a necessary component of 
a proper understanding of meaning. This work shares many such aspirations. The 
provided material is intended to help approach theories of (linguistic) meaning – 
specifically, so-called foundational semantics (Stalnaker, 1997)1 concerned with the 
 
1 Some of the addressed examples belong in descriptive semantics which is concerned primarily 
with the assignment of specific meaning to linguistic items. However, while one may conceivably 
provide a theory about the nature of meaning without committing oneself to any specific descrip-
tive theories, any descriptive theory which references extralinguistic factors appears bound to make 
some commitments concerning the sources of whichever meanings are being posited. In the case 
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dynamics which give rise to meaning as such rather than the resulting assignment 
of semantic values to expressions – in a new light. Any reference to ‘theories of mean-
ing’ within this context ought to thus be understood as denoting the explanatory 
models proposed for explaining the emergence of meaning of some kind among 
entities of a specified type. The type of meaning in question may correspond to some 
manifest impression such as words having set meanings or utterances having clear 
interpretations in light of specific contexts. A theory may also posit a more technical 
notion in service of some other purpose but often somehow related to such mani-
fest meaning such as when a formal representation of the intension of an indexical 
like ‘it’ is used to explain how the term gets used.2 In the vein of the pragmatic ap-
proach, the explored perspective focuses on the characteristics of a specific field 
(foundational semantics) and the material conditions involved in the production and 
treatment of results – namely, theories of meaning – within that field. As such, theo-
ries are strictly speaking individuated based on associated corpuses and there can 
be several ‘theories’ in this sense for which the same name (e.g. relevance theory) 
is used. Clusters of such specific ‘theories’  share a family resemblance which allows 
them to be categorised into distinct theoretical approaches, however. The resulting 
models and methodological suggestions involving the retrieval and application of 
such models are intended to act as analytical tools,3 primarily for philosophers of 
language and theoretical linguists. 
 
of a purely compositional theory, such commitments might be limited to the apparatus respon-
sible for enabling the necessary operations while a theory of indexicals appears bound to posit a 
directly meaning-contributing relation between language and extralinguistic entities. 
2 In this instance, the foundational theory being that words possess properties or relate to certain 
facts in ways which define intensions specific to them which in turn designate their referents that 
substantiate said intensions – or a variant thereof. 
3 Authors such as Clark (1997) and Dennett (1996; 2000; 2013), inspired by Gregory’s (1993, pp. 
48–68) account of mind tools, argue that ideas act as tools and proper tools enable exceeding 
prior intellectual performance. While this work does not thus strictly speaking present a traditional 
philosophical thesis statement, developing instruments for philosophical inquiry ought to be of 
no less value than designing tools for any other worthwhile task. In particular, if the results of Bloom 
et al (2017) on the increasing relative cost of innovation can be generalised to human sciences, 
such further means of analysis help structure the increasingly sophisticated theoretical apparatuses 
around common frameworks and identify otherwise invisible issues to hopefully steer debates 
towards more productive tracks. For instance, distilling competing theories to similarly formatted 
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The exact approach being taken involves identifying a schema around which 
at least some necessary components of theories of meaning, specifically, may be 
structured for purposes of modelling the associated mental representations. This 
form of framing is not intended as the sole valid means of representing such con-
tent. However, applying it does reveal aspects of theories of meaning as they mani-
fest in people’s conceptions based on available sets of associated (written or spoken) 
texts. Specifically, the angle being applied is to focus on what sets of key texts4 associ-
ated with a given theory of meaning (or variant thereof) present as prompts for peo-
ple to construct corresponding mental models. The schema used to frame such mod-
els is derived from the notion of attributed situations, which seems to underlie specific 
expressions (e.g. ‘your situation’) but is formalised and has the conditions and result-
ing limits of its applicability charted here. This schema consists of (1) the central entity 
to which the situation is being attributed, (2) the constituents linked to the central 
entity by a set of recognised relations, and (3) an (implicit) observer to whose per-
spective said relations are available. Treating whichever kind of entity (e.g. a word) 
to which a theory attributes meaning as a similarly situated focal entity enmeshed 
within a set of relations a theory treats as definitive of its meaning as applicable 
sources of semantic influence replicates this structure.5 The position from which said 
arrangement would be observed is primarily constituted by the perspective inherent 
 
graphs of definitive relations between differently inclusive key entities ought to simplify directing 
comparisons and associated tests. 
4 ‘If we wish to learn what a theory is from the standpoint of scientists who use the theory, one 
way to proceed is by examining the textbooks from which they learned most of what they know 
about that theory.’ (Giere, 1988, p. 63). In the case of academic study of meaning, primary texts and 
particularly influential secondary texts appear to form a similar corpus for analysis. An interesting 
example is the difference between people familiar with relevance theory primarily either through 
the work of Sperber and Wilson (1995) or Carston (2002). The impression one gets is that the latter 
tend to emphasise the explanatory role of language of thought more and treat it as less idiolectic. 
5 The cause for drawing this connection involves how this work began as an attempt at creating 
a general model of the different levels of contextual influence (the immediate situation, personal 
beliefs and recollections, etc.) on meaning. This involved treating the various forms of (potentially) 
context-sensitive signifiers as worldly entities situated at the heart of a set of circumstances acting 
as potential context. How different theories define the context embodied in such circumstances 
so differently had prompted the original project. In time, it became apparent that applying the 
model to said theories of meaning to explain these differences would be more interesting. 
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in the material being presented in a necessarily selective manner as no text may ac-
commodate the totality of possible participants in such scenarios.6 This kind of cog-
nitive orientation aligns with that of Giere (1988; 2006) as both focus on how human 
endeavours such as academic research ought to recognise the effects of the human 
element and be informed by related fields of research such as cognitive science.7 
As such, the models of how theories of meaning become conceived are constructed 
using concepts and dynamics borrowed from cognitive science, specifically research 
on embodied cognition (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002).8 
By itself, applying this angle allows theories of meaning to be approached 
from a perspective which ought to help identify the range of conceptions which 
each encompasses, the distribution of such conceptions, and the contingent influ-
ences responsible. While it is not being argued that theories of meaning ought to 
be exclusively identified with such conceptions linked to the designated sets of texts, 
recognising this dynamic as part of the material existence of said theories should 
enrich the overall understanding of their nature. Such understanding, in turn, ought 
to contribute to a more reflective treatment of such theories. For instance, if a theory 
 
6 ‘The basic idea is that conception is a lot like perception, or, that theorizing is a lot like observing. 
More specifically, in creating theories, […] scientists create perspectives from within which to con-
ceive of aspects of the world.’ (Giere, 2006, p. 59).  
7 ‘The starting point of cognitive psychology, and the cognitive sciences generally, is that humans 
have various biologically based capacities including perception, motor control, memory, imagina-
tion, and language. People employ these capacities in everyday interactions with the world. A 
cognitive theory of science would attempt to explain how scientists use these capacities for 
interacting with the world as they go about the business of constructing modern science.’ (Giere, 
1988, pp. 4–5) 
8 As is noted below, considerations involving embodied cognition are not being applied to under-
stand some form of folk semantics. It is merely the approach to cognition selected for this work, 
largely for its focus on interaction between material conditions as an influence on the content of 
conceptions. In this context, theories of meaning need not be assumed to have a special relation-
ship to the considerations in question. The defining contribution of this work is applying a cogni-
tive approach to how people relate to the material expressing theories of meaning, and embodied 
cognition treating mental representations as not (solely) propositional allows the resulting concep-
tions to be treated as more than themselves uninteresting paraphrases of the texts. The highly ab-
stract subject matter of such theories is susceptible to needing grounding in familiar models of 
observable phenomena via cognitive metaphors (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), for instance. Differ-
ences in salient models such as whether utterances are understood primarily in terms of distinct 
replies in an oral exchange or (parts of) written publications result in distinct understandings. 
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relies on tractable cognitive biases in how people’s mental reconstructions are af-
fected by the chosen presentation for its appeal, this form of treatment can locate 
such influences for further assessment. This work itself provides guidelines for how 
to extract two forms of key details implicit in the structure of a theory of meaning 
relative to theories of meaning can be assessed. 
The first detail which can be recovered based on this framing is the full ma-
terial identity of the entities required to instantiate the form of meaning a theory 
posits. When a theory is not treated as a description of the world but a schematic 
model which only incorporates what the theory describes using available cognitive 
resources when conceived based on textual prompts,9 one may study the nature of 
its elements with fewer commitments to folk realist presumptions. In this context, 
the main supposition would involve that theories explain the meaning of manifest 
signifiers of the sorts being named, e.g. theory-internal reference to ‘utterances’ just 
designating discrete linguistic tokens. Given how entities appropriate for the task a 
theory imposes on them must be able to participate in the correct positions in the 
relations definitive of their meaning, their material identity may be required to ex-
ceed such manifest instances. Such full instantiators can, for instance, incorporate 
some surrounding elements such as ‘utterances’ not only requiring recognisable 
linguistic forms but the associated intention-bearing neural states of an utterer if a 
theory only treats pairs of (reconstructed) intentions and externalised signals as 
meaningful and subject to whichever influences define their posited meanings.10 This 
 
9 ‘If we insist on regarding the linguistic formulations of principles as genuine statements, we have 
to find something that they describe, something to which they refer. The best candidate I know for 
this role would be a highly abstract object, an object that by definition exhibits all and only the char-
acteristics specified in the principles. […] this abstract object is a very general model whose initial 
function is to characterize relationships among the elements of the world.’ (Giere, 2006, pp. 61–62) 
10 It can be objected that the states embodying an intention (or reconstruction thereof) are merely 
a necessary form of influence. This formulation does not preclude the details of the intention from 
also acting as influences, however. All that would matter is how for purposes of such a theory, an 
incidental manifestation of a linguistic form such as the works of Shakespeare recreated by a 
thousand monkeys tied to typewriters would not qualify as being of the proper kind (until some-
one unfamiliar with said origins reconstructed some intent behind the results). Such a theory 
might even allow that such things embody meaning in certain other respects but not in the sense 
the theory itself addresses. 
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possibility that different theories involve materially different kinds of recipients of 
meaning even when they overlap in the form of a manifest focal entity or set of enti-
ties affords one venue of systematically assessing both individual theories and their 
differences from a new angle. Even if each theory were found to cohere with the 
baseline assumptions, access to such means of verifying whether that is the case 
would help secure more sustainable epistemic grounds for asserting as much. 
The second detail concerns the extent to which the particular material under 
inspection accounts for available considerations and the limits of the set of principles 
expressed therein with respect to such scope. Whatever the aspirations of a theory 
might be in terms of the extent to which it accounts for possible considerations, the 
manner in which its presentation is implemented necessarily has its limits. These 
limits can then be expected to be reflected in the default conceptions engendered 
by engaging with said material, even if further considerations on part of the conceiver 
may adjust their conception of the theory in this respect. Given that more inclusive 
domains for aggregating suitable influences are not inherently more desirable,11 the 
question of proper scope for a task (e.g. to what extend should it be inclusive of 
cross-temporal considerations if at all) can then be asked. Depending on the an-
swer(s), the scopes different theories implement and those they can in principle sup-
port can then be assessed relative to the demands of the tasks each theory sets for 
itself. In practice, for example, such information can also be used to specify which 
forms of counterexamples are appropriate in a given context. Should a task be ag-
reed not to be inclusive of cross-modal considerations, for instance, criticising an 
associated theory using an example which requires accounting for counterfactuals 
would constitute a foul. This second potential avenue of constructive discourse, in-
tended to further hone the details of how specific theories are understood, thus 
focuses attention on principles for defining proper scope for the different tasks the-
 
11 For instance, should one wish to retain intuitive referents for expressions such as ‘the tallest moun-
tain as part of a theory of definitive descriptions (e.g. Russell, 1905), one might wish to apply some 
form of domain restriction which adjusts the applied scope to only be inclusive of Earth, the local 
solar system, and so forth based on a general auxiliary principle. 
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ories of meaning address and especially the scope of considerations actually imple-
mented in the relevant texts. That how a theory is understood need not be limited 
to what its author(s) present does not mean that this selection responsible for the 
boundaries of non-enriched conceptions can be overlooked. No matter how one 
treats the fundamental metaphysics of such theories, people’s conceptions of their 
contents are with what we are forced to contend when operating with said theories. 
These conceptions are subject to – among other things – attentional biases, and 
what gets presented is always more salient than what does not. 
In sum, then, this thesis aspires to provide a novel angle from which con-
siderations involved in assessing theories of meaning may be approached, and to 
explore methods of systematically extracting and developing details relevant for 
assessing different theories of meaning from the resulting models. The chosen angle 
involves mapping the range of conceptions prompted by designated sets of key 
texts (relative to factors characteristic of the accounted for demographics such as 
cohorts of post-graduates compared to their professors in specific academic fields). 
This cognitive approach to the structure of theories of foundational semantics treats 
cognition as subject to embodiment-related factors like prototype effects and com-
pression to human scale for purposes of mental modelling. Based on the structure 
of such models, one may then systematically specify a theory’s requirements on the 
entity instantiating the forms of meaning the theory posits and the scope of the do-
mains relative to which meaning-defining influences get aggregated. Ideally, paying 
conscious attention to such details will help further develop theories accordingly. 
1.2 Overall Structure 
The thesis proceeds in three phases. The notion of attributed situations on which 
the model is founded is detailed first, including the related notion of observers which 
links their identity to the sources of information accessible to them. This first phase 
mainly provides the structure of the schema to be applied and details the sense in 
which a text may materially embody a specific perspective even when distinct cog-
nising agents are required to independently implement it. In the second phase, the 
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schema provided by this notion of attributed situations is then mapped onto theories 
of meaning as a framing device. This treatment focuses on the means to identify how 
theories’ contents would be typically conceived by members of specified demo-
graphics given the conception-influencing factors they share because these analyses 
are intended to avoid abstracting away potentially significant differences at the out-
set.12 Focusing on the material conditions in this manner also highlights the effects 
and limits of the forms in which people may relate to a theory of meaning and on 
which the theory’s role as part of human conduct is thus based. The resulting 
structuring of this content also helps model it in a manner which highlights influence-
defining relations’ role and the resulting coverage. Based on these factors, the re-
mainder of the thesis focuses on methods of extracting details embodied in such 
models. Such details include theory-internal identity conditions for meaning-instan-
tiating entities and the extents of the domains within which influences certified by 
the theory are accounted for based on how the theory is presented. 
1.2.1 The Model of Attributed Situations 
While the model of how the contents of theories of meaning become conceived 
could strictly speaking be presented independently of the preceding notion of at-
tributed situations on which it is based, this background is provided to clarify the 
approach being taken. Theories of meaning are not being treated as forms of at-
tributed situations as such, but a lack of a relatively grounded characterisation of 
what the schema being applied to them involves would make the framing appear 
arbitrary. Starting with a discussion of attributed situations allows the schema to 
instead be associated with a sense of situatedness, which does apply to theories of 
meaning: they are focused on mapping the relationship between something mani-
festly present in the world – the various forms of signifiers – and the conditions which 
 
12 In defining demographics and specifying the sets of influences typical of them, one may still err 
on the side of too much abstraction, resulting in models which fail to capture some factors of in-
terest. However, correcting for such issues is a matter of adjustment. In contrast, modelling the 
contents of theories in a manner not sensitive to such possible influences, mainly by designating 
a specific version conceived from an institutionally privileged (possibly justifiably so) position as 
the proper representation of their contents, provides no grounds or guidelines for such adjustments. 
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give rise to these entities’ experienced meaningfulness. Some details such as the 
presence and role of observers in determining the selection of registered relations 
are more prominent in the case of attributed situations as well. Establishing the role 
observers, for instance, in this relatively more neutral context grounds the transition 
to examining their role in the case of theories of meaning. 
The basic framework for representing situations applied here uses set-the-
oretic notation adapted from situation semantics (e.g. Barwise and Perry, 1999) to 
list the constituents of said situations. This use of formal models which carries over 
when the schema is applied to theories of meaning is intended to be maximally un-
ambiguous about the relations involved despite its relative opacity. Such models also 
provide a template for indexing the elements identified as part of the proposed forms 
of analyses. Given how they track the structural relations between such elements, the 
results can be graphed based on the template. The discussion of attributed situations 
first considers how situations can be treated as simply designated sets of entities. 
However, it appears that there are distinct means to specify which entities a given sit-
uation being invoked would incorporate. For instance, a mention of ‘the situation in 
London’ would be constituted by location-based anchoring. If one then presumes 
that expressions such as ‘your situation’ or ‘the situation of the EU’ designate condi-
tions which are inclusive of the circumstances that ground whichever judgement is 
being applied (e.g. ‘Your situation right now is pretty bad.’), the question becomes 
how the involved constituents would be specified. The proposed model states that 
any such constituents must relate to the designated entity to which the situation is 
being attributed in a manner accessible to a specified observer. This model which 
is discussed in more detail in chapter 2 therefore includes (1) the core entity to which 
the situation is attributed, (2) the relations used to specify constituents, and (3) the 
observer whose perspective determines which relations qualify. 
Additionally, chapter 2 postulates that the schema it presents can in principle 
be applied to attribute a situation to any entity which qualifies as a potential consti-
tuent of such a situation – including relations and arbitrary states of affairs. The sig-
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nificance of this claim lies in expanding the applicability of the notion. It is required 
that one can conceive of meaning-instantiating entities as situated in approximately 
in this manner as part of adapting the schema as a framing device for theories of 
meaning later. One ought to also be able to conceive the possibility that the entities 
thus situated correspond to no well-defined, familiar entities. As some reactions to 
the proposed model consist at heart of the claim that the person in question finds 
it hard if not impossible to conceive of such possibilities, the notion of imaginative 
resistance (e.g. Szabó Gendler, 2000) and associated explanations are used at the 
end of chapter 2 to address the potential reasons for such limitations. In effect, as 
inconceivability has traditionally been considered a sign of self-contradiction, the 
possible involvement of other forms of imaginative resistance is used to respond to 
the criticism that applications of the model itself are somehow inconceivable. Access 
to alternative explanations bars inferring that trouble conceiving the involved forms 
of situations must entail the model being incoherent. Ideally, the provided considera-
tions will also help overcome such issues moving forward. 
The observers integrated into the model of attributed situations presented 
earlier are then discussed in more detail in chapter 3. The purpose of this in-depth 
model of them is to specify in what sense conceptions across individuals can incor-
porate perspectives attributable to the texts on which their conceptions are based. 
Specifically, the model is intended to provide a material basis for this treatment of 
the structure of theories of meaning down the line. The basic model consists of path-
ways of (information) access which are characterised as structurally founded succes-
sive points sensitive to select immediate conditions, and layers of integrative format-
ting where the information from associated channels of access is parsed.13 While the 
purpose of access is to specify the limits of any given observer’s perspective and to 
 
13 Such pathways include both external and internal media such as the trajectories of light and 
sound alongside neural connections. Layers of integration include both neural sub-systems re-
sponsible for parsing such information and external instruments such as computer monitors which 
depict the internal state of the machine in a manner suited for further processing by the average 
user. As Giere (2006, p. 41) notes, ‘scientific instruments are perspectival in that they respond to 
only a limited range of aspects in their environment’. The layered model in part accounts for such 
contributions of external instruments, scientific and otherwise. 
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ground the model in basic causal interactions, the focus for purposes of this thesis 
lies on the role of the layered systems of integration. Most importantly, the layered 
system allows for sub-layers of a total system to be treated as (partial) observers, 
even when such systems may only operate as observers when incorporated with 
further layers of integration. Thus, one can analyse the perspectives embodied in 
individual texts and sets of texts with a common subject as such partial systems which 
are incorporated into the total perspectives of individuals studying the material. 
Even though realising the perspectives embodied in texts requires them being im-
plemented within a larger system, this model allows the nature of such perspectives 
to be understood and therefore addressed instead of them being treated as merely 
a convenient abstraction. The chapter divides the resulting kinds of observers into 
positioned basic observers (e.g. human beings), positioned constructed observers 
(e.g. first-person narrators), and detached constructed observers (e.g. the camera 
in film).14 These categories are used to structure the roles involved in theories of 
meaning: the conceiving person, the idealised processor of meaning, and the per-
spective from which the material is presented. 
Besides the mentioned instrumental reasons for the inclusion of the discus-
sion on attributed situations, this analysis ought to also possess some value indepen-
dently of its role relative to the rest of the thesis. Ideally, the presented notion of 
attributed situations and formal model thereof can also be applied to frame issues 
other than the structure of theories of meaning because acknowledging the situat-
edness of the objects of research helps accommodate the presence of the widest 
range of (potential) factors.15 For instance, moral particularists (e.g. Dancy, 2004) may 
 
14 Detached basic observers – observers of actuality which are (selectively) exempt from the rules 
to which entities are subject as part of that reality – play no role in the discussion, and the category 
may well consist of an empty set without inviting any issue with the provided taxonomy. 
15 Consider how the explicitly situated entity is being related to each potentially pertinent factor 
in its particular environment. Only when the presence of those factors is recognised can their 
effects be controlled for in recording the results. Whenever such particular conditions are abstracted 
away, one risks some recurring condition biasing the supposed relation between studied 
phenomena. As Keller (1995, p. 163) summarises Barbara McClintock’s attitude towards science, 
exemplified in her research on maize development which helped identify the presence of genetic 
transposition (i.e. systematic reordering of parts of the genome): ‘”Exceptions” are not there to 
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benefit from access to such models of situatedness which they can adapt to depict 
the sources of the considerations which apply to a given ethical dilemma and the dif-
ferences in circumstances which change how such instances are judged. Similarly, the 
presented model of observers may help focus attention on the aspects of the process 
of observation which it highlights despite how this technical definition is not intended 
to capture some singular, true essence behind the everyday notion of observers. For 
instance, framing the system responsible as involving structural ambiguity in terms of 
the possible activation conditions of any of its parts – including ‘internal’ forms of in-
formation transmission – allows approaching hallucinations and other forms of non-
veridical experiences as a matter of insufficient first-personal differentiation. The in-
ternal states associated with external conditions at the level of evolutionary precedent 
are misconstrued based on expectations embodied by the system. However, this per-
spective also then leads to potentially interesting further questions about the exact 
nature of the means by which such ambiguities are habitually resolved and the role 
of awareness of one’s fallibility in changing those expectations, often based on ac-
counting for third party testimonies. Potentially seeding such possible avenues of 
further research by doing so makes discussing the model in detail worth the effort. 
1.2.2 Idealised Models of Conceived Content 
In the middle lies the section on reconstructing and representing models of how the 
contents of theories of meaning become conceived based on texts expressing said 
theories. The objective is to relate to theories as worldly entities rather than abstract 
sets of principles. Specifically, the section utilises the introduced schema for attributed 
situations as a framing device around which the contents of such theories can be 
structured, given certain generic features shared specifically by theories of mean-
 
“prove the rule”; they have meaning in and of themselves.’ Deciding in advance which factors a 
model accommodates defines any other less than fully understood influences as such supposed 
exceptions, whereas acknowledging their presence through modelled situations at least allows 
controlling for them in hindsight. Another example would be Principe’s (2013, pp. 138–143, 158–
166) successful recreations of supposedly impossible alchemical recipes by controlling for 
impurities in the components and quality of implements. For instance, iron dissolved from non-
stainless steel explains the alleged redness of vinegar-based extracts from glass of antimony 
(heated antimony with traces of quartz). 
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ing.16 This schema is not treated as uniquely suited for the task: the same content can 
be structured using different frameworks depending on which aspects of it are focal 
to the purpose of one’s analysis. Parallels with attributed situations specifically help 
focus on two key details: the relationship between the central, meaning-instantiat-
ing entity and its surroundings, and limitations on scope linked to the constraints of 
human cognition. Means to extract such details based on these models are presented 
in the last two chapters. Highlighting these details helps dissociate theories of mean-
ing from mere descriptions of a (hypothetical) reality. Instead, texts expressing them 
provide schematic models which possess internal conditions and material limitations. 
Unlike descriptions, such models are not subject to evaluations of truth and falsity as 
such but to questions of fit: ‘Schemata are not generally described as being true or 
false, but as fitting the world in limited respects or degrees, and for various purposes.’ 
(Giere, 1988, p. 6). Veridicality instead applies to claims derived from such schemata. 
Models of the proposed kind contribute to this form of understanding by accounting 
for the selection of involved particulars and relations between functional categories. 
Under this framework, theories of meaning are approached as the range of 
mentally modelled conceptions which a designated corpus of key texts affords as 
interpretations of what it describes under specified sets of influences. These possible 
ways to conceive the contents of a theory are restricted, both in principle and in prac-
tice. In principle, (the grounds for applying) some schematic structures will recur 
across conceptions because of the invariant material on which such conceptions are 
based and the nature of said texts as expressions of explanatory models of how cer-
 
16 Such generic features include (1) the presence of a type of entity treated as meaningful based 
on a set of contributing factors, (2) a selection of relations (including of parts of the entity to itself) 
treated as definitive of the meanings of applicable types of entities, and (3) a perspective relative 
to which such considerations are presented. The perspective is considered inclusive of both the 
position of an idealised processor of meaning to account for how the posited form of meaning 
relates to how people experience meaning and the overall perspective relative to which everything 
is presented. Of these, only the presence of a perspective should be potentially controversial. 
Though, its inclusion ought to be treated as a banal feature of the form of naturalist analysis being 
conducted: ‘The inescapable, even if banal, fact is that scientific instruments and theories are hu-
man creations. We simply cannot transcend our human perspective, however much we may aspire 
to a God’s-eye view of the universe.’ (Giere, 2006, p. 15). Each text of any kind embodies a per-
spective peculiar to it insofar as it may only express or depict a limited set of considerations. 
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tain entities come to hold meaning or be experienced as meaningful. The latter in-
principle reason includes the basic structure the frame derived from the notion of 
attributed situations provides. This structure is inclusive of the representation of the 
type to which meaning is being attributed, the set of relation types treated as defini-
tive of the meanings of such entities, and the presence of a position relative to which 
this arrangement is presented. Meanwhile, practical restrictions on the range of po-
tential conceptions come from the range of actual applicable influences. That these 
practical restrictions apply counters the argument that this form of relativism allows 
for absurd, clearly wrong-headed conceptions to be treated as representative of the 
contents of a theory. Unless the conditions under which such an absurd conception 
would be arrived at based on the designated corpus can be specified, the possibility 
has not been proven. If these conditions can be specified, the results are no longer 
absurd – only highly unlikely and with respect to said conception, probably irrelevant 
for most purposes. The models do not touch on the matter of whether a possible 
conception is wrong as such an assessment would require settling on some concep-
tion as a correct understanding to use as a measure of correctness. Even if an author’s 
intended version, for instance, were treated as authoritative in this respect, their 
works cannot be guaranteed to represent said intentions satisfactorily. The current 
approach is only concerned with what said public representations of the theory 
ground as they act as the source of the conceptions with which people operate in 
relation to a given theory.17 
The models are derived by designating a set of texts and testing if the mem-
bers of some demographic of interest gravitate towards specific representations of 
the scenario these texts present. If a pattern of clustering in terms of their individual 
conceptions emerges, it can be assumed said demographic shares a set of influences 
typical of them, and that these influences meaningfully affect their conceptions. The 
 
17 Thus, discussions such as Mele and Livingstone’s (1992) arguments for the primacy of authorial 
intentions do not directly touch upon the issue at hand. Their argument can be treated as a norma-
tive recommendation for basing certain judgements about texts on evidence about underlying 
intentions. This position remains compatible with the form of each text embodying a range of in-
terpretations which it affords under specific circumstances. 
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hypothetical eye of such clustering – its centre of gravity, in a sense – is treated as 
what Sperber (1996) calls an attractor, as part of his theory of cultural epidemiology. 
Such attractors are abstract statistical constructs which express that ‘in a given space 
of possibilities, transformation probabilities […] tend to be biased so as to favour 
transformations in the direction of some specific point, and therefore cluster at and 
around that point.’ (Ibid. p. 112). The transformations in question involve the poten-
tial changes in the forms in which conceptions emerge and change when construct-
ed, recalled, and so on. If such a pattern emerges, the factors typical of that demo-
graphic which would explain the results need to be identified – including typical so-
cioeconomic trajectories and the other theories and related material to which they 
would have been subjected as part of their education. Once a satisfactory collection 
of such influences which would explain the observed pattern has been identified, 
how the theory would be conceived under their (and as much as possible, only their) 
influence can be reconstructed to represent an idealised conception typical of the 
members of said demographic.18 This approach is intended to accommodate and 
record potential variation in resulting conceptions based on cognitive differences. 
Should no meaningful variation be found, it would in itself be a consequential result. 
1.2.3 Methodological Suggestions 
The last two chapters then detail how the perspective provided by framing theories 
of meaning using the above schema can be used to identify (1) theory-internal iden-
tity conditions for instantiators of meaning and (2) the extent of various forms of in-
volved scope, respectively. Building on what has come before, these proposals act 
as a proof of the value of said considerations. The proposed methods provide a 
means to understand and assess theories of meaning from a new angle, but applying 
 
18 Thus, while the approach is interested in approximating internal conceptions, the models are 
only derived from such conceptions instead of attempting to directly capture any given one. Giere 
(2006, p. 105) expresses scepticism towards the possibility of satisfactorily capturing how theories 
are understood based on internal models. His reasons include the variation between individuals 
and the unlikeliness that even experts possess complete internal models of complex theories. The 
focus on reconstructing a typical conception addresses the former worry. The latter worry need 
not factor in since such models do not represent what people retain. Instead, these models re-
construct what forms of conceptions a given set of texts would engender under set influences. 
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them involves recognising the forms of selectiveness emphasised by the model of 
observers and other limitations of the human cognitive apparatus. These details are 
not treated as explicit parts of how theories of meaning are conceived. They are con-
sidered a structural feature partly obscured by the features of how people conceive 
content by default. As such, these methods ought to be considered means to develop 
such conceptions in the light of the provided perspective, and formulae for creating 
secondary material which highlights such details. 
Starting with the identification of the instantiators of meaning, the hypothesis 
being presented is that a theory’s total form may impose further conditions on the 
required entities beyond what an intuitive understanding would entail. For instance, 
‘utterance’ is manifestly used to designate whichever form of language-betokening 
entity such as a verbal statement or text message. The inclusion of some such entity 
is surely necessary for meaning according to contextualist theories of utterance 
meaning (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Recanati, 2004). However, it remains an open 
question whether such entities may by themselves suffice as receptacles for the kinds 
of meanings attributed to them based on the principles such theories propose. Ac-
cording to these theories, the utterance is never meaningful independently of its con-
text, after all.19 Therefore, the minimal meaningful entity would include the manifest 
utterance and at least some contextual prerequisites. Similarly, a literalist theory which 
ascribes meaning to ‘words’ in themselves (e.g. Cappelen & Lepore, 2004; Borg, 2004; 
2012) imposes conditions on the possible material identities of these types.20 Given 
the potential for theory-internal demands to necessitate variation in the material 
identities of applicable instantiators, the proposed methods act as a means to ensure 
a systematically grounded understanding of such details over reliance on intuitive 
 
19 ‘Contextualism ascribes to modulation a form of necessity which makes it ineliminable. Without 
contextual modulation, no proposition could be expressed – that is the gist of Contextualism. In 
this framework the notion of a 'minimal' proposition collapses: there is no proposition that is ex-
pressed in a purely 'bottom-up' manner.’ (Recanati, 2005, p. 180, emphasis in original). 
20 Word identity, specifically, has been discussed independently (e.g. Kaplan, 1990; 2011; Gendler 
Szabó, 1999; Wetzel, 2009; Hawthorne & Lepore, 2011). Approaches to their material identity can 
roughly be divided between defining criterion-based type-token distinctions (e.g. Wetzel, 2009) 
and materially extended stage-continuant models (e.g. Kaplan, 1990; 2011) based on causal chains. 
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approximations.21 The purpose is to help form clear(er) and (more) distinct impres-
sions of the involved entities for assessing the feasibility of theories. 
The method for identifying the conditions for full instantiator identity and 
the available material realisers of such identities starts with specifying what the theory 
considers the basic-most form of some entity qualifying as fully meaningful. This form 
of closure condition to help specify the simplest applicable entity is based on theory-
internal criteria to avoid generalising a single theory’s assumptions as a guideline 
by which the rest are assessed. At the same time, however, the minimalist nature of 
the criterion helps assess the results in terms of their parsimony: whether the same 
results can be achieved with fewer requirements. The set of relations treated as defi-
nitive of such basic meaning is then made the subject of analysis. The identities of 
applicable entities are seeded based on the manifest identities associated with which-
ever terms the author uses for the kinds of instantiators they are discussing such as 
‘word’. To respect the author’s choice of terminology, the inclusion of some uncon-
troversial basic identity like this is treated as necessary but not sufficient until proven 
otherwise. When the requirements of occupying the designated position – mostly 
that of a recipient of associated semantic effects – in each of the relations definitive 
of basic meaning according to a theory have been specified, the results can be com-
pared to this baseline. If the associated entity is not fit as a participant in such rela-
tions, one may specify which material extension available in the relevant kinds of 
situations would allow for said requirements to be met. The resulting type of entity 
 
21 As Hawthorne and Lepore (2011, p. 482) allege, the majority of authors presume the sufficiency 
of such sloppy realism according to which ‘the unsettled questions turn out to rest on borderline 
cases and are to be handled using the correct theory of vagueness’. The authors themselves claim 
(Ibid. p. 482) that ‘[t]hose who pursue questions of word individuation and hope for systematic 
answers are almost invariably in the grip of a faulty picture of the semantic mechanisms that un-
derlies thought and talk of words.’ (In context, it is unclear whether the authors subscribe to this 
claim since it only applies under a pessimistic view they are addressing. Kaplan (2011, p. 528) clearly 
interprets Hawthorne and Lepore to share said pessimism, though.) Assuming that the criticism 
concerns attempts to define some true essence of entities such as words, though, their position is 
not antithetical to the current project. The analysis of theory-internal identity conditions for the 
instantiators of the kinds of meaning being posited only concerns the theories themselves even 
if the resulting data can perhaps be used to define distinct pragmatically relevant categories of 
meaningful entities like utterances-in-context. 
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is then treated as the minimal full instantiator a theory allows, given the principles 
it espouses. For instance, if a theory treats true homonyms22 as distinct words rather 
than as the same word possessing unrelated senses, the sense in which ‘word’ is being 
used requires some further condition to materially differentiate instances of the dis-
tinct ones associated with a singular expression. Depending on how interpreters are 
assumed to differentiate between instances of such words, for example, one may 
then extend such enriched identity to be inclusive of associated (functional) neural 
states or whichever other available entities fit theory-specific criteria.  
Scope, on the other hand, is an expression of the extent of the domains 
within which a theory applies its set of influence-defining relations. If said relations 
were compatible with multiple entities, scope would define which register and are 
accounted for to achieve the proposed meanings. The contrast between Russellian 
definite descriptions (e.g. Russell, 1905) and Austinian situation-based semantics 
(e.g. Austin, 1950; Barwise & Etchemendy, 1987; Barwise & Perry, 1999) provides an 
obvious example of applied domains defining the resulting meaning.23 The inclusion 
of both a temporal and a modal axis allows for even more differentiation. As the exis-
tence of temporal externalism (Jackman, 1999; 2005) proves, for instance, accounting 
for the future is possible despite most theories opting not to extend their temporal 
scope in said direction as it risks either the resulting meanings becoming unknowable 
at any given point in time or at least constantly open to revision. Such scope is being 
treated as having three aspects: (1) which dimensions it covers (spatial, temporal, 
and modal), (2) which directions on those dimensions register, and (3) to what extent 
does the domain spread in said directions. 
 
22 In the case of a true homonym, both the pronunciation and spelling used to express the involved 
concepts are identical. A popular example is ‘bank’, most commonly meaning either the edge of 
a body of water or a financial loaning, investing, and bookkeeping institution. 
23 The ideal of Russellian semantics would be utilising worlds as the relevant domains in order to 
achieve unilateral referents for expressions. Within Austinian semantics, formally similar principles 
are applied relative to implicit situations specific to each statement (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1987, 
pp. 26–30). As a result, a description such as ‘the biggest dog’ would define variable referents for 
an Austinian depending on which situation (including the world-encompassing scope) is being 
applied where as a Russellian would require (implicit) further qualifiers for a dog other than the 
very largest canine to be designated by the description. 
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For each theory of meaning, at least three associated kinds of scope can be 
defined relative to such factors. The type most directly linked to the material limita-
tions involved with the media in which theories are expressed is implemented scope. 
It expresses the extent of the considerations actually presented for purposes of con-
ceiving a theory’s content and embodied in the resulting conceptions. Specifying 
what a theory actually presents can be contrasted with what it alleges to cover as 
well as the range of considerations it excludes. Meanwhile, potential scope consists 
of the limits of what the principles a theory provides can provide without undermin-
ing the predictions the theory makes. Finally, ideal scope is specified relative to the 
task of a given theory (e.g. defining truth conditions). It specifies which dimensions 
and directions ought to be accounted for by a theory attempting said task and to 
what extent. Each kind involves distinct methods of extraction. Implemented scope 
effectively corresponds to the extent of the considerations accounted for from the 
perspective of the constructed observer which corresponds to a total view of the 
scenario depicting how a theory is presented. Potential scope is derived by consider-
ing cases beyond implemented scope and which kinds of entities may act as influ-
ences given the principles a theory posits. Determining ideal scope involves general 
considerations such as how rigid the results ought to be, with greater rigidity requir-
ing more inclusive scope. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
Much of the current work applies whichever notions help structure or ground the 
issues highly opportunistically whenever prior discussion of a specific issue has not 
been available. However, many of the claims being made involve specific theoretical 
scaffolding which differs from premises in how one need not accept the metaphysical 
and scientific positions which constitute such scaffolding in order to apply the pro-
posed approach. These positions play a non-essential, instrumental role enabling the 
perspective being applied to be reached.24 Said theoretical framework consists of 
three main parts. The first part is a form of materially based ontological pluralism 
 
24 This resembles how Wittgenstein (1921, §6.54) treats Tractatus as a ladder to be discarded. 
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which posits that it is in principle possible to carve the world in an infinite number of 
ways which only differ in terms of their value relative to their task-specific applicability 
instead of any among those which fit uniquely corresponding to the underlying base 
structure. The second part of this scaffolding is the epistemological position that 
claims to objectivity are unprovable, resulting in a need for critical analyses to estab-
lish the sense in which objectivity is being approached and the degree to which it is 
achieved. The third position – an embodiment-based approach to cognition – is less 
philosophically oriented. It acts to provide a framework for characterising the (likely) 
involved cognitive processes. Basically, the way experience gets structured is treated 
as contingent and the exact details as subject to material dynamics involving the 
active interaction of both physiological and environmental factors. 
1.3.1 Promiscuous Realism 
Promiscuous realism (Dupré, 1993) is adopted as a guiding principle to minimise the 
strong ontological commitments associated with more substantial forms of realism. 
This position remains agnostic on which explanatory frameworks among the alterna-
tives might be superior to others, leaving room for the possibility of unconventional 
entities such as extended instantiators of meaning being treated as explanatorily im-
portant. Promiscuous realism consists of radical ontological pluralism, according to 
which ‘there are countless legitimate, objectively grounded ways of classifying ob-
jects in the world […] [which] may often cross-classify one another in indefinitely 
complex ways.’ (Ibid. p. 18). Legitimising countless classification schemes in this 
manner neither legitimises all the possible schemes nor makes each equivalent. The 
position remains a form of realism, and thus, appropriate schemes must still be 
mappable to how reality presents itself.25 For current purposes, such grounding is 
associated with physical reality in a naturalist sense: one ought to be able to identify 
 
25 ‘Before admitting something as real, one has to say what it is an invariant across. And one 
doesn’t rely on relations to alternative realities to give structure to the world or on intrinsically 
meaningful entities.’ (Barwise & Perry, 1995 p. xli). Here, Barwise and Perry are discussing how 
Dupré’s promiscuous realism which also undergirds situation semantics does not constitute a form 
of Meinongianism. 
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the substrate involved and causal processes responsible under some observatory 
framework instead of appealing to entities and processes in the abstract.26 This 
commitment motivates the approach being taken to characterise theories of meaning 
based on the ways in which they become conceived in relation to available texts, 
and it is partly responsible for the preference to treat cognition as embodied. 
Though, as Dupré (1993, pp. 34–36) observes, classifications serve various 
interests (e.g. profitability, intrigue, appeal). Classifications may be ranked relative 
to such interests, giving them different (practical) legitimacy. Criteria for sameness 
cannot be established without attending to aspects of entities selectively, and inter-
est-laden values determine which aspects are worthwhile in a given context.27,28 For 
instance, one may construct a category inclusive only of dogs and cats. Call it ‘ur-
pets’, consisting of predatory mammals domesticated prior to the Iron Age. This neo-
logism would distinguish between sub-types of domesticated species in a manner 
that highlights people’s historic relationship to dogs and cats. The category of ‘ur-
pets’ not being based on genetic features does not make it less real than taxonomies 
which focus on such aspects of organisms. Different classification schemes may co-
exist as equally valid means of identifying patterns present in reality even when some 
are situationally more useful, making them preferable in the associated contexts. In 
 
26 ‘Minimally, naturalism implies the rejection of appeals to anything supernatural.’ (Giere, 2006, 
p. 11). Giere treats his naturalism as a ‘methodological stance’ in much the same way this work 
considers the presented theoretical baseline a form of scaffolding: it is a way of relating to the 
phenomena under discussion in hopes of achieving a results that prove the attitude helpful instead 
of the approach needing to be justified a priori (Ibid. p. 12). 
27 ‘[T]here is no conception of species that supports the idea that there is any privileged sameness 
relation demarcating the members of a species. Thus the criteria chosen in practice to distinguish 
the members of a species are likely to be chosen in part for anthropocentric reasons such as ease 
of human application.’ (Dupré, 1993, p. 36). For a stronger formulation of the reliance on interests, 
consider the following quote (Ibid. pp. 51–52): ‘The point […] is to make clearer what should be 
the grounds for accepting a taxonomic scheme: not that it is the right one, since there is none 
such; but that it serves some significant purpose better than the available alternatives.’ 
28 For instance, while genotypical criteria such as phylogenetic differentiation have mostly super-
seded phenotypical criteria such as morphological similarity in the biological sciences, there seem 
to be conflicting reasons to prefer different classifications in different contexts. By phylogenetic 
standards, dogs and wolves, for instance, remain part of the same species since interbreeding 
results in fertile hybrids (Gray, 1954). Yet, distinguishing between the two based on morphological 
and behavioural criteria undoubtedly holds value in canine ethology, for instance. 
Introduction  23 
       
 
    
terms of the material identity of ‘words’, for instance, the entities presented by 
Kaplan’s (1990; 2011) stage-continuant model29 of word identity may be accepted as 
one referent for ‘word’ while more intuitive referents would remain distinct senses 
with different domains of application. The shared expression is mostly irrelevant. 
Within this framework, all categorisations being applied – for instance, situ-
ations being inclusive of objects, properties, and so forth – are treated as a form of 
shallow metaphysics of human cognition without any commitment to their more 
fundamental reality.30 Under promiscuous realism, the only pre-conditions for such 
a taxonomy – including typifying heretofore unrecognised constellations of complex 
states of affairs – are the posited entities being grounded to a degree and them 
being humanly conceivable.31 Some taxonomies may be more readily compatible 
with organising principles of experiences such as continuity or closure but this makes 
harder to conceive (but not inconceivable) entities no less acceptable. 
1.3.2 Perspectival Fallibilism 
The term ‘perspectival fallibilism’ is intended to convey the notion that judgements 
on the objectivity of different perspectives are necessarily fallible. Taking cues from 
feminist epistemology (e.g. Bordo, 1987; Longino, 1990; Keller, 1995), this position 
stands in opposition to epistemic objectivism (e.g. Nagel, 1986) with regard to the 
 
29 According to the stage-continuant model, each individual word corresponds to a temporally 
extended, often branching continuity of expressions intended to refer in a particular manner re-
gardless of the forms utterances expressing stages of this continuum take. Thus, the word for 
referring to domesticated felines in a relatively neutral manner would accommodate various me-
dia and variants such as ‘cat’, ‘cate’, or ‘catto’, each of which is present in current online vernacular. 
30 In other words, that discussion is not about what is real, only what is conceivable. This distinction 
between shallow and fundamental metaphysics is inherited from Fine (1982; 2001) and it differen-
tiates the role of analysing the ontologies present in systems of structuring reality (e.g. language, 
cognition) from arguments on the fundamental nature of reality as such. The distinction is not 
explicit in Fine’s writing but Moltmann (2014) identifies in his work on non-existent objects and 
his conceptualisation of realism links to his lectures on shallow and fundamental metaphysics. 
31 ‘One of the assumptions of situation semantics is that human cognitive abilities make natural-
ization routine; […] anything humans systematically use is an invariant across situations so that 
they can step back and objectify it, and so treat it as a thing in its own right. […] Thus, in situation 
theory, anything we use can be objectified and talked about. This applies to situations themselves, 
to relations, operations, conditions, parameters – whatever’ (Barwise, 1988, pp. 179–180). 
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possibility of an ideally objective standpoint being recognisable as such in a non-cir-
cular manner. The ideal of objectivity itself remains worthwhile but success in attain-
ing it cannot at any point be treated as given. In the spirit of epistemic fallibilism 
(e.g. Peirce, 1955; Popper, 2002a; 2002b), evaluations of whether an ideal epistemic 
position has been attained are treated as always being subject to having been made 
from a standpoint which would itself need to be proven objective. Attempting to ob-
jectively certify any such perspective as purely objective may only lead to either an 
infinite regress in search of such guarantees or circular justification. The adopted 
position instead embraces how a degree of uncertainty about its impartiality always 
accompanies any given perspective relative to its specific applications. Objectivity is 
being treated not only as scalar but also as multi-faceted: it cannot universally be 
reduced to singular factors such as impersonality. As Daston and Galison (2007) 
demonstrate, there exist mutually exclusive historical conceptions of objectivity (e.g. 
discerning judgement versus mechanical processing) with different benefits. 
Because of the prevailing discourse on the nature of objectivity tending to 
privilege the notion of objectivity as detachment – so-called aperspectival objectiv-
ity32 – as true objectivity, applying perspectival fallibilism creates a contrast with such 
objectivist attitudes. According to that position, objectivity ought to be identified with 
an idealised perspective entirely purified of subjective or position-based considera-
tions – a God’s eye point of view (Putnam, 1981) or view from nowhere (Nagel, 1986). 
The ideal of impartiality this conception embodies is not questioned here. Only the 
unique privileging of said ideal as the essence of objectivity and the associated, 
exclusionary methodological approach are being contested. For instance, as Bordo 
(1987) and Keller (1995) show, the dichotomies on which the justification for this posi-
tion is founded (e.g. pure intellect versus impure material existence) can be traced 
to the psychological effects of perpetuated socio-historical factors, potentially up 
 
32 The term ‘aperspectival objectivity’ is adopted from Daston (1992, p. 599) who characterises 
this ideal by quoting Nagel’s (1986, p. 5) definition of objectivity: ‘A view or form of thought is 
more objective than another if it relies less on the specifics of the individual’s makeup and position 
in the world, or on the character of the particular type of creature he is’. 
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to and including models of gender hierarchy.33 Such commentary may not disprove 
the opposed position but it does nevertheless reveal ways in which the ideal and its 
associated values are themselves foundationally related to historical contingencies 
instead of being the products of the advocated form of ‘pure’ deliberation. These 
forms of considerations ought to at least give one pause and invite further reflection. 
Within this thesis, the main criticism of claims to aperspectival objectivity concerns 
the available objects of such inquiry. Whenever one assumes a position distanced 
from one’s actual perspective on the world – a precondition for aperspectivity – it 
occurs in relation to a reconstruction (whether modelled mentally or computation-
ally). Since the reconstruction must exceed one’s own, positioned perspective for pur-
poses of greater generality, one always lacks the means to reliably represent reality 
with this extension. Its contents are extrapolated from perspectivally available infor-
mation rather than based directly on the actual states of affairs being modelled. 
That detached depictions depend on reconstructions due to the involved 
physical limitations motivates the analysis of constructed observers, including those 
relative to which the contents of a theory are presented. Such models are inherently 
restricted in the scope of what they may accommodate. This detail calls to attention 
the scope being implemented, especially whenever a theory alleges to apply in an 
absolute sense, accounting for every state of affairs, since the version of the world 
from which justification is derived may never actually be inclusive of all the facts. The 
ideal itself need not being questioned. The criticism only pertains to worldly limita-
tions being bracketed as inconvenient and unavoidable when the details still matter. 
The proposed means of relating to theories’ content ought to in fact help push the 
 
33 Keller (1995, pp. 33–65, 103–112) stresses how scientific understanding is historically characterised 
as mastery – domination over nature – wherein the unaccountability of the experimenter towards 
their subject parallels the unilateral dynamics of paternal hierarchies. Most importantly, the parti-
cular (i.e. data) is treated as secondary to the general (i.e. theory): abstracting and discounting in-
convenient data points as ‘deviations’ is legitimised despite each representing something real. 
Bordo (1987, pp. 60–73), on the other hand, points to the historical connection between perspec-
tivity in the arts and the idealisation of unpositioned representations of visual reality. The contin-
gency of this ideal is put in perspective by her analysis of medieval European art which depicts 
inherently visually unrealistic scenes that nevertheless represent other veridical relations such as 
the continuity between events (as opposed to separation into individual scenes). 
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limits by making the implemented boundaries evident and therefore defining the 
available directions of expansion. While fallibilism concedes that absolute certainty 
is impossible (Peirce, 1955, p. 59), epistemic ideals may regardless be approximated 
ever more closely with the help of continued critical scrutiny. 
1.3.3 Embodied Cognition 
In a sense, the acceptance of embodiment lies at the root of the theoretical frame-
work: both the multiplicity of acceptable ontologies and the inaccessibility of a truly 
detached view on reality as such are in part motivated by this position.34 In generic 
terms, theories of embodied cognition (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Clark, 1997; 2016; 
Varela et al, 2016; Damasio, 2018) claim that the features of the material reality which 
gives rise to cognition ought to be accounted for in explaining cognitive processes. 
Thus, the characteristic operations of different cognisers’ cognitive processing are 
considered continuous with both their anatomy and the environments they inhabit. 
In contrast to how the brain is often conceived as a self-subsistent cognitive appara-
tus (i.e. capable of thinking by itself, given basic sustenance),35 theories of embodied 
cognition would argue that a brain alone does not suffice for supporting cognition. 
Consider, for instance, the form of life enabled by the presence of smart-phones 
and the like – devices which allow largely non-spatially (in terms of user experience) 
 
34 Specifically, the current project relies on the branches of embodied cognition theory which Sha-
piro (2011) dubs (1) the conceptualisation hypothesis (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Sweetser, 1990; 
Varela et al, 2016) and (2) the constitution hypothesis (e.g. Clark, 1997; 2016; Damasio, 2018). 
These approaches to embodied cognition allege that ‘[t]he properties of an organism’s body limit 
or constrain the concepts an organism can acquire’ and that ‘[t]he body or world plays a constitutive 
rather than merely causal role in cognitive processing’ (Shapiro, 2011, p. 4), respectively. The most 
radical version of embodied cognition, the replacement hypothesis (e.g. Van Gelder, 1995; 1998), 
which claims that ‘[a]n organism’s body in interaction with its environment replaces the need for 
representational processes’ (Shapiro, 2011, p. 4), plays no role in this work. 
35 This position is captured by Dennett’s thought experiment in Where am I? (Dennett, 1981, Ch. 
17). In this thought experiment, Dennett initially has his brain removed from his body and con-
nected to it using long range communicators. When the signal is cut as his body is buried during 
an incident, Dennett is left as an unstimulated brain in a vat for a time before a new body is pro-
vided. Dennett assumes that his brain would continue supporting its usual modes of thinking 
even when deprived of both bodily and environmental modulation. An embodied approach, on 
the other hand, would involve at least asking what changes in cognition habituation to this novel 
environment would involve, assuming that such arrangements were able to sustain cognition at all. 
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mediated forms of interconnectivity through two-way interactions – in contrast to 
pre-modern life or even the era of the radio. That information technology appears to 
affect people’s sense of space and time has been recognised and discussed for a 
while now (e.g. Graham, 1998). From the perspective of embodiment, this effect 
would be explained through the experiential link between proximity and associated 
details (immediacy, interactivity, clarity of audio-visual sensations) on the one hand 
and the device as an extension of one’s capacity as a cognising actor on the other 
hand. The design of web interfaces together with the nigh-immediate presence of 
content in the device for browsing condenses the distance between scattered 
servers into a sensation reminiscent in these respects to sharing a space. 
Especially in relation to embodiment, one must keep in mind that the theo-
retical framework under discussion is not intended as a set of premises but as scaf-
folding for the discussion. Because the thesis approaches its subject in relation to the 
effects of cognition, some frame of reference is needed for discussing these pro-
cesses. Theories of embodied cognition have been selected to act as this frame of 
reference because these theories address rather than bracket the connections 
between cognition, ecology, and physiology.36 Unlike alternatives such as the com-
putational theory of mind (e.g. Fodor, 1975; 2008; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 2015),37 em-
bodiment allows sourcing the details of mental content, i.e. answering why a given 
concept would emerge in its specific form.38 When this angle is applied to how theo-
 
36 As Kuhn (2012, p. 18) notes, scientific theories never explain all the facts with which they are 
confronted: ‘To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but 
it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts which it can be confronted.’ The details of 
the current theories of embodied cognition involve notable kinks, as Shapiro (2011) indicates. Yet, 
the aspiration to seriously accommodate the rich evolutionary history of cognisant organisms and 
their symbiotic relationships with their environments is undoubtedly worthwhile. Even if the ef-
fects were ultimately deemed limited, having observed them would enrich the total picture. 
37 In brief, the computational theory of mind is the view that ‘cognitive processes are computa-
tions, which is to say that cognitive processes are operations defined over constituent structures 
of mental representation of the concepts and propositions that they apply to, which they may 
supplement, delete, or otherwise rearrange’ (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 2015, p. 11, emphasis in original). 
38 For instance, Lakoff’s (1987, pp. 339–343) main criticism of what he calls the ‘mind-as-machine 
paradigm’ constituted in part by the mind as an algorithmic processor is how such a position pro-
vides no grounds for a systemic account of why any given representation would have come to 
hold the value it does. In the case of computational theories, claims concerning the origins or 
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ries of meaning become conceived based on specified texts, it helps locate and ex-
plain potential differences in the conceptions of demographics with systematically 
different experiential frameworks that yield different cognitive models. For instance, 
factors such as the degree to which one operates with creoles can in principle deter-
mine whether one understands languages as relatively distinct systems of canonical 
lexicons and grammar or as more opportunistic, improvisational systems under active 
negotiation. Such differences can make the resulting pictures from engaging with a 
theory differently palatable to different people in part because they presumably 
construe the models differently and in part because of the mismatches between the 
structural relations between said hypothetical models and their sense of the real. 
Recognising any such differences allows addressing the relative merits of the variants. 
However, the standing focus on embodiment does not necessarily preclude 
alternatives. The approach’s concern with concept acquisition and the substrates 
which sustain cognition rather than the brute nature of the relevant processes also 
leaves room for computational processes as noted by both Clark (1997, pp. 220–221) 
and Shapiro (2011, pp. 205, 208–210). In principle, it ought to be possible to recon-
struct the approach to modelling what is involved in people conceiving the contents 
of a theory of meaning being proposed under such alternative frameworks. Electing 
to treat cognition as embodied would thus be optional but doing so here helps high-
light ecological effects on people’s conceptions without adapting the alternatives. 
While an in-depth understanding of the involved theories is not necessary 
for understanding their applications in the context of this thesis, the central theore-
tical apparatus being applied is introduced here, starting with the conceptualisation 
approach39 and then touching on the constitution hypothesis. According to the con-
 
contents of representations belong in supplemental but associated theories such as radical con-
cept nativism (Fodor, 1975; 1981, Ch. 10) according to which all (proto-)concepts are innate. 
39 Much of the work under discussion belongs in cognitive linguistics which risks begging the ques-
tion despite how the thesis itself is intended to largely remain neutral towards the different theories 
of meaning to which the proposed methods can be applied. However, while the authors in question 
do attempt to reduce semantic phenomena to the cognitive apparatuses they propose, the claims 
about human cognition are not essentially theories of meaning. Even if these structures were 
integral to individuals’ understanding of linguistic items, this would not need to entail them being 
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ceptualisation approach to embodiment which features prominently across this work, 
people’s conceptual frameworks mirror their embodied existence as extended and 
oriented actors who experience both their internal states and external circumstances 
in idiosyncratic ways determined by their constitution. As a result, understanding 
tends to be based on models which reflect experience-based connections. Their 
contents include frames (Fillmore, 1976; 1982)40 and conceptual metaphors (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987)41 which parallel experienced relations 
between manifest entities. In the case of frames, individual elements of familiar sce-
narios contextualise one another and substantiating the associated concepts requires 
invoking prototypical42 representations of scenarios. Conceptual metaphors, on the 
other hand, involve parallels between multiple such domains wherein relationships 
familiar in one are used to structure the other. In general, more concrete, more 
directly experienced phenomena are applied in this manner to make sense of more 
abstract phenomena. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980, pp. 56–58), the ground-
ing of one such system over alternatives ultimately comes from what a certain form 
 
definitive of the nature of meaning. After all, meanings need not be equated with such personal 
conceptions. It would remain coherent to accept cognitive linguists’ claims concerning the nature 
of cognition without advocating the associated theories of meaning. One might, for instance, still 
define meaning without reference to individual psychology or by only accommodating a privi-
leged subset such as ‘the experts’ (Putnam, 1975) who fit further criteria. While the risk of alienating 
proponents of other cognitively oriented linguistic approaches remains, the incompatibility of the 
proposed approach with these approaches’ principles would need to be established independently. 
Embodiment remains scaffolding for framing cognition. The results are (largely) selfstanding. 
40 ‘By the term ”frame” I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to under-
stand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of 
the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are 
automatically made available.’ (Fillmore, 1982, p. 111). The notion of being a buyer, for instance, 
can only be understood relative to the frame of transactions which includes codefined concepts 
such as ‘seller’, ‘trade’, ‘relative value’, and so forth. 
41 ‘The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of an-
other.’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 5, emphasis removed). Conceptual metaphors express this no-
tion at the level of the conceptual system: notions in the target domain are defined (in part) by 
the conceptual structure superimposed from the source domain, and a given domain may be linked 
to multiple sources in this manner. As an example, consider how assessing abstract entities such 
as ideas relies on importing familiar experiences (e.g. taste) such as when an idea is ‘unpalatable’. 
42 People need not have distinct prototypes in mind for such prototype effects where the degree 
of similarity with ‘the clearest cases, best examples’ (Rosch, 1975, p. 193) based on available experi-
ences determines experienced fit with associated categories (Lakoff, 1987, pp. 43–45). 
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of embodied existence entails in terms of available orientations, experiences, and the 
like.43 Because the environments of individuals factor in their experiences, the specific 
cultures which emerge in part based on the levels of emphasis granted to different 
available basic associations in distinct conditions also factor in the results in an insep-
arable manner. One example are the various ways in which ‘common’ is synonymous 
with or etymologically related to ‘lowly’ in English (‘vulgar’, ‘banal’, etc.). 
Consider, for instance, the relations between the elements of ‘a game’: you 
have players, the roles of winner and loser, relatively distinct and largely sequential 
moves, abstract resources, and so forth, with some variations depending on the type 
of game being exemplified (e.g. team-based sports vs. boardgames). For the most 
part, the significance of such participating elements is co-defined with minimal re-
ference to anything outside the corresponding frame they constitute together. A 
winner is whoever clears a game’s internal victory condition, defining which is part 
of the role of the rules, and a loser is (generally) whoever is not a winner. While few 
situations are as self-contained as games, a degree of such interdependence is not 
rare, either (e.g. transactions, families, or organisation of biomes). In contrast to such 
self-containment which defines frames, conceptual metaphors connect otherwise 
distinct domains sharing experientially similar aspects by mapping partial frames 
and smaller associations between them from one domain to another. Thus, for in-
stance, notions as they are expressed in the context of games such as what defines 
a winner appear to be used to structure people’s understanding of economic actors 
rather frequently. This form of imposition of relations where one domain becomes 
characterised in terms of another constitutes a conceptual metaphor, and such con-
nections tend to only focus on specific aspects at a time. Economies are not like 
games in many important respects, and while time can be treated as analogous to 
space in some respects, it is unlike space in others (e.g. directions of travel). 
 
43 ‘Human spatial concepts, however, include UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, IN-OUT, NEAR-FAR, etc. It is 
these that are relevant to our continual everyday bodily functioning, and this gives them priority 
over other possible structurings of space – for us. In other words, the structure of our spatial con-
cepts emerges from our constant spatial experience, that is, our interaction with the physical 
environment.’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 56–57) 
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These kinds of connections give rise to networks of internally structured and 
externally connected mental models which are generally known as mental spaces 
(Fauconnier, 1985; 1997). In a sense, a mental space constitutes a mentalised minimal 
context which gets constructed to track the identity of recognised entities and rela-
tions between them.44 Some are semi-permanent while others only track situation-
ally relevant relations such as the identities of mentioned entities. Mental spaces 
only represent the relation-based structures being expressed by various media (dis-
course, images, etc.) instead of needing to fully simulate such situations. However, 
visualising these cognitive constructs as either such simulated spaces or diagrams 
may assist the reader in approaching posited contents. Internally, mental spaces are 
structured based on available frames and other (idealised) cognitive models (e.g. in-
dividual prototypical representations of categories), while externally, they are linked 
by so-called connectors (Fauconnier, 1997, p. 39). A basic source of connectors is the 
Identification (ID) Principle (Nunberg, 1979, pp. 168–169; Fauconnier, 1985, pp. 3–5)45 
which can be used to, for instance, bridge identity between two descriptions of the 
same individual in different contexts. For instance, stating that Clark Kent is Superman 
connects the identity of one’s representation of a certain journalist in one mental 
space with one’s representation of a specific hero in another. Thenceforth, one would 
be able to infer that Superman works at Daily Planet based on the connection estab-
lished between the relatively independent representations one has of the news scene 
in Metropolis and Justice League, respectively. Similarly, one might draw connections 
between one’s representations of various fictional settings and the professional act-
ing scene based on who plays which character in different adaptations. For current 
purposes, it suffices to consider mental spaces the interconnected representations 
of such distinct domains ranging from the situational to one’s overall sense of what 
is real, individually constituted by lower order idealised cognitive models like frames. 
 
44 ‘[…] [M]eanings assigned to sentences in isolation […] are obtained in reality by building local, 
maximally simple contexts in which the sentences can operate’ (Fauconnier, 1985, p. xxi). 
45 ‘If two objects (in the most general sense), a and b, are linked by a pragmatic function F (b = 
F(a)), a description of a, da ,  may be used to identify its counterpart b.’ (Fauconnier, 1985, p. 3, em-
phasis in original). 
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While basic mental spaces are derived straightforwardly from experience 
or descriptions, among them are blended spaces (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002)46 which 
are generated when the connections between a set of mental spaces are integrated 
inside a novel space which incorporates aspects of the corresponding models.47 
Independently of individual combination principles, the overarching guideline is that 
blending occurs to enable applying relations internal to mental spaces to entities 
drawn from otherwise distinct contexts in a manner which compresses the total to 
be reducible to familiar cognitive models.48 Thus, typical instances come to repre-
sent types and cosmological scales are reduced to relative distances between con-
ceivably co-inhabiting entities of non-representative tiers of size (e.g. planets being 
large enough to remain identifiable relative to the sun and no planet being imag-
ined as having more than thrice the diametre of the Earth). 
To provide an example of the associated dynamics, consider the image 
known as ‘The March of Progress’: a line of great apes from left to right with gradually 
straightening posture and reduced hair, some of which to the right hold primitive 
tools. The image is intended to depict human evolution, and one can ask what details 
explain its success in this task according to the presented theories. The foundation 
appears to consist of various idealised cognitive models based on the metaphorical 
transfer of embodied qualities: line of sight correlating with direction, uprightness 
and upwardness with betterment, and so forth. As the image’s title states, it depicts 
progress, and these details provide a basis for that through the forms of change they 
imply through gradual, unidirectional shifts. In contrast, everyone could have been 
kept sitting level with the rest to further emphasise greater continuity between them 
 
46 ‘There is a fourth mental space, the blended space, that we will often call “the blend”’ (Faucon-
nier & Turner, 2002, p. 41). 
47 ‘In blending, structure from two input mental spaces is projected to a new space, the blend.’ 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 47). While individual acts of blending only apply to dyads of men-
tal spaces, complex blends can be achieved through a sequence of such simple blends. 
48 ‘[T]he governing principles are driven by one overarching goal: Achieve Human Scale. Human 
beings are evolved and culturally supported to deal with reality at human scale – that is, through 
direct action and perception inside familiar frames, typically involving few participants and direct 
intentionality.’ (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 322) 
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instead.49 Direction also matters since in the culture of origin, the future is depicted 
as ahead, unfolding before one’s eyes (‘foreseeable future’).50 These details define 
the relations within the mental space associated with the image itself – the connec-
tions between the discrete simians being depicted. For said image to be experienced 
as representing its intended subject – human evolution – though, the depicted rela-
tions must be blended with those present in one’s understanding of people’s evo-
lutionary history.51 At a conceptual level, one might understand said process to in-
volve an indefinite number of gradually changing and continually branching gener-
ations. However, being able to conceive observable changes requires compressing 
this indistinct cascade of ant lines into a few clearly distinct, successive phases. The 
picture maps onto such an understanding by providing a specific expression for such 
a schematic understanding. Thus, while the conga line does not inherently represent 
the intergenerational succession involved in (human) evolution according to this ex-
planation, it being designed to elicit such associations helps reliably engender this 
understanding given an audience informed on the basics of human evolution. The 
image and the audience taken together afford a relatively invariant core significance 
to be derived through the construction of corresponding mental spaces which share 
their basic structure due to mutual experiences specific to human bodies and con-
temporary physical and cultural environments. 
The significance of the above to this work lies in the acceptance of human 
limitations engendered by material realities such as the limits of neural processing, 
the effects of ecological contingencies related to position, and reliance on prece-
 
49 As a further example, consider how mainly conservative propaganda even shows the modern 
person hunching back over to represent their supposed degeneracy (bad posture from computers, 
‘regressing’ to a pig from obesity). A more humanist or technocratic variation might instead con-
tinue the line by depicting technology as enabling one to soar off the ground or by having people 
stepping on a stairway of the books the author considers most definitive of humanity’s progress. 
50 For contrast, consider Paul Klee’s 1910 painting Angelus Novus which Benjamin (2005, Thesis IX) 
interprets as progress blowing the angel towards an unforeseen future as it faces towards the past. 
51 Please note that it is assumed the image itself is not already entrenched in said understanding. 
Its ubiquity as part of biology curriculums and pop science makes it almost inseparable from peo-
ple’s standing understanding of the subject, showing how culture moulds the environment within 
which later learning of associations occurs. 
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dent for models of reality. Many such details are themselves indubitable – such as 
that people can at most conceive infinity in the abstract given the finite resources 
available to them – which motivates taking their likely effects seriously, as this thesis 
attempts to do in relation to elaborating the understanding of people’s relation to 
theories of meaning and the implications concerning the nature of the latter. The 
results of attempts to conceive the contents of a theory of meaning are treated as 
a mental space constructed using the provided prompts. The details of such spaces 
rely on the available cognitive material which is being considered inclusive of proto-
type effects, frames, and metaphorical transfer to emphasise the role of embodied 
factors and to have some framework as scaffolding. Since theories seek to describe 
the real to some extent, blending is involved at least in the act of attempting to meld 
what a theory posits with one’s sense of the real. 
The conceptualisation hypothesis discussed above is complemented by the 
constitution hypothesis according to which non-neural bodily and environmental 
structures are involved in the very realisation of cognitive processes (e.g. Clark, 1997; 
Damasio, 2018).52 In the present context, this is largely a matter of framing instead of 
being treated as a substantial claim. Mere access to theoretical literature differs from 
neurally implemented memory traces of its content, for instance, yet treating the texts 
available to a person as an extension of their cognitive capacity can also help appreci-
ate that relationship. The current project considers how a person may be attributed 
a certain understanding of a theory of meaning (or any other conceptual construct) 
even when they are only able to retrieve (parts of) it when actively engaged with the 
material rather than based solely on their neural states. Should this form of assisted 
recall consolidate into a relatively stable conception of what the theory entails when-
ever the person is prompted to reconstruct what the texts describe, the results can 
 
52 ‘[T]he basic form of individual reason (fast pattern completion in multiple neural systems) is 
common throughout nature, and […] where we human beings really score is in our amazing capac-
ities to create and maintain a variety of special external structures (symbolic and socio-institutional). 
These external structures function so as to complement our individual cognitive profiles and to 
diffuse human reason across wider and wider social and physical networks whose collective com-
putations exhibit their own special dynamics and properties.’ (Clark, 1997, p. 179) 
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be of independent interest compared to what the person retains in absence of active 
access to the texts. The significance of such results lies in understanding the concep-
tions associated with interpreting the relevant set of texts based on one’s existing 
cognitive architecture without accounting for the distortions invited by the fallibility 
of memory.53 The results filtered through memory processes, on the other hand, are 
of interest in helping understand the effects of memory and resulting long term 
understanding. Recording the immediate conceptions even provides a baseline for 
tracking the changes involved in remembrance. 
The above example of this dynamic demonstrates the sense in which an 
environmental factor relative to the individual may be granted a constitutive role in 
describing their cognitive state: in the absence of said factor, the results would be 
expected to differ. When an individual can intentionally reproduce this cognitive state 
by engaging with the material to which they have reliable access, the conditions 
enabling this extension of their cognitive arsenal are functionally little different from 
recall-enabling internal conditions. This form of interaction-reliant existence is best 
characterised through the Gibsonian notion of affordances.54 Clark (1997, p. 172) de-
fines affordances as follows: ‘An affordance is an opportunity for use or interaction 
which some object or state of affairs presents to a certain kind of agent.’ In other 
words, different objects (or other objectified entities) may be analysed in part in terms 
of the actionable qualities they may only actualise in the presence of suitable agents. 
As Sanders (1997, p. 97) notes, an affordance’s reliance on both the features of the 
object and the agent makes treating affordances as the features of such combina-
tions rather than either constituent of the dyad useful, as they can for instance be 
used to analyse emergent systems.55 Specifically, affordances are specified based on 
 
53 For an overview of the various flaws of human memory such as suggestibility and bias, consider 
Schacter (2001). Many can be explained by treating recall itself as another form of guided recon-
struction based on available cues and influences. 
54 ‘The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, 
either for good or for ill.’ (Gibson, 1979, p. 127). However, the sense in which the term is being 
used focuses on this co-reliant core dynamic and eschews reference to animals. 
55 ‘Emergent phenomena, on this account, are thus any phenomena whose roots involve uncontrol-
lable variables […] and are thus the products of collective activity rather than of single components 
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the conditions for specific interactions to occur relative to the qualities of each in-
volved entity, making them attributable to neither in isolation. For instance, for a stick 
or stone to be graspable, certain kinds of appendices or other capacity to envelop 
must also be present. However, in the context of this work, both how theories of 
meaning become conceived and the extraction of details concerning available 
instantiators and potential scope of theories are given an affordance-based treat-
ment like this. 
The constitution hypothesis, then, provides the thesis with a framework for 
characterising the aspect of theories of meaning towards which it directs attention: 
the systematic relations between specified sets of texts and sets of factors affecting 
the resulting conceptions, especially those typifying demographics of interest. The 
conceptions of interest need not be what a person retains overall. Instead, the total 
picture can be constructed in a manner inclusive of the features of both the texts and 
the conceiving individuals which define the resulting mental space constructs and 
only the features involved in active engagement. How such conceptions tend to be 
retained and reconsolidated provides a further avenue of inspection distinct from 
how what theories of meaning present directly becomes cognised and the refinement 
of such conceptions. Focusing on these active pairs of text and specified audience 
allows observing what is realised directly based on what the text presents. The results 
can then be exported and generalised by considering the contributions of the texts 
in question relative to the specific influences based on which the details of the result-
ing conceptions are satisfyingly explained. The results consist of descriptions of the 
affordances a text embodies in relation to specific influences which systematically 
affect the resulting conceptions. 
 
or dedicated control systems.’ (Clark, 1997, p. 110). Variables in the intended sense are uncontrol-
lable when they ‘track behaviors or properties that arise from the interaction of multiple parameters 
and hence tend to resist direct and simple manipulation’ (Ibid.). Thus, how theories of meaning 
are conceived would qualify as an emergent phenomenon since while the designated corpuses 
remain invariant for purposes of such analyses, while the sets of influences guiding the construc-
tion of the corresponding mental spaces provide the uncontrollable (but not entirely intractable) 
component relative to which the affordances associated with the texts can be analysed. 
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At the root of the current approach lies the notion of attributed situations – sets of 
circumstances defined relative to a designated central entity. The associated schema 
and formal model of it are later adapted as a framing device to represent aspects of 
the conceptual structure involved in conceiving the contents of theories of meaning. 
This chapter specifies the elements of the schematic model of such situations. Since 
the model is also intended to be generalised beyond the conventional cases and this 
development risks inviting trouble conceiving such situations, a part of the chapter 
is dedicated to addressing this issue with inability to conceive certain situations. 
The general model of situations adapted from situation semantics treats situations 
as sets of (1) objects, (2) properties, (3) relations, (4) partial states of affairs, and (5) 
spatiotemporal coordinates. Different types of situations involve different selection 
principles for specifying such constituents. The constituents of attributed situations 
must be related to the designated central entity dubbed the situation’s ‘core entity’ 
in a manner accessible to the observer relative to whose perspective the situation is 
attributed. Any viable constituent of a situation may in principle be designated as a 
core entity and a corresponding situation attributed to it. 
In practice, however, situations attributed to some viable recipients can be hard to 
conceive. Explanations of imaginative resistance provide potential solutions to such 
issues. Insufficient contextualisation and rigid realism need to both be addressed as 
a result since otherwise, such hardships risk recurring throughout this work. 
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2.1 Attributed Situations 
This section provides a formal, set-theoretic model of the type of situation being 
dubbed ‘attributed situation’. Such situations include those denoted by expressions 
such as ‘my situation’, ‘your situation’, or ‘the situation of the UK’. This model grounds 
the eventual template for reconstructing how theories of meaning become con-
ceived based on how their corpuses present them. While the notion of attributed 
situations is treated as already present in how people think, the model is not intended 
to directly represent the structure of any corresponding cognitive unit. Rather, the 
provided definitions formalise how the relevant situations’ constituents could be 
identified based on the features of the observed notion. The section first briefly dis-
cusses the nature of situations in general before specifying the selection principle 
characteristic of attributed situations and the role of observation relative to that 
principle and the resulting situations. 
2.1.1 Situations and Selection Principles 
When people refer to situations, they seem to be referring to various bounded 
totalities of states of affairs which are designated using different criteria. Such men-
tions are often specified using spatiotemporal coordinates, e.g. ‘the situation in Rus-
sia’ or ‘the situation yesterday’. If such mentions designate states of affairs, situations 
would seem to be constituted by whichever kinds of entities comprise those. Ac-
cording to situation semantics, such states of affairs include (1) objects, (2) proper-
ties,1 (3) relations, and (4) space-time locations.2 Since it seems to respect the relevant 
folk metaphysics, this taxonomy is accepted in the current context with some quali-
fiers. Firstly, complex states of affairs are also included as a distinct type of proper 
constituent.3 Since these states of affairs remain limited to configurations of the 
 
1 Although, Barwise and Perry consider properties a special case of relations: ‘The 1-ary relations 
are called properties […]’ (Barwise & Perry, 1999, p. 50; emphasis in original). 
2 ‘[…] we think of real situations as basic, with objects, properties, relations, and space-time loca-
tions arising as uniformities across them.’ (Barwise & Perry, 1999, p. 50). 
3 This view is not alien to situation semantics, either: ‘We will call the members of SOA states of 
affairs […]. Situations, the members of SIT, are sets (not classes) of these.’ (Barwise & Etchemendy, 
1987, p. 75; emphasis in original). 
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other constituents, including them does not affect what a situation encompasses. The 
inclusion is therefore benign, and it helps with later developments which involve spec-
ifying arbitrary entities. Secondly, each type of constituent is implicitly linked to how 
such entities are conceived instead of the taxonomy being committed to the 
existence of objects and such as substantial metaphysical classifications in the world. 
Such fundamental metaphysics are not the focus here and the approach remains 
agnostic on them. 
The other feature inherited from situation semantics is expressing the con-
stituents of situations using sets. The formal definition of attributed situations is pro-
vided in this chapter and further substantiated in the next. Definition 1 treats situations 
as the set of the total elements of five sub-sets. Each of those five sets corresponds 
to a type of constituent and contains the selection which the situation in question 
encompasses. Objects and locations ground the sets of properties and relations 
since at least some of each must incorporate some object or location. Definition 1 
also permits properties and relations which apply to other properties and relations. 
Both properties and relations are expressed using ordered sets4 that incorporate 
involved particulars. Because any included properties and relations thus provide the 
structure of continuous states of affairs, partial states of affairs are simplified to 
unordered sets of the situations’ constituents. As such elements include the involved 
objects, no arbitrary states of affairs may contain discorporate relations and pro-
perties. Pairs of times and locations denote spatiotemporal coordinates. 
Definition 1, Constituents of Situations (General):5 
Sx = {O, P, R, A, C} 
E = (O∪P∪R∪A∪C) = {e1, e2, … en│n≥0}
6 
 
4 These ordered sets are denoted using angled/chevron brackets. 
5 The values of variables (m, n, q, x, y, z) are non-negative integers, where zero denotes the empty set 
∅. Variables m, n and q denote the number of variations and variables x, y, and z arbitrary variants. 
Superscripts identify a related type of set and subscripts specific variants of elements or subsets. 
6 The only role of set E is to assign a symbol to constituents from any of the sets. 
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O = {o1, o2,… on│n≥0} 
P = {〈p1, e1〉, 〈p2, e1〉, … 〈pm, en〉│m≥0, n≥0, {e1, e2, … en}∩O} 








x= 〈e1, e2, … en│n≥2〉, 












x = {e1, e2, … en│n≥2}} 
C = {(l1, t1), (l1, t2), … (lm, tn)│m≥0, n≥0} 
Explanation of Definition 1: 
Sx: specified situation 
E: set of elements in the situation 
 ex: element of a situation 
O: set of objects in the situation 
 ox: instantiated object 
P: set of properties 
 px: type of property 
 〈px, ey〉: px is instantiated by ey 
R: set of relations 
 rx: type of relation 
 〈rx, E
*
y〉: rx is instantiated by the elements of E
*
y 
A: set of partial states of affairs 
C: set of spatiotemporal coordinates 
 lx: specific location 
 tx: specific time 
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The rules definition 1 contains are that (1) the sets of entities instantiating properties 
or relations must include some which are conceived as objects,7 (2) no unary rela-
tions are included though entities may stand in relation to themselves, and (3) no 
partial state of affairs is constituted by a singular element. The listed conditions for 
set membership express these rules. In effect, the first and third rule express that 
properties and relations are subservient to entities being conceived as objects: they 
may only be involved when such entities are present. Bare properties and relations 
may only be involved when they are being conceived as objects.8 
2.1.2 Attributed Situations 
Because definition 1 represents situations in general, attributed situations adhere to 
the rules the definition presents. Yet, definition 1 is insufficient to specifically capture 
how the constituents of attributed situations would be identified. For this task, addi-
tional conditions are needed. Definition 1.1 develops on this baseline by 
incorporating the principle which distinguishes attributed situations from other 
situation types such as those linked to named locations (e.g. ‘The situation in Lon-
don.). The situatedness of the entities to which the relevant situations are attributed 
is expressed as each constituent partaking in some relation which involves the des-
ignated core entity to which the situation is being attributed.9 These relations need 
 
7 The notation expressing this rule for relations relies on n-tuples 〈a1, a2, … an〉 being identical with 
n-1 nested pairs of the form 〈a1, 〈a2, …〈an-1, an〉〉〉. Each such nested pair is a set where 〈an-1, an〉 
corresponds to {{an-1}, {an-1, an}} (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1987, p. 42). 
8 How such reconceptualisations occur is discussed in section 2.2. However, the foundation is ex-
pressed by Barwise (1988, p. 179) in relation to situation semantics as follows: ‘[H]uman cognitive 
abilities make naturalization routine; everything is, or can easily become, upon reflection, a first 
class citizen. That is, anything humans systematically use is an invariant across situations so that 
they can step back and objectify it, and so treat it as a thing in its own right.’ In other words, peo-
ple seem able to treat anything they observe as a thing in its own right – a kind of object. In En-
glish, this process is exemplified by expressions which use nouns to denote particular non-objects, 
e.g. ‘their self-identity relation’ rather than ‘them being self-identical’. 
9 This condition by itself is vacuous because there exist omni-applicable relations which relate 
anything to everything. For example, degree of similarity can be used to relate any two things. 
This problem is addressed in section 2.1.4 but the short answer is that the further condition that 
the included relations be observed appears necessary to restrict the types of relations and the 
spatial extension of the designated location. Additionally, even if these relations would make each 
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not be direct – an entity’s situation might well encompass factors which only bear 
on its conditions indirectly such as a person’s spouse’s parents’ broken coffeemaker 
having made the in-laws irritable during the couple’s visit. The designated core entity 
need not have access to the presence of the relevant relations, either. From the out-
side, the complex relation between the broken coffeemaker and the resulting argu-
ment may well be included in the situation of the designated person without them 
ever becoming aware of the coffeemaker’s contribution to their circumstances. 
Chapter 3 discusses the effects of access and different perspectives in more detail 
when the definition for attributed situations is finalised. For current purposes, the 
general model for attributed situations is formalised as follows: 
Definition 1.1, Constituents of Situations (Attributed): 
Assume Definition 1, amend set E as follows: 






Ec = {e1, e2, … en│ n≥1, ex∈〈p
c, ey〉} 
Explanation of Definition 1.1: 
Assume Explanation of Definition 1, with the following inclusions: 
Ec: set of constituents of the core entity 
pc: the property of having been designated as a core entity 
Definition 1.1 mainly acts to introduce (1) set Ec which is a subset of E and covers the 
entities to which the situation is being attributed and (2) property pc which defines 
members of Ec. As per the definition, set Ec may never be empty as the presence of 
some core entity is necessary for deriving an attributed situation. Because there is 
no general criterion for being designated, the property of having been designated 
is treated as given, and each member of Ec has this property by definition. Although 
the members of Ec are collectively referred to as ‘the core entity’, the set may contain 
 
attributed situation all-encompassing, the reason said situations would encompass all entities in 
existence would be specific to them, given the definition which would be responsible. 
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multiple elements. Expressing the identity of the core entity as a set mainly acts to 
showcase how other entities relating to its parts suffices for them to become (poten-
tial) constituents of its situation. In some cases, the principle is less than intuitive. If 
a concert is in part constituted by the members of its audience, then the relationship 
between a member of audience and an obstacle which corresponds to them stub-
bing their toe would contribute to the concert’s situation alongside its media cover-
age and performers’ availability. Once the role of observers is included in chapter 
3, the answer becomes that while such facts remain potential constituents, they can 
(and often will) be subsumed by the wider picture available to perspectives required 
to view a concert as a core entity using the principles presented this chapter. 
2.1.3 Core Entities 
In the current context, the entity to which a situation is attributed is called its core 
entity. In definition 1.1, the core entity is represented by set Ec. The core entity acts 
as the centre of the corresponding situations, relative to which the contents of the 
situation are defined. In this respect, it resembles the designated centre of a cen-
tred possible world (Quine, 1969; Lewis, 1979b), especially based on Lewis’s criterion 
that the centre be a designated entity.10 You are the core entity of any situation 
attributed to you, for instance. When this model of attributed situations is later trans-
lated to a template for framing the contents of theories of meaning, the core entity’s 
position is inhabited by the so-called instantiator – whichever kind of entity the 
theory requires as the material expression for the form of meaning it posits.11 While 
 
10 ‘[W]e might redefine centered possible worlds as pairs of a world and a designated inhabitant 
thereof.’ (Lewis, 1979b, p. 147). 
11 Specifically, chapter 5 differentiates between a ‘manifest instantiator’ and a ‘full instantiator’ 
wherein the former designates the intuitive referent of whichever term is used for the entity to 
which meaning is being attributed (e.g. sentence). The full instantiator, in contrast, is defined rela-
tive to the internal requirements of whichever theory is being analysed, as expressed by this allu-
sion. For instance, the unarticulated constituents posited within truth-conditional pragmatics (e.g. 
Perry, 1998; Recanati, 2002) – parts of statements which correspond to nothing in their linguistic 
expression – might require extending the material identity of the instantiator proper. As a result, the 
corresponding full instantiator would be inclusive of corresponding circumstances such as neural 
correlates of the utterer’s beliefs about the time of utterance or even external factors such as a 
demonstrative gesture, its target, and the relationship established between the two. 
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situations are generally attributed to people, nothing prevents attributing them to 
arbitrarily designated entities within the metaphysical framework relative to which 
situations are being defined (properties, states of affairs, etc.). That conceiving the 
corresponding situations successfully requires comparably more effort is to be ex-
pected. However, every person is treated as able to potentially identify at least some 
elements which would sensibly be included in such situations unless they refuse to 
seriously attempt the task. While the nature of core entities is therefore largely 
uninteresting – they are simply designated – addressing the task of attributing 
situations to arbitrary entities allows this section to ground understanding the 
possibility of non-manifest instantiators. An entity which provides the worldly 
instantiation for a posited meaning is considered non-manifest when its boundaries 
do not respect the usual structure of human experience. An example would be the 
pair of an utterance and a set of other entities acting as context. A positive account 
explaining the criteria for an entity becoming treated as a viable core entity can be 
provided.12 However, this chapter merely includes a response to potential issues peo-
ple may encounter in attempting to conceive arbitrary entities in this role. Section 
2.2 discusses the possible involvement of imaginative resistance (e.g. Szabó Gendler, 
2000; Stock, 2005; Todd, 2009) and how it could be overcome in this context. 
 
12 An earlier draft did exactly that. In summary, attributing situations appears to rely on the ability 
to project onto an entity a sense of situatedness akin to one’s own awareness of relative personal 
position. The main components of said experience include (1) local presence and (2) intentionality 
as the sense of being situated seems linked to being positioned amidst interest-laden entities. 
Thus, attributing a situation would involve the intentional stance (Dennett, 1971; 1983; 1987) being 
applied to reconceptualise the target’s observable or imaginable behaviour as goal-oriented 
(Dennett, 1971, p. 90). The experience of visual fields acting as containers based on the boundaries 
of visual experience (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 30) is also likely involved in bounding such situ-
ations. In the absence of any tangible presence, visualisations using other conceptual metaphors 
would be needed for locating the relevant entity (e.g. a relation) within such a bounded field. The 
act of conceiving would then be constituted by a blended space (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) 
wherein a mental space which includes the designated core entity and its observable surroundings 
is enriched with this overlay of projected intentional states (interests, etc.) and figurative framing. 
As a result, given access to applicable cognitive models, one may denote elements which would 
constitute, for instance, the situation of a one-sided relation of intimate attraction: such attraction 
has conditions for ceasing based on available circumstances, or it may evolve into either resent-
ment or mutual interest under other conditions, and it lies ‘between’ the involved parties as a vector 
arrow from one to the other. 
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2.1.4 Observing Situations 
Finally, the referents of any mention of a situation are treated as being dependent 
on specific observers. In effect, the selection of entities which becomes included in 
such a situation depends largely on someone or something applying the described 
selection principle to the entities they recognise. The notion is hardly unique, given 
how scenes constitute the prototypical real situation within situation semantics.13 
That some such organising principle is required follows from one general considera-
tion and one specific to attributed situations, assuming the validity of the model 
presented above. Firstly, the manner in which situations are treated includes a level 
of arbitrariness: 14 despite the definiteness of an expression like ‘the situation in 
London’, not all entities in London appear to usually be designated. The resulting 
selection may be context-sensitive in various ways, of course, but such contextual 
guidance appears mainly linked to attention, specifically. Some entities’ presence is 
more salient or pertinent than that of others. Thus, their inclusion appears to depend 
on whether they are recognised when the appropriate selection principle is applied. 
Attributed situations in particular require this limiter because there are omni-appli-
cable relations which would make each such situation all-inclusive in the absence 
of a further selection principle. One such relation is degree of similarity: all entities 
resemble one another in some respects.15 Similarity being a vacuous relation because 
 
13 ‘Any part of the way the world M happens to be I call a situation in M. Scenes are visually per-
ceived situations.’ (Barwise, 1981, p. 27, emphasis in original). While situation semantics mainly 
analyses the abstract situations which represent such scenes, they are considered primary relative 
to meaning: ‘Meaning’s natural home is the world, for meaning arises out of the regular relations 
that hold among situations – bits of reality.’ (Barwise & Perry, 1999, p. 16) 
14 The sense in which the term ‘arbitrary’ is being used expresses how a given situation’s constituents 
appear to only accidentally adhere to more systematic principles of grouping. In other words, no 
singular principle such as any Gestalt grouping principle such as proximity, similarity, continuity, 
and so on (Wagemans et al, 2012, pp. 1180–1188) appears to suffice to explain the full extent of 
what attributed situations are conceived to cover although they can certainly contribute. 
15 The way in which degree of similarity relates any arbitrary set of entities can be elucidated using 
Dennett’s notion of Design Space (Dennett, 1995, pp. 104–145; 2013, pp. 225–231): ‘the multidi-
mensional space of all possible designs, not just the actual […] but – like the books in the Library 
of Babel – all never-evolved, never-constructed designs’ (Dennett, 2013, p. 225; emphasis in 
original). Thinking of structure as describable by a potentially limitless number of sliding scales 
enables drawing pathways between any two points in this space of possibilities. Adjustments 
along these dimensions act like vectors and the shortest route from one design to another can 
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it applies to each element of any set is also a stance shared by both Searle and 
Davidson who express it in relation to their respective criticism of the view that 
metaphors are abbreviated similes: ‘Similarity is a vacuous predicate: any two things 
are similar in some respect or other.’ (Searle, 1977, p. 96) and ‘[…] everything is like 
everything, and in endless ways.’ (Davidson, 1978, p. 254). 
The need for some further selection principle to explain the non-compre-
hensive inclusion of applicable entities does not itself obviously entail that the role 
should be reserved to observers. Demonstrating such observer-relativity relies on 
abductive reasoning in favour of such a characterisation. Two main reasons exist for 
the observer-relativity: the need for a relative principle, and the fit between situations 
and observed scenes. Consider the conceivable variation in terms of inclusivity 
among (attributed) situations. One may draw a connection between a core entity 
and vastly removed entities such as when a supernova from before life on Earth is 
going to be recorded by someone’s childhood rival, prompting an existential crisis 
that will doom all they hold dear. The same principles as this case are involved in 
many everyday situations, and if some such cases are considered acceptable, all in-
volving the same principles ought to qualify.16 Relative distance, whether in terms 
of position, time, or degrees of separation, may only matter if the limit is principled, 
and only a relative principle seems reasonable in the face of the available variation. 
One ought to then question why people even experience there being situa-
tions, given how they are merely sets of circumstances. Barwise (1981, p. 26) points 
to (visual) experience: ‘When I look around I cannot see a single thing-in-itself, some 
sort of ideal physical object stripped of its properties and its relations with other ob-
jects. What I do see is a scene, a complex of objects having properties and bearing 
relations to one another.’ Such experience is unified in the form of a distinct scene 
 
be identified as the degree of (dis)similarity between them. Perfect dissimilarity would exist be-
tween any two things which did not share any such dimensions. 
16 Critics might point to the use of future-oriented projection, inaccessibility to the target, and in-
direct relations. However, a football about to smash through your television screen in your absence 
involves all three and treating its presence as a part of your overall situation should be inoffensive. 
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but also granular rather than continuous in terms of the constituents. The source of 
experience unity likely involves the sense of containment involved in visual experi-
ence based on how vision as an embodied activity involves access bounded by eye 
orientation and related features. Even in the absence of these human features, sight 
as an embodied activity would necessarily involve limited range because of disper-
sion. This forms the basis for a container metaphor: the imposition of bounded 
structure at the level of conceptualisation.17 What is treated as bounded may then 
be isolated, turning a set of circumstances into a distinct situation. As mental imagery 
relies on such models derived from real precedent, the contents of imagined scena-
rios are subject to similar experiential limitations (e.g. Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn et al, 
2006). Treating situations as observer-relative thus helps explain the experienced 
nature of situations instead of merely providing a template for variable results. 
Simply put, ‘[d]ifferent organisms can rip the same reality apart in different ways, 
ways that are appropriate to their needs, their own perceptual abilities and their 
capacities for action’ (Barwise and Perry, 1999, p. 11). 
Definition 1.2 which expresses how observer-relativity manifests for attribut-
ed situations is provided here but its contents are largely substantiated in chapter 3. 
This formal definition specifies an observer to be an ordered set of embedded layers 
of integration, each of which consists of a set of inputs ordered according to the 
format of the integrating system. One such input involves a single point of access as-
sociated with a set of modes of access. Each mode of access corresponds to a sys-
tematic sensitivity to the presence of a specifiable set of stimuli. The basic idea of a 
set of points and modes of access is that any given observer recognises only the pres-
ence of certain kinds of entities within a set domain. For instance, no ordinary person 
may view all of existence, nor can a human being without special equipment sense 
radio waves. Yet, a human being with the appropriate equipment can achieve the 
 
17 ‘Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. We project our own 
in-out orientation unto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces. […] But even when 
there is no natural boundary that can be viewed as defining a container, we impose boundaries – 
marking off territory so that it has an inside and a bounding surface – whether a wall, a fence, or 
an abstract line or plane.’ (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 29). 
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latter. They would be considered a distinct type of observer since the equipment 
extends access and provides a further layer of integration through its interface. The 
final layer of integration defines the perspective of the observer but their identity 
includes each involved layer. Here are the details: 
Definition 1.2, Constituents of Situations (Attributed; Observed): 
Assume Definition 1.1, amend set E as follows: 













m, 〈W, 〈rn, E
*




W = {〈I1, 〈I2, … 〈In〉〉〉│n≥1, Ix∈I} 
I = {I1, I2, … Im│ m≥1, Ix=〈〈(l’1, t’1), D
*
1〉, 〈(l’2, t’2), D
*
2〉, … 〈(l’m, t’n), D
*
q〉│ m≥2,  
      n≥2, q≥2, 〈(l’x, t’y), D
*
z〉∈U〉} 
U = {〈(l’1, t’1), D
*
1〉, 〈(l’2, t’2), D
*
2〉, … 〈(l’m, t’n), D
*
q〉│m≥1, n≥1, q≥1, (l’x, t’y)∈N, 
       D*z⊆D, D
*
z≠Ø} 
N = {(l’1, t’1), (l’1, t’2), … (l’m, t’n)│m≥1, n≥1} 
D = {d1, d2, … dn│n≥1} 
Explanation of Definition 1.2: 
Assume Explanation of Definition 1.1, with the following inclusions: 
Rb: set of relations of observation 
 rbx: type of relation of observation 




x is instantiated by W relative to relation 〈ry, E
*
z〉 
W: set of layers of integration which correspond to the observer 
 〈Ix, 〈Iy〉〉: Ix is a single level higher order of integration than Iy 
I: set of layers of integration 
 Ix: specific layer of integration 
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 〈〈(l’1, t’1), D
*
1〉, 〈(l’2, t’2), D
*
2〉, … 〈(l’m, t’n), D
*
q〉〉: set of inputs up to 〈(l’m,
  t’n), D
*
q〉 is ordered according to the format of a layer of integration Ix 
U: set of inputs 
 〈(l’x, t’y), D
*
z〉: at (l’x, t’y), D
*
z applies 
N: set of points of access 
 l’x: specific location of access 
 t’x: specific time of access 
D: set of modes of access 
 dx: type of mode of access 
Specifically, definition 1.2 posits that relations between the designated core entity 
and other constituents only qualify when a specified observer has access to said 
relation which includes each member of the associated ordered set. Thus, a given 
relation being observed also involves the participating entities being observed, as 
exemplified by how distance or degree of similarity can only be judged when some 
impression of the involved entities is available. When a person may only rely on a 
conception not based on direct access, such as when a presence must be inferred, 
the cognised entity is what participates in the relevant relation even when the entity 
it represents exists. Observers themselves consist of ordered sets of embedded layers 
of integration involving set points and modes of access. The details are discussed 
in chapter 3. However, an example observer would be some specific individual inter-
facing with a computer screen. Information about the internal states of components 
like the hard disk gets formatted based on access pathways and this system of inte-
gration gets embedded in the conscious experience of the user. Observers are not 
a matter of individual potential but the overall capacity of an extended system of 
directed information transfer terminating in a system which retains access. 
Below the level of integration lie the inputs, each of which involves a single 
point of access and a non-empty set of modes of access. As chapter 3 elaborates, the 
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various modes of access are linked to structures sensitive to the presence of specific 
states. Sensitivity in this context systematic reactivity. For instance, a rod cell on the 
retina of an eye becomes hyperpolarized in the presence of light which inhibits the 
cell from releasing neurotransmitters which in turn acts as a signal to a connected 
bipolar cell, causing it to release synapse-exciting transmitter. The tendency for such 
reactions constitutes the eye’s sensitivity to light. Each point of access within a space 
corresponds to some such access-enabling structures. Definition 1.2 links points of 
access to spatiotemporal coordinates but technically, constructed spaces like men-
tal spaces may involve other forms of organisation such as associative links for pur-
poses of navigation, even when the experience may parallel spatiotemporal conti-
nuity. Because most of the cases relevant for the current project involve a degree 
of spatiotemporal organisation as overlays onto natural situations such as when a 
theory acts as a template for picking out suitable influences,18 points of access are 
identified with spatiotemporal coordinates for the time being. 
2.2 Inconceivability Issue 
This section addresses the criticism some people have presented where they find 
themselves wholly unable to conceive of the kinds of situations being presented (i.e. 
unable to motivate the inclusion of any entities in the situation of the specified entity). 
The problem appears to be exacerbated for less conventional core entities such as 
arbitrarily designated states of affairs (e.g. the pair of that tree and the closest dog). 
However, should one encounter this problem, the first step is to remember that if 
one accepts that expressions such as ‘my situation’ are used in a manner where the 
intended referents are inclusive of the entities contributing to the relevant circum-
 
18 The mental spaces linked to hypothetical observers are a potential subversion since the relevant 
models seem to only contingently involve (absolute) spatiotemporal relations. For instance, Fill-
more’s (1982) classic example of the frame for transaction of goods might prototypically involve 
payment preceding delivery of goods. A mental space involving this frame would not necessarily 
elaborate on the period separating them. For now, it is conceded that while studies (e.g. Kosslyn, 
1980; Kosslyn et al, 2006) do show evidence of spatial, perspectival simulation in mental imagery, 
a more sophisticated model would be required to capture the other cases. The results of said 
studies are also not entirely uncontested (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1973; 2003).   
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stances, there already exists a baseline notion which is simply being formalised. The 
more extreme cases are not intended as uses which are ever realised. They explore 
the limits of the notion’s in-principle applicability to refine the baseline conception 
into a framing device suited to be applied as a framing device which is compatible 
with the possibility of arbitrarily specified entities occupying this central position. 
That someone is unable to conceive how and what kinds of situations might be at-
tributable to select bricks on the wall does not endanger the model but unless the 
underlying issue can be resolved, that person is likely to struggle to follow similar 
developments down the line. Additionally, while the problem of any number of in-
dividuals having trouble conceiving what is presented does not prove the model 
being unfit unless an inconsistency or other problem is identified, experienced in-
conceivability may be interpreted as a sign of such a problem with the model. This 
section seeks to prove that at least the possibility of reasons unrelated to an issue 
with the model as such can reasonably explain such experiences. That the risk exists 
because of relative rather than essential features of the model means that one would 
not be in position to infer that the problem conceiving some of the situations being 
treated as viable under this model results from some form of inconsistency. Alterna-
tive explanations which ought to be eliminated first (unless such an inconsistency is 
indeed located and pointed out) exist, as is demonstrated below. 
The purpose of this section, therefore, is to address habits of thought which 
may hinder engaging with the presented ideas. This is not an attempt at immunising 
the model from criticism. If specific issues are pointed out, none of the considerations 
in this section apply. Mere experienced inability to conceive attributed situations, 
however, can be explained in terms of cognitive considerations related to the task 
of applying the model. Specifically, this section adapts considerations related to 
imaginative resistance (Szabó Gendler, 2000): systematic failure to imagine prompted 
states of affairs. While the notion is primarily associated with the inability to accept 
some fictitious moral claims as true relative to their settings, the shared task of world-
building (Goodman, 1978) between fiction and theory appears dependent on over-
lapping cognitive dynamics (e.g. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). 
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2.2.1 Imaginative Resistance 
The inability to conceive some or all situations being attributed is assumed to relate 
to the kinds of reasons linked to imaginative resistance – the inability to imagine certain 
types of (fictive) states of affairs. What is known as ‘the puzzle of imaginative resis-
tance’ primarily concerns people’s (in)ability to entertain morally deviant states of 
affairs within a fictional narrative.19,20 The difficulty in attributing situations concerns 
neither properly fictional, nor morally loaded imagining tasks, but as Weatherson 
(2004) argues, imaginative resistance splinters into distinct sub-puzzles. These sub-
puzzles concern (1) authorial breakdown, (2) unimaginability, and (3) phenomeno-
logical and (4) aesthetic effects of relevant passages. Importantly, the second puzzle 
Weatherson identifies – the imaginative puzzle (Ibid. p. 2) – can be extended to 
non-fictional imaginative tasks. The puzzle concerns people’s (professed) inability 
to imagine some specified type of world, such as a world in which a murdered child’s 
gender determines whether killing them was justified.21 While discussion on the imag-
inative puzzle tends to focus on fictive cases, the task of imagining the world being 
a certain way is not restricted to fictional narratives. For instance, such reconstructions 
appear to be involved in postulating natural laws through the inclusion of explanatory 
forces or entities as part of reality. As a result, if someone has trouble conceiving what 
the situation of a given entity would include, the reasons may well resemble those 
discussed in relation to imaginative resistance. 
The literature on imaginative resistance contains two main divisions. Some 
try to explain the observed cases using general considerations instead of positing a 
 
19 The modern discussion on imaginative resistance was initiated by Walton (1994) though the 
term imaginative resistance was first applied to the phenomenon by Szabó Gendler (2000, p. 56). 
She borrowed the term from Moran (1994) who used it to describe a different phenomenon but 
her use of the term has since become predominant. 
20 ‘The puzzle of imaginative resistance: the puzzle of explaining our comparative difficulty in 
imagining fictional worlds that we take to be morally deviant.’ (Szabó Gendler, 2000, p. 56, empha-
sis in original). 
21 This is a reference to an example discussed by Walton (1994, p. 37) and Szabó Gendler (2000, 
p. 62) wherein a story is posited to contain the passage ‘In killing her baby, Giselda did the right 
thing; after all, it was a girl.’ Both posit that people generally have trouble imagining this claim to 
be true, even within the fictive realm it invokes. 
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dynamic unique to these instances. For instance, Stock (2005) considers alleged 
cases of imaginative resistance the result of insufficient contextualisation. While she 
denies the existence of imaginative resistance proper, she is addressing the same 
types of cases which is why her viewpoint is addressed below. People who do agree 
on the existence of special cases disagree on the reasons why the associated states 
of affairs cannot be imagined. The corresponding viewpoints can roughly be divided 
into impossibility theories (e.g. Walton, 1994) and unwillingness theories (e.g. Szabó 
Gendler, 2000; 2006; Todd, 2009). The current take focuses on the latter which posit 
there being various reasons why people who lack no requisite cognitive material 
cannot will themselves to complete the presented imaginative tasks. For instance, 
strong realist commitment may interfere with such tasks (Todd, 2009). 
The way this section approaches the matter involves first discussing the 
effects of culturally available models on the moves which attributing situations to 
non-standard recipients requires. Specifically, section 2.2.2 differentiates between 
problematic kinds of contextualisation which even allow for a sense of inconsistent 
states of affairs being conceivable and more standard contextualisation before pro-
posing which forms of the latter help with conceiving the situations of non-standard 
recipients. Since inability to conceive such situations even with access to suitable 
cognitive models cannot be guaranteed, section 2.2.3 then addresses a potential 
further issue in the form of interaction between rigid realism and the seeming invol-
vement of considerations incompatible with the state of the world. The section at-
tempts to disarm such reactions by clarifying the role of such considerations. For 
instance, instrumentally attributing intentional states to rocks is simply a means to 
prime applying models derived from intentionality to rocks as a means to highlight 
relations in which they participate such as being split by a maul. 
2.2.2 Contextualisation 
Outside logical contradictions, almost any state of affairs ought to in principle be 
conceivable. While inability to conceive one may therefore signal a contradiction, 
insufficient context is another factor which may block imagining a scenario. For in-
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stance, Stock (2005) argues that (almost)22 any scenario is imaginable with access 
to enough cognitive resources to contextualise how it would attain.23 An extreme 
example is Szabó Gendler’s Tower of Goldbach24 which attempts to illustrate that 
even incoherent states of affairs may be imagined given sufficient contextualisation. 
Her intent is to show why incoherence is insufficient for imaginative resistance to 
motivate an alternative to Walton’s (1994) treatment of imaginative resistance as 
implicit contradiction. In fact, if the example succeeds in prompting some people to 
imagine twelve both being and not being the sum of two primes, it risks 
contextualisation turning into a means to bypass a reader’s critical faculties.25 Thus, a 
 
22 Stock does admit that her explanation has certain limitations. Even if conceptual impossibility 
such as that evoked by Szabó Gendler’s Tower of Goldbach (2000, pp. 67–68) which is discussed 
below were ignored, fictional identities are in part defined by the established contents of the 
relevant fictions. Thus, Stock (2005, p. 623; emphasis in original) agrees that enriched context 
cannot solve instances where ‘we already have detailed information which context is being fiction-
ally posited, and this is such that the other judgement employed by the relevant proposition is 
straightforwardly incompatible with that context.’ To use Moran’s (1994, p. 95) example, given 
who Duncan and Macbeth are as well as the setting in Shakespeare’s play, it cannot be the case 
that ‘The murder of Duncan is unfortunate only for disturbing Macbeth's sleep.’ Were the context 
to be altered to accommodate this claim, it would risk the identity of the characters the claim 
mentions being altered as well. Such cases, however, are irrelevant for current purposes. 
23 ‘The upshot is that failure to imagine (GK) cannot be explained in terms of conceptual impossi-
bility, for given the nature of moral judgement, it must in fact be possible, […] to find a surrounding 
context for any such single proposition which shows it to be conceptually coherent. This observa-
tion, however, leads immediately to a more promising train of thought: namely, that readers of 
(GK) contingently fail to understand it. Contingently, we are unable to think of a surrounding 
context for a proposition such that (GK) would be true in it, in which case we are, perhaps only 
temporarily, unable to understand (GK).’ (Stock, 2005, p. 619; emphasis in original). The case Stock 
calls ‘(GK)’ is Walton’s (1994, p. 37) example which states that ‘In killing her baby, Giselda did the 
right thing; after all, it was a girl.’ The example context Stock (2005, p. 617) suggests is Giselda’s 
baby having been born into a situation where all women are subjected to fates worse than death. 
24 In Szabó Gendler’s (2000, pp. 67–68) thought experiment, mathematicians prove Goldbach’s con-
jecture (‘every even number is the sum of two primes’), angering God who then punishes their 
hubris by making twelve no longer adhere to the rule. The pleas of the people make God reconsider 
and promise to retract the punishment if twelve true believers are found and presented. However, 
this condition is impossible to fulfil while twelve is not a sum of two primes because the twelve 
candidates were found in groups of five and seven, respectively. To resolve the situation, a divinely 
ordained judge decrees that henceforth twelve both is and is not a sum of two primes. Thus, the 
conceptual impossibility to be imagined is twelve both being and not being the sum of two primes. 
The narrative devices she uses to motivate imagining a conceptually impossible state of affairs 
include divine intervention and omnipotence. 
25 Dennett (e.g. 1991, pp. 399–400) criticises some philosophical thought experiments for doing 
exactly this by abusing unwarranted intuitions using misleading narratives (e.g. invoking bizarre 
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distinction is made between conceiving a state of affairs being realised and 
conceiving that a state of affairs is being realised. The target is the former. While the 
total states of affairs need not be imagined in a clear and distinct manner, at least 
one case exemplifying the principle being generalised (e.g. an entity being included 
in another’s situation) ought to become manifest. In contrast, the latter cases which 
effectively involve accepting that a proposition is true relative to a worldbuilding 
narrative are distinguished from the former because they appear to involve semi-
propositional metarepresentation (Sperber, 1985, pp. 51–53; 1996, p. 72).26 In such 
cases, truth is attributed to a quotational representation of a scenario (e.g. ‘twelve 
both is and is not the sum of two primes’) based on epistemic heuristics like trusting 
a testimony rather than personal understanding of the involved state of affairs.27 
Based on this hypothesis, one might link the imaginability Szabó Gendler 
(2000) attributes to Tower of Goldbach with the implicitly presented notion of true 
omnipotence.28 Even without being aware of theological voluntarism, people sub-
jected to the monotheistic dogma of Abrahamic religions seem to pre-reflectively 
understand omnipotence as inherently unconstrained. The exact cognitive models 
likely vary but for instance, one who accepts the possibility of the story’s God pos-
sessing (true) omnipotence would have no reason to doubt whether the incoherent 
 
notions which may only be conceived in the abstract). That some thought experiments are prob-
lematic in this respect is considered true here. 
26 ‘A conceptual representation that fails to identify one and only one proposition, I shall call a semi-
propositional representation.’ (Sperber, 1985, p. 51, emphasis in original). In essence, a person who 
holds to such (mental) representations – such as quotational beliefs where they believe that ‘God 
can do anything’ rather than that God can do anything – is unable to fully reconstruct the scenario 
being expressed due to lack of understanding what that would involve despite potentially even 
assenting to the claim. 
27 Sperber (1985, p. 53; 1996, p. 72) emphasises how semi-propositional representations are part 
of normal learning even though they can also be used to avoid cognitive dissonance by muddling 
the relationship between believed claims. For instance, someone who is told by a teacher they 
trust that ‘humans and chimpanzees share a common ancestor’ may justifiably accept the claim 
before they can realistically conceive the nature of the evolutionary processes enabling it. 
28 True omnipotence is here equated with the type theological voluntarists advocate. For instance, 
Descartes (1984, p. 294) accepts that an omnipotent being could alter even the laws of math-
ematics and logic to accommodate contradictions: ‘God could have brought it about […] that it 
was not true that twice four make eight.’ This conception of omnipotence contrasts the position 
according to which omnipotence only enables all acts which adhere to necessarily true principles.  
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in-story proclamation is true. The reasoning would be that if ‘God’ may be omnipo-
tent, there is no reason this one would not be, and if they are omnipotent, they can 
achieve the impossible. Therefore, the contents of the provided testimony would 
be accepted relative to the narrative in the aforementioned quotational sense. Alter-
natively, the association between word and divine creation can ground an interpre-
tation where ‘God’ proclaiming a proposition would suffice to force the world to 
conform. The divine testimony by itself would represent the state of affairs attaining 
since the word would be made flesh (e.g. ‘Let there be light’ resulting in there being 
light) by virtue of its utterer’s supposed divine nature. These examples are intended 
to show how specific cognitive models may enable forms of authorised intellectual 
negligence such as naïve forms of faith where details in the conceived state of affairs 
are substituted for by semi-propositional metarepresentations. 
Since conceptions based on these forms of contextualisation may be incon-
sistent, the form of contextualisation used to help conceive attributed situations can-
not abuse such means. This distinction must be recognised as such abuse appears to 
occasionally occur in philosophical practice. For example, a claim may be embedded 
in an authoritative assertion such as the description of a scenario you order the reader 
to imagine.29 The candidates for cognitive models without which attributed situa-
tions turn inconceivable come in three categories. Firstly, one might simply lack a 
prototype for such a situation including an entity. Instead of situations having been 
treated as constituted by sets of distinct entities, they would have been only consid-
ered in a holistic manner where only the totality was referred to for judgements 
such as ‘your situation could be worse’. The solution is to focus on the contributions 
of those constituents to how the totality is judged. For instance, if a person finds 
themselves in a precarious situation, the reason likely involves the presence of some 
source of threat. Consider a hiker hearing a large beast in the wilderness and whis-
 
29 Arguably, this exact problem occurs in Jackson’s (1982; 1986) Mary the Colour Scientist thought 
experiment which involves a person being attributed the totality of scientifically verifiable facts 
about colour. That Mary has such domain-specific omnipotence is an axiom yet as Dennett (1991, 
p. 399) states: ‘The reason no one follows [Jackson’s] directions is because what they ask you to 
imagine is so preposterously immense, you can’t even try.’ 
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pering to themselves: ‘Okay, this situation is probably bad.’ One may specify the 
referent of ‘this situation’ either as a generic description of a hiker in the presence 
of a predator or as the specific circumstances of the utterer relative to themselves. 
While the former alternative is undoubtedly possible, it requires the person to dis-
tance themselves from their position enough to approach it from an allocentric 
perspective. The latter option thus seems more reasonable as the default interpre-
tation because the person need only observe the presence of a threat to themselves. 
The interpretation substantiates ‘bad’ in relation to the person’s own interests in-
stead of leaving it as a generic value judgement, and the demonstrative ‘this’ can 
be applied directly to the actual circumstances rather than to a model then superim-
posed onto them. Thus, answering what makes the situation bad would involve 
designating the beast in relation to the interests of the hiker, making it a constituent 
of the hiker’s situation. 
Needing to treat such personal situations as constituent-involving is not 
the only potential source of problems involving a need for further contextualisation. 
Attributing situations to non-standard core entities such as bare relations is particu-
larly dependent on applicable conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) for 
framing their behaviour in terms of intentionality and for visualising their status. As 
the previous example demonstrates, the target’s intentional states such as interests 
help motivate including a particular entity in a situation being attributed to it. Know-
ing that the threatened hiker will slip on a specific leaf ought to increase willingness 
to consider the presence of that leaf rather than the overall precariousness of the 
terrain a part of the hiker’s situation. Meanwhile, visualisation helps position con-
ceived abstract entities relative to the potential constituents of their situation. Should 
visual fields likely act as the natural containers which ground how situations are con-
ceived (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 30), core entities must manifest in said scenes. 
Models for intentionality involve the same considerations as applying the 
intentional stance (Dennett, 1971; 1983; 1987): parallels to observable behaviours re-
liant on possession of information. Some such associations are culturally encoded 
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such as sluggish compliance with the intended results of one’s actions (e.g. being 
moved) being likened to stubbornness. However, ensuring maximal applicability re-
quires focusing on the most basic conditions attributable to any constituent of a 
situation besides coordinates: cessation and change.30 Personal existence being ter-
minated relates to every other potential interest which would also cease to apply. 
This makes it appear universally interest-laden: when it is not feared, it is instead 
revered (e.g. Buddhist nirvana). Similarly, change always shifts individual capacities. 
If any such capacity is attributed value, change has some net effect in terms of those 
values: improvement or degeneration. Folk teleology applies the intentional stance 
when it treats the results of prototypical behaviours as purposive. As fulfilment of pur-
pose is generally treated as positive, the effects of change can be related to such 
usual trajectories. In practice, then, one ought to consider what conditions may con-
tribute to the cessation of an entity (or prevent it, prolonging its experienced exis-
tence) or change the projected course of its existence. For instance, an arbitrarily 
denoted state of affairs might disintegrate if its constituents scatter, and this repre-
sents its termination onto which a negative value relative to its interests is readily 
projected for the above reasons. Schools of fish or flights of birds provide a familiar 
model for such collectives. Similarly, changes in the constituents can affect the prob-
ability of such terminating events. 
Visualisations, on the other hand, are treated as largely dependent on the 
availability of apt grounds for conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and 
therefore, ecological affordances for structuring thought (Clark, 1997, Ch. 9). If con-
ceptual metaphors already largely underlie how abstract entities are conceived (e.g. 
the movement of time), conceptions of properties, relations, and the like already rely 
on similes based on concrete experience which can be consciously tapped for cur-
 
30 For metaphysical purposes, whenever people systematically conceive identity as retained through 
a transformation, it counts as ‘change’, and whenever attributed identity shifts, ‘cessation’ has oc-
curred. As Barker and Jago (2014, pp. 193–194) note, what becomes treated as ‘total destruction’ 
need not involve more than ensuring that no unique inheritor for continued identity remains. The 
example they use involves a mass of gold: chipping off a part is conceived as damage it retains 
but chopping it to two or more fungible pieces removes non-arbitrary grounds for unique identity. 
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rent purposes. Observable properties, for instance, seem to be treated like coatings 
(e.g. paint) which stick to the relevant entities. After all, the very act of separating the 
identity of an entity from the totality of its properties in terms of its substance implies 
that something beyond such properties underlies its existence. The link between 
colours and paint is the most obvious example but cartoons and other edited media 
provide visualisations which help extend the logic to features like the possession of 
a mouth by providing a cognitive model for how the visible signifier (lips, teeth, etc.) 
may slouch off a person. Such models provide the means to objectify bare proper-
ties and thus position and situate them. While such models may not adhere to how 
reality itself literally operates (a mouth, for instance, is a hole rather than a sticker), 
they only help structure aspects of the abstract using more approachable templates. 
The aspects of these phenomena being highlighted in this manner are no less real 
for the related conceptions involving some elements which do not correspond to 
reality but are either required or helpful as part of the conceptualisation. Assuming 
that conceptual metaphors are part of human cognition, the very same dynamics 
would also cover very basic, unproblematic conceptualisations such as time being 
treated as either static or mobile depending on the context (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 
pp. 139–147). Visualisations are no more inherently problematic than such cases. 
Electing to apply specific conceptualisations to help conceive the situations 
of non-standard core entities ought to thus help with the task. Further conceptuali-
sations for properties include ownership, symbiosis (or parasitic dependence), and 
directory entries, and each such conceptualisation embodies a partial mapping which 
highlights some characteristics associated with properties (e.g. transience, depen-
dence). Each also grounds different similes for the realisation of the relations discuss-
ed above such as parasites’ survival depending on their host living and remaining 
oblivious helping conceptualise properties’ cessation. A harmful but remediable pro-
perty such as bad fitness would be subject to such considerations and therefore a 
situation attributed to it would be sensitive to motivators for the person to exercise. 
Relations, on the other hand, form connections which may be (in)direct, differently 
directional, and of various strengths. As a result, lines form the simplest representa-
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tion of relations, and they can be cut, knotted, or fortified in various ways. Thus, for 
instance, a relation which is strained might snap and therefore cease such as when 
people drift apart. 
In evaluating the suggested conceptualisations, one ought to keep in mind 
the presented difference between means to bypass the need to conceive the details 
of a state of affairs and the means to structure them through appropriate framing. 
The details of these scenarios are not made more abstract through methods such 
as quotational representations. Those details are instead made more concrete by 
tapping available means to frame them. The problem with non-standard core en-
tities – i.e. inanimate objects, bare properties and relations, or arbitrary states of af-
fairs – lies in the degrees of separation between them and the entities to which situ-
ations are standardly attributed like human beings. These methods highlight the 
relevant aspects in which the former resemble the latter. Ideally, anyone struggling 
to identify which entities would participate in the situations of non-standard recipi-
ents because they did not utilise such tactics will understand what is involved in the 
task by now. Being able to conceive situations for such entities should alleviate the 
task of conceiving the possibility of theories of meaning requiring more complex 
and potentially non-continuous entities as the instantiators for the sorts of meanings 
these theories supply. In both kinds of cases, these unintuitive entities must be con-
ceived as parts of their respective models, in the central role they share. However, 
it remains possible to still find oneself unable to bring oneself to conceive such situ-
ations. As such, the rest of the chapter discusses further potential reasons based on 
explanations for imaginative resistance and tries to alleviate associated concerns. 
2.2.3 Realist Resistance 
That the form of contextualisation discussed above might suffice to make notions 
such as ‘the situation of that rock’ palatable is expected to remain a distasteful so-
lution to philosophers of a certain bent common within the analytic tradition.31 A 
 
31 While evidence is circumstantial, a survey by Bourget and Chalmers (2014) on philosophers’ po-
sitions on various issues depicts non-sceptical realism concerning the external world (81,6%), sci-
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degree of realism concerning the natural grounding of categories where nature has 
joints at which to carve it32 appears a likely cause for such reservations, especially 
when it is accompanied by intuitions that associate truth with correspondence.33 Ex-
pressed bluntly, the problem is how abstract properties and the like cannot in reality 
possess the full gamut of properties conceiving them as situated would require such 
as intentional states. Of course, the problem here lies in assuming that as a result, 
there exists no meaningful sense in which such framing may depict anything real. 
The presented notion of attributed situations is a formal refinement and exploration 
of the conceptual limits of the more intuitive notion with which people operate in 
using expression such as ‘your situation’. Understanding the sense in which the less 
conventional cases remain no less viable than more familiar instances relies on the 
capacity to assume a stance in which identity-involving intuitions based on direct 
observations are temporarily suspended. In the case of non-standard core entities 
and the associated situations, such suspension involves accepting the possibility of 
non-substances such as properties and arbitrarily designated states of affairs being 
positionable and subject to being affected through environmental interactions. The 
manner in which the possibility is then substantiated no longer requires such sus-
pension. In the case of the identities of meaning-instantiating entities discussed later, 
 
entific realism (75,1%), and externalism concerning mental content (51,6%) as clear majority posi-
tions (Ibid. p. 476). The study primarily concerns analytic philosophers (Ibid. p. 468). 
32 The notion of carving nature at the joints comes from Plato but it is present, for instance, in Lewis’s 
(1983, pp. 346–347) distinction between natural and unnatural categories provided by a nominalist 
account where the former correspond to such supposedly mind-independent boundaries between 
distinct entities. 
33 Such intuitions are not limited to people who subscribe to correspondence theories of truth ac-
cording to which true descriptions are made so by – roughly speaking – the expressed relations 
being unequivocally mappable to the relevant states of affairs (e.g. Russell, 1912, p. 129). For in-
stance, according to Strawsonian performative deflationism (Strawson, 1949), asserting the truth 
of some claim describes no particular relation but rather, serves to express agreement, acceptance, 
or endorsement. However, under specific circumstances, such judgements appear to involve an 
observed correspondence between the meaning of what is stated and how things seem. The de-
flationist would oppose over-generalising this relation into a universal theory of truth rather than 
it bearing a relation to how the notion of truth is used. Depending on how one delineates the 
proper application of this intuitive notion of reality determining truth and falsity, then, claims about 
the situations of unconventional recipients of such attributions may appear non-truth-abiding for 
the sorts of reasons addressed below. 
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the suspended assumption concerns the proper referents of terms such as ‘word’ 
in the context of theory-specific discourse. In either instance, one must first be willing 
to conceive such a state of affairs as possible and then, to relate that possibility back 
to their sense of the real as part of recognising its potential significance. Both types 
of tasks involve merely applying a schematic template for re-structuring what is 
already present through an added filter. While this task involves few substantial meta-
physical commitments, there are reasons addressed below why either stage of the 
process may be complicated by rigid realist intuitions. 
Todd (2009) observes how realist intuitions risk imaginative resistance.34 His 
reasoning can be summarised as stronger and more extensive realist expectations 
exerting normative force on what is considered imaginable: ‘[…] the views and com-
mitments of those more susceptible to imaginative inability or resistance in the rele-
vant cases are somehow less ‘flexible’ in what they allow to be likely, possible, or 
desirable alternatives to the relatively ‘rigid’ and well-articulated commitments they 
hold to be true. Normative concepts and propositions […] may be more susceptible 
here […] partly because they are essentially or very tightly tied to certain conditions, 
and to the evaluative stances or world-views of those holding them, such as that 
there is, as it were, (felt to be) more at stake in the imaginative projects involving 
them.’ (Ibid. pp. 197–198). The inter-related key components here are the (1) rigidity 
of realist commitments, (2) their normativity, and (3) the linked stakes. Even though 
Todd is primarily discussing forms of ethical realism, ontological realism appears to 
share these features for reasons addressed below. 
Musgrave’s (1995, p. 132) definition of folk realism demonstrates why forms 
of ontological realism motivated by this intuition can be expected to be rigid: ‘Folk-
realism is the belief that there is a real world outside of us and largely independent 
of us. This world is populated with objects that do not usually depend upon our 
 
34 ‘[…] the imaginative projects of those holding realist commitments may be more susceptible to 
resistance and inability than those holding non-realist commitments, and those holding articulat-
ed theoretical commitments yet more susceptible than those possessing less articulated pre-the-
oretical ones; […]’ (Todd, 2009, p. 197, emphasis in original). 
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doings for their existence and which continue to exist when we are not perceiving 
them.’ Should one subscribe to such realism, the nature of the external world be-
comes set, and how people conceive it may only be compared with the facts. The 
assumed rigidity of the real also seems to ground a normative view on such com-
parisons. Given this framework, truth should be expected to generally be associated 
with (some form of) correspondence, and the supposed real provides the proper mea-
sure of truth since its rigidity ensures a common standard. As a result, the possibility 
of truth as correspondence is (experienced to be) at stake when considering how 
rigidly independent of people’s ways to conceive it the world should be treated. The 
value of such stakes is made ever more evident when one considers how folk realism 
undergirds scientific realism and thus (at least seemingly) the possibility of acquiring 
objective knowledge systematically.35,36 
Such rigidity being motivated by a feeling of such high stakes all too easily 
entails that any seeming subversion of one’s sense of the real turns into a threat to 
the possibility of systematic knowledge. While the only claims the proposed model 
makes about reality itself involve the functioning of human cognition rather than the 
nature of the objects thus represented, conceiving the situations attributed to non-
standard core entities in particular is susceptible to such resistance. Specifically, the 
relationship between one’s sense of the real and other mental spaces has two pos-
sible break points where rigid realism can prevent proper integration. Firstly, one 
may be prevented from modelling the mental space relative to which an entity has 
its situation defined because it is subjected to the same rigid rules as one’s sense of 
the real. Alternatively, re-integrating the presence of said situation with one’s sense 
of the real may invite a clash due to its reliance on representing entities in a manner 
 
35 ‘So scientific realism is not completely metaphysically neutral, since the scientific realist is also 
a folk-realist.’ (Musgrave, 1995, p. 133). After all, if the scientific enterprise is to be a realist pro-
ject, there must be a common standard to which results can be related and against which others’ 
claims can be tested. 
36 Bernstein recognises the dread associated with loss of singular objective foundations and dubs 
this dichotomy Cartesian anxiety: ‘Either there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation 
for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with intellectual 
and moral chaos.’ (Bernstein, 1983, p. 18, emphasis in original). 
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antithetical to folk realism. Thus, even when the rigidity of one’s realist intuitions does 
not prevent success in expanding towards hypothetical possibilities, the same level 
of rigidity can result in imaginative resistance by preventing said possibilities being 
reintegrated with one’s sense of the real. This difference likely stems from how only 
the task of reintegrating a hypothetical possibility as a real possibility involves adjust-
ing one’s sense of the real.37 In essence, it might be fine to suppose38 what the situa-
tion of some non-standard core entity would be but then accepting that this hypo-
thetical situation can truly be attributed to it would demand accepting the presence 
(in some capacity) of a corresponding entity. 
The first of the presented scenarios concerns being able to derive a hypo-
thetical mental space involving the degree of intimacy with one’s sense of the real 
which having to largely rely on representations of recognised particulars involves. In 
this context, said hypothetical space involves the schema based on which a situation 
would be attributed: the representation of the core entity as a being with intentional 
states which link it to the surroundings of a position ascribed to it. Such constraints 
formed by prior experience and associated expectations readily apply to representing 
various counterfactuals and thereby invite imaginative resistance when said 
scenarios rely on one’s sense of the real as framing. In this respect, both realist moral 
principles and ontological assumptions appear equally likely candidates to be im-
ported and to clash with contrary prompts. This notion of imaginative resistance in-
volving imported assumptions itself comes from Mahtani (2012, p. 426) who claims 
 
37 This difference between experienced hypothetical and real possibility can be characterised 
using Gibbs’s (1970, p. 340, emphasis in original) distinction between formal and real possibilities: 
‘[…] real possibility, i.e., the kind which, unlike mere formal possibility, is correlative to actuality. 
Actuality as meant here is not something which can belong to mathematical objects or formal 
truths. It is the mode of existence proper to causal agents and patients.’ What is in reality impos-
sible may still be formally possible and what is formally possible is not necessarily possible in 
actuality. The same relations tend to apply when a state of affairs is perceived as either a real or 
hypothetical possibility. 
38 The distinction between supposing and imagining is briefly addressed by Szabó Gendler (2000, 
p. 80): ‘The source of this resistance can be traced to the way in which imagination requires a sort 
of participation that mere hypothetical reasoning does not.’ Thus, supposing in the sense being 
intended equals accepting the posited state of affairs as a hypothetical possibility while imagining 
it would entail tacitly accepting the state of affairs as something closer to a real possibility. 
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that ‘‘[…] moral principles do not get to be true in fictional worlds by being imagined. 
Rather, general moral principles hold in fictional worlds because they are automatic-
ally imported into them, along with a host of other background claims that are not 
explicitly stated by the author.’ That some assumptions are imported is undeniable, 
whether Mahtani’s account of imaginative resistance for the moral cases is correct or 
not, and these assumptions certainly include basic metaphysical intuitions such as 
how causality operates. Essentially, how rigid said assumptions are sets a threshold 
for necessary contextualisation and the stronger the connections to one’s sense of 
the real are, the stricter the expected adherence becomes. For example, it is easier 
to accept a cartoon rock being conscious since it only bears a relation of resemblance 
to real rocks than to entertain a designated real rock’s hypothetical intentional states 
because even a hypothetical space derived from the real is not similarly detached 
from it. As Todd (2009, pp. 196–198) notes, well-articulated realist positions are more 
likely to be especially rigid which predicts philosophers being particularly susceptible 
to this form of imaginative resistance even if it need not be exclusive to them, given 
the extent to which such basic assumptions also apply at the level of pre-reflective 
common sense (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 164–170). 
In contrast to Mahtani’s (2012) import-based account of imaginative resis-
tance, Szabó Gendler (2000, p. 77) offers the implicit exportation of results as the 
source of failures to conceive states of affairs: ‘ […] cases that evoke genuine imagina-
tive resistance will be cases where the reader feels that she is being asked to export 
a way of looking at the actual world which she does not wish to add to her concep-
tual repertoire.’ While these are competing accounts, within the current framework, 
each appears to describe a failure at a different stage of the process. On the one 
hand, imported assumptions may prevent constructing mental spaces wherein coun-
terparts of pre-recognised entities possess features antithetical to the realist prin-
ciples to which the originals are subjected. On the other hand, trouble exporting 
involves blending the results with the space(s) responsible for one’s sense of the real. 
Effectively, if one subscribes to more objectivist forms of realism, even if one might 
entertain the notion of attributed situations, treating the results as viable means to 
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structure experience appears to engender attributing to them a degree of meta-
physical reality incompatible with the figurative models used to specify their elements. 
When independent existence (in contrast to one defined relative to particular forms 
of experience) is treated as the standard for ontological viability, conceived entities 
may only be treated as either existent in this objective sense or fictions. Attributed 
situations – especially those of non-standard core entities – are clearly not the former 
but in the absence of more nuanced alternatives, treating them as anything but 
pure fictions would imply an unsatisfactory degree of objective reality. Hence, such 
exportation is refused, as Szabó Gendler (2000; 2006) argues happens when one is 
prompted to imagine a reprehensible moral reality as part of a fiction such as murder 
of innocents being righteous. The mere possibility is denied since accepting it would 
have real implications. 
In the case of problematic imported assumptions, the solution to such wor-
ries remains to just be conscious of these suppositions and to remind oneself that 
representing reality directly and in full is not part of the purpose of the intermediate 
hypothetical space. Such mental constructs only act as a means to define which en-
tities would be involved in the situations of whichever entities are being designated 
as the intended core entities. Any involved considerations which do not directly and 
fully correspond to reality are purely instrumental and represent the means to con-
ceive such situations using available cognitive resources. Once this baseline has been 
achieved but one still cannot accept how such situations could be real when specify-
ing their constituents relies on such considerations, the problem becomes accepting 
the possibility of such exports from scenarios involving a cognitively enriched and 
hence ‘impure’ model of reality. Yet, such supplementary scaffolding is not inherently 
any more problematic than standardised cognitive metaphors such the different 
ways in which time is conceptualised. Ultimately, situations are simply designated 
states of affairs. Attributing them even to unconventional recipients holds no meta-
physical stakes unless one elects to treat such situations as objectively real, and there 
is little reason to support said attitude. In the current context, all that is presented is 
how people appear to derive such situations and how the model can be generalised. 
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2.3 Takeaway 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the structure of the schema which is im-
plicit in expressions such as ‘your situation’, at least if said reference to situation is 
treated as denoting a set of circumstances and the involved entities rather than as 
expressing current status in a manner synonymous with ‘condition’. The notion of 
observers included in the schema to represent the perspectives relative to which 
such attributions are defined is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Such 
observers are given this treatment to provide a material basis for how texts and the 
like may be said to embody specific perspectives. Namely, they act as systems which 
integrate information from various sources (the authors’ own observations, etc.) in 
a format which allows for access and re-integration by the readers in the form of 
structurally relatively uniform mental space constructs (Fauconnier, 1985; 1997). The 
model provided a material basis for such elements as the perspective present in a 
text or set of texts. 
The model presented here is that similarly to the situations utilised by situa-
tion semantics (e.g. Barwise & Perry, 1999), any situation may be represented as a set 
of the entities being designated. In this instance, besides the inclusion of what gets 
experienced as objects, properties, and relations, both arbitrarily defined yet inde-
pendently recognised states of affairs constituted by the former and spatiotemporal 
coordinates may be treated as proper constituents. The inclusion of the former is in-
tended to recognise how sometimes, constellations of entities to which there exists 
no conventional means to refer as a collective and which do not fit how people natu-
rally structure their surroundings (e.g. Rosch, 1987; 1981) may regardless contribute 
to experienced scenarios.39 The same is assumed of spatiotemporal coordinates. For 
instance, that the cat is in the wrong place at the wrong time may affect its owner’s 
situation independently of the cat simply being connected to them through owner-
 
39 In discussing the existence of negative facts, Barker and Jago (2012, p. 129), for instance, note 
how we may attribute causal power to such complex states of affairs and events. In their example, 
plants desiccate and die from lack of watering by their owner who had been kidnapped by aliens. 
The relevant state of affairs responsible for the plants’ death includes both the conditions on Earth 
and two million light years away where the owner has been transported. 
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ship. Explicitly highlighting that such entities can contribute to situations also allows 
for reference to them later.  Fully specified instantiators of meaning may potentially 
consist of unconventional constellations of entities, for one. The tracking of the rela-
tive coordinates a theory of meaning addresses as the scope it implements within 
the designated corpus involves analysing the involved coordinates. 
If situations are states of affairs constituted by a set of designated entities, 
there ought to be some means of specifying which entities are being designated. 
In some instances, they might occupy a specific location, such as when someone 
mentions ‘the situation in that room’, for instance. When situations are attributed 
to specific entities through formulations such as ‘your situation’ or ‘the situation of 
the UK in relation to the rest of Europe’, any constituents being related in some fash-
ion to said core entities is treated as a necessary condition for their inclusion. Unless 
they relate to the core entity somehow, there is no sense in which they ought to be 
treated as part of its situation. However, this condition is not sufficient: every entity 
relates to every other entity in some fashion. Given how people thinking in terms of 
situations in the first place can be traced to aspects of perception such as the bound-
edness of visual fields, the included relations also needing to be accessible to and 
processed by some observer is treated as the best further delineating principle. As 
a result, an attributed situation consists of the designated core entity and the entities 
participating in relations that involve it and are being observed from the involved 
perspective which need not belong to the core entity itself. 
The above model is a formalisation of the likely schema for determining 
which entities a situation being attributed includes. It is compatible with the possi-
bility of attributing such situations to any kind of entity which may participate in 
such a situation – including arbitrarily designated states of affairs. While attributing 
situations to such entities is unconventional and therefore references to such situa-
tions may appear uncanny or even ungrammatical, such situations are not inconceiv-
able in themselves. However, some people have reported having trouble imagining 
what entities could possibly be involved in such situations and used the fact that 
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they find themselves unable to conceive such situations to imply that the model 
which allows for them must be flawed because of it. Yet, such trouble can also be 
explained based on various factors associated with imaginative resistance – the ex-
perienced inability to imagine states of affairs which are conceptually consistent 
(e.g. Szabó Gendler, 2000). Not only do the possible explanations for such a reaction 
provide an alternative to the best explanation being something internal to the model 
(until proven otherwise) – they also outline a means to overcome similar issues going 
forward. For instance, trouble conceiving complex, non-continuous states of affairs 
as the potential instantiators of meaning ought to be ameliorated by the provided 
models for the ways in which such entities may be subject to environmental factors. 
Specifically, there are at least three distinct conditions which may result in 
the feeling of such situations being inconceivable. Any number of them may apply 
at a time since each relates to a different part of the process of conceiving such sit-
uations. Firstly, one may simply lack the proper cognitive models and context for 
imagining such a state of affairs (Stock, 2005). However, suitable models ought to 
be differentiated from those which allow even inconsistent states of affairs to be ex-
perienced as conceivable by abstracting the scenario. One needs the means to posi-
tion the involved entities by visualising them as tangibly continuous alongside 
grounds for applying the intentional stance (e.g. Dennett, 1987) such as considering 
possible sources of change. Secondly, one may be resisting the construction of the 
required hypothetical scenario because of strong realist commitments (Todd, 2009) 
being imported by default and clashing with parts of the scaffolding which do not 
fully correspond to observable reality (Mahtani, 2012). Thirdly, one may refuse to 
re-integrate the possibility expressed by that scenario with one’s sense of the real 
because of the involved non-literal cognitive models used to conceptualise aspects 
of the situation like a relation as a string-like connection (Szabó Gendler, 2000). The 
solution to such concerns is being conscious of such tendencies and systematically 
assessing the involved details. In the case of attributed situations, the involved forms 
of conceptual metaphors (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) are ordinary and no different 
from various everyday conceptualisations (e.g. movement of time). 
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Observers in the presented sense represent how information from the physical events 
within a specific accessible domain gets aggregated and formatted until it manifests 
experientially. Such observers consist of embedded layers of systems which integrate 
information conveyed to them by structures capable of accessing it based on their sen-
sitivity to specific conditions. Focusing on embedded positions which only get realised 
experientially in conjunction with the embedding experiencers allows treating the con-
structed positions embodied in various media, including disembodied perspectives, 
themselves as kinds of observers with set inputs. 
Access consists of positioned structures sensitive to specific immediate states to 
which they react with some consistency. Together, the forms of sensitivity and the 
associated coordinates form bounded domains. Such domains include whichever 
processes central systems interface with to extend such domains to otherwise distal 
states, such as when light conveys information about distant surfaces.  
Systems of integration format and retain the information conveyed to them by such 
systems of access. Weakly integrating sub-systems format and forward information 
while strongly integrating systems retain what they access because recursive struc-
tures of internal access allow for previously accessed information to be reconsolidated. 
Even when the perspectives embodied in text cannot be realised without conceiving 
individuals, they exist as part of the format and the results of engaging with the texts. 
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3.1 Observer Types 
In the preceding chapter, definition 1.2 linked the selection of an attributed situation’s 
constituents to the relations involving such situations’ core entities needing to also 
be observed by some designated observer. Said formalisation presents the relevant 
observers as systems consisting of embedded layers of integration connected to set 
points of access through corresponding modes of access. In less technical terms, each 
observer corresponds to a network of connections conveying information towards 
a system which structures and retains it. That the thesis does is not satisfied with a 
more intuitive notion results from the need to concretely represent perspectives 
which do not correspond directly to the intuitive notion of an observer. Such per-
spectives include specific instances of the view from nowhere (Nagel, 1986) being 
implemented and other theory-internal constructed positions. 
This section provides an overview of the key distinctions between the rele-
vant kinds of observers. These distinctions involve two axes: basic versus constructed 
observers and positioned versus detached observers. The intuitive notion of an ob-
server as a concrete individual only covers specific kinds of positioned basic observ-
ers: real (human) organisms embedded in the world. In contrast, the current model 
accounts for whether such people use access-extending instruments, as well as for 
the kinds of positions involved in media with which people may engage (text, video, 
interfaces, etc.) using embedded layering. As such, this rubric also covers simulated 
and idealised perspectives. This enables approaching the various perspectives em-
bodied in how texts expressing theories of meaning present their material under a 
materialist metaphysical framework. 
3.1.1 Basic and Constructed Observers 
Within the posited framework, how accessible information manifests depends on the 
details of the corresponding system of integration. All such information concerns ma-
terial facts – actual, physical structures – as it is reliant on causal interactions but how 
this information is integrated need not result in strictly congruent representations. 
In this context, spaces are differentiated on such basis: (approximately) congruent 
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representations constitute a shared space while divergent representations of the 
same information constitute distinct spaces. For instance, when three people observe 
the same brains during a surgery, their conscious experience will converge with con-
tingent differences based on focus of attention, eyesight, and position. However, let 
us assume one of them is the patient who is being fed video of the surgery. For them, 
the state of their brain also manifests in a distinct manner through internal channels: 
not as a fatty, protein-infused lump of neurons and glia but a first-personal perspec-
tive which is inclusive of but not reducible to their conscious experience of mutual 
surroundings. The same material structure manifests distinctly based on the forms 
of access and the format of the system(s) of integration involved.1 Basic and con-
structed observers are defined relative to the spaces available to them. A basic ob-
server may access the most encompassing available space while a constructed ob-
server is restricted to a space subordinate to that basic space. 
The space a basic observer may access effectively corresponds to what gets 
treated as actuality – a baseline relative to which alternatives are defined. Technically, 
‘actuality’ in this sense is a relative notion. The status of the actual depends on lack 
of access to more basic spaces. This condition (for any given space treated as actual) 
is compatible with either the space truly being subordinate to no other or it being 
a closed system from within which the presence of a more encompassing reality 
cannot be verified (at the time).2 For current purposes, the reality manifest in basic 
human experience is granted this status of being actual for purposes of defining basic 
observers. Any observer which formats the information it integrates in a manner 
congruent with the form attributed to corresponding parts of said space qualifies as 
a basic observer. Due to their neurological similarities, at least all vertebrates ought 
 
1 Indeed, the shared actuality attributed to the three people is technically a single space wherein 
whoever was prompted to imagine it is themselves integrating information from the imagined in-
dividuals’ perspectives. These imagined perspectives are constructed using inference at best rather 
than facts accessible to the conceiving person. Thus, the result is a mental space distinct from the 
actuality it represents no matter the degree of convergence between the two. 
2 This is a nod to simulation theorists (e.g. Bostrom, 2003), since it is conceded that actuality itself 
could be but an elaborate model being simulated by some higher order system. However, this 
theoretical possibility does not otherwise impinge on the discussion on observers. 
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to qualify, and even some microbes might constitute basic observers in this sense if 
they feel aspects of their environment in a manner grounded in shared physiochem-
istry.3 So, in effect, a basic observer is one for which the totality of the spaces it may 
access cannot be reduced to the components of some more fundamental space. 
The states of an informationally isolated computer’s circuitry capable of sustaining 
a simulated reality, for instance, would not qualify as the system is but a part of a 
wider observable reality. The ‘may’ in this definition refers to the capacity to register 
such facts independently of contingent position. The definition may be rather techni-
cal to account for further possibilities but the prototypical basic observer is any con-
scious entity which may access its surroundings such as a human person. 
Meanwhile, constructed observers are limited to spaces which represent 
states of affairs embedded in the actual as proper parts in a manner non-congruent 
with their counterparts in that primary space. The forms of access which underlie such 
observers are those occurring in actuality rather than any represented directly in the 
subordinate spaces themselves. In the case of a read fiction, for instance, the text sys-
tematically prompts the construction of mental spaces within which the emulated 
experience of a viewpoint character is reliant on neural connections rather than 
space-internal processes analogous to actual perception such as the character seeing 
something. Similarly, the scenery presented on a computer screen while playing an 
immersive virtual game is integrated based on the states of the computer and 
therefore represents those actual, physical states in a distinct manner. What defines 
a constructed observer is how the elements of the space(s) available to one may be 
mapped onto those present in a more fundamental space. They include those which 
are implemented neurally based on prompts provided by texts expressing theories 
of meaning as well. With this formulation, such observers and the spaces they 
inhabit remain reducible to physical processes. 
 
3 Damasio (2018, pp. 53–56), for instance, speculates on the nature of microbial existence and 
whether a limited phenomenology may precede neural systems based on the more basic homeo-
static principle of organic systems seeking a state of sustainable equilibrium relative to the condi-
tions of their continued existence. 
Observers  74 
       
 
    
3.1.2 Positioned and Detached Observers 
The other relevant discussion involves whether or not the specified observers are die-
getic relative to the space accessible to them – whether they are subject to the same 
rules as any other entities within the space. As an illustration of the principle, consider 
a scene on film where two people stand in line, both facing the audience. Viewers 
who mentally emulate the scene in question as part of understanding it may take 
on the position of either of the depicted people who are positioned and therefore, 
for instance, only the person standing behind the other would see their companion. 
Approaching the situation form the perspective of either of them involves being 
subject to considerations which are imported (Mahtani, 2012) to the scenario based 
on its resemblance with reality. In contrast, the camera that provides the audience’s 
primary point of view generally remains a non-entity without a distinct representa-
tion within the narrative or corresponding mental space. Unless they are allowed to 
break the fourth wall, neither person facing the camera would recognise its presence, 
for instance.4 This viewpoint consists of the cut compiled using material from each 
recording device on the filming set. Because the presence of the camera can some-
times be recognised, even if such observers are typically transparent, such non-pre-
sence is not a defining quality of being a detached observer. The rules to which they 
are subject being dictated selectively instead of being derived from the general rules 
within that space allows for either possibility. 
In effect, the positioned and detached observers occupying a space are de-
fined relative to the source of the rules applied to them. Positioned observers share 
a set of rules defining what is possible within the space while each detached observer 
is subject to an independently specified, idiosyncratic set of rules. In neither case do 
the rules need to be explicitly stated: they are embodied in the presentation itself. For 
instance, positioned basic observers are subject to causality-based information 
 
4 This example has little to do with the set at which a film is shot. The actors obviously see the camera 
in this scenario unless it is hidden for some reason. Rather, the space of the narrative corresponds 
to the mental spaces audiences construct using the cues the film provides. Within that space, the 
shown people correspond to their characters rather than the actors, even though the audience may 
also connect their identities across spaces when they recognise the actor. 
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transfer and may not access distal facts without a corresponding causal pathway such 
as the kinetic energy embodying sound reaching the ear. Since they occupy distinct 
spaces, constructed observers may be positioned even when they are only subject 
to such rules grounded on actuality in terms of the physical substrate which under-
lies the space they occupy. If the rules of the constructed space are lenient enough 
or contain special clauses for exceptional entities, a positioned observer may even 
have degrees of access encompassing the whole space which is a privilege usually 
associated with detached perspectives. Lewis (1979b, p. 139), for instance, prompts 
one to imagine two gods positioned within a shared possible world. Both possess 
a form of omniscience where they know every true proposition about the possible 
world they occupy, and one lives atop the tallest mountain while the other lives 
atop the coldest mountain. Within the rules specified for the space one is prompted 
to imagine, therefore, even a positioned observer may access every fact indepen-
dently of their position – as long as they are a god. Yet, there is also the detached 
perspective from which one imagines the scenario based on Lewis’s instructions and 
presumably, even the two gods are treated as ignorant of it. 
The sense in which detached observers are non-diegetic involves them not 
being subject to the general rules of whichever space they inhabit and instead having 
their relation to that space be based on individually specified conditions. Such excep-
tionalism does not entail more comprehensive access but it is a common trait asso-
ciated with the usual roles for detached observers. An omniscient narrator, for in-
stance, is used in place of a positioned perspective to allow the audience access to 
a perspective from which characters’ errors in judgement based on their limited per-
spective can be made evident, among other things. Similarly, expressing any general 
explanatory model must view the phenomenon with a degree of abstraction as such 
models correspond to no specific instances of it. As such, the perspective from which 
they are presented concerns a constructed space instead of directly applying to ac-
tuality. Such constructed spaces’ limits are defined by the perspectives from which 
they are accessed: within them, to exist is to be witnessed. While it might be possible 
to present such models from a positioned perspective relative to said space, position-
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ing a perspective would require specifying how it operates despite doing so providing 
no obvious benefit. A detached observer position allows the material to just be pre-
sented directly – even if such transparency to the audience may hide that the de-
tached perspective remains a particular perspective. As is discussed down the line, 
this perspective ought not to be assumed to be some universal position of objective 
inquiry, either. Instead of instantiating a singular view from nowhere (Nagel, 1986), 
each detached observer is constructed individually as part of the process of some-
one selecting what is presented and what is excluded as part of the worldmaking 
(Goodman, 1978) for representing a phenomenon or narrative. That selection over 
what qualifies for inclusion is necessarily involved ought to already prove that the 
results are not an unfiltered representation of objective reality. However, even when 
the ideal of aperspectival objectivity is being approximated, the perspectives in ques-
tion apply to distinct constructed spaces, making them separate. The degree to which 
they converge around the ideal ought to be assessed by heeding the specifics. 
These two axes yield a taxonomy for categorising observers. Three of the 
four resulting categories are pertinent to the main discussion: (1) positioned basic 
observers, (2) positioned constructed observers, and (3) detached constructed ob-
servers. While the theories themselves introduce various constructed observers, they 
remain dependent on positioned basic observers – mainly real people – to instantiate 
these positions in corresponding mental spaces (and the like). The layered model with 
its multiple stages of integration allows for layers embedded as parts of the input for 
such basic observers to be isolated as distinct constructed observer positions. Such 
extraction respects physical monism while providing a concrete means to capture 
how such perspectives operate as parts of the relevant phenomena such as theories 
of meaning. In effect, the mental spaces constructed based on the directing prompts 
provided by external media like texts possess systematic similarities, the extent of 
which depends in part on the cognitive resources available to differently primed de-
mographics.5 These relationships between the form in which a theory is expressed 
 
5 The contributions of cultural evolution are left largely unaddressed but such dynamics are assumed 
to underlie both the differences and the similarities between demographics’ mental models. No 
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and different people may then be used to characterise the contents of the theory 
itself in a manner reducible to material facts. Namely, specific material configurations 
embody features which ground their potential to systematically engender function-
ally similar neuronal compositions. Both positioned and detached observers are pre-
sent in theories of meaning, specifically, as they must provide both a link to how 
meaning manifests to people because of the subject matter and a generic model.6 
3.2 Access 
What underlies the physicalism of the presented notion of observers is its reliance 
on access: the directed flow of physically embodied information. Degree of access 
specifies the bounded domain within which information is available to a specified 
observer, and it consists of sets of modes of access present in determinate points 
of access. The former define which facts register and the latter where. Both rely on 
the presence of enabling structures with features discussed below. While this chapter 
substantiates this aspect of the formal definitions, the subject is also of independent 
interest because of other potential applications for (parts of) the model. 
3.2.1 Modes of Access 
Modes of access correspond to the various forms of reactive sensitivity which allow 
a structure to convey information. They are defined relative to three features these 
 
particular theory is treated as uniquely apt but aspects of epidemiological models (e.g. Sperber, 
1996; 2001; 2006), meme theory (e.g. Heylighen, 1999; Heylighen & Chielens, 2009), and dual-in-
heritance models (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 2005; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) each appear to 
help explain the distribution dynamics of mental and public representations in part. 
6 The sense in which meaning is anchored to how it manifests to people merely involves the notion 
that no matter how divergent the predictions a theory makes or no matter how far-removed the 
sources of influence a theory postulates might be, these details ought to be related to how peo-
ple experience meaning. The two need not be equated but because the forms of experiences as-
sociated with meaning are necessary for questions concerning meaning to become the object of 
inquiry, it remains imperative to provide a sense of the relationship between such experiences 
and what a given theory of meaning claims. For instance, Stalnaker (1999; 2014) employs possible 
worlds to represent propositional content and contextual information, yet this apparatus which 
hardly presents itself in experience is intended to explain meaning as it is experienced, including 
features such as statements considered true sometimes involving counterfactual states of affairs 
(e.g. ‘Had I not hesitated, I would have succeeded.’) (Stalnaker, 1970, pp. 32–34). 
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structures must minimally possess: (1) reactivity, (2) compliance, and (3) accretion. 
The first two enable conveying information: the structure must react to its surround-
ings with a degree of consistency. Accretion turns mere conveyance of information 
to a form of access: what is being conveyed contributes towards an aggregate which 
manifests it in some format. In effect, when specifiable stimuli engender a systematic 
reaction which feeds information towards some system of integration, the structure 
can be attributed corresponding modes of access. 
Both reactivity and compliance characterise how a structure behaves in rela-
tion to available (and therefore immediate) presences. Being reactive involves the 
capacity to change in response to such conditions. Reactivity is required because a 
perfectly static state across all possible conditions fails to differentiate between the 
conditions and cannot thus act as an index7 signifying any of them. As per Shannon’s 
(1948) conception of information, conveying any information requires reduction in 
uncertainty concerning which possible state of affairs is being actualised. A non-
reactive structure fails to differentiate between such conditions and thus, access to 
said state cannot reduce uncertainty over which is being actualised. Compliance, in 
turn, consists of differential degrees of correlation between pairs of inputs and out-
puts. Lack of compliance corresponds to the state of a structure fluctuating inde-
pendently from the presented states of affairs, resulting in similar non-differentia-
tion among the states to which the structure does react. Mechanisms may only act 
to store and convey information when inputs correlate with outputs.8 Such compli-
ance can be quantified relative to each pairing associated with a structure, and this 
would yield a distribution of probabilities for the inputs yielding a given output. Any 
correlation suffices to reduce uncertainty and thereby convey some information, 
and this model presents no standardised minimum thresholds. Instead, the extrac-
 
7 ‘An Index is a sign which refers to the Object it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that 
Object. […] it is not the mere resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which makes it a sign, 
but it is the actual modification of it by the Object.’ (Peirce, 1955, p. 102, emphasis in original). 
8 ‘The mechanism is a mechanism of information storage, because the properties that figure in the 
content of its output are (to a degree determined by the accuracy of the mechanism) the properties 
possessed by the objects which are the input to it.’ (Evans, 1982, p. 125). 
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tion of discrete facts occurs during integration based on predictive processing (e.g. 
Clark, 2016) as discussed in section 3.3.9 
Neuronal structures help illustrate these principles’ contribution to the flow 
of information in action. If a neuron sensitive to the state of a receptor cell reacts to 
changes in the latter and changes in the latter correlate systematically with sets of 
conditions, then the firing of the neuron also carries information on some element 
of that set having been presented to the receptor. For example, a vanilloid receptor 
1 (TRPV1) reacts equally to at least four distinct conditions: temperatures greater 
than 43˚C, presence of capsaicin or allyl isothiocyanate (AITC), and deviations from 
neutral pH (Dhaka et al, 2009). Neurons sensitive to the corresponding reaction only 
convey that the receptor has reacted and thus the information that at least one of 
these conditions has been presented to it but not which condition. Once the informa-
tion these neurons convey becomes integrated within the central nervous system, 
a set feeling is produced. Properly speaking, this feeling should thus be considered 
the feeling of a generic TRPV1 response even if it is primarily associated with heat. 
What that feeling represents subjectively depends on other available information 
such as the expectations seeing and feeling a chilli pepper enter the mouth generate. 
The inclusion of accretion turns this mere flow of information to access. A 
structure is accretive when the information it expresses is directed towards greater 
integration. Thus, a structure may only become accretive when it is incorporated in 
a system wherein there exists an information-retaining pathway between the struc-
ture and some system of information integration. Such pathways consist of other 
 
9 Underlying this model is an adaptation of Dretske’s (1981, p. 57) xerox principle: ‘If A carries the 
information that B, and B carries the information that C, then A carries the information that C.’ How-
ever, the current model operates on disjunctive possibilities rather than discrete facts themselves 
being conveyed in this manner. As Lloyd (1989, p. 43) observes, some simile of this principle is ne-
cessary when information must be retained across sub-events. Lloyd (Ibid. pp. 43–48) is critical of 
Dretske’s approach because his epistemological focus requires univocal relations while informa-
tion tends to be compatible with a set of conditions, threatening even its ability to ground repre-
sentation. The current approach accepts that at most, information may concern the possibility of 
a state of affairs attaining and resolves the issue of representation by linking the reliability of subjec-
tive certainty to objective probabilities within local ecological conditions. 
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structures which react compliantly to the conditions corresponding to the states of 
preceding constituents of the pathway. A nerve is but one example of such a path-
way, and its proper constituents could be specified with more granularity than the 
states of individual neurons, given how synaptic and axonal communication works. 
As the later distinction between primary and extended access illustrates, being ac-
cretive is not restricted to such enduring structures, either: when an information-
conveying process interfaces with an appropriately sensitive system, its prior stages 
may be retrospectively redefined as being accretive.10 Similarly, the retina of an eye-
ball is only accretive when it feeds towards some system able to integrate the em-
bodied information in some format, whether a brain or a machine. 
3.2.2 Points of Access 
Points of access are merely coordinates which correspond to modes of access. Note 
how modes of access being limited to their immediate surroundings would there-
fore prevent extending the domain an observer may access to include states of af-
fairs distal to them. The proposed solution involves drawing a distinction between 
primary access and extended access to characterise differences between contribut-
ing proximal and distal processes. Primary access is linked to stable structures which 
remain accretive by virtue of their design whereas extended access consists of pro-
cesses made accretive when they interface with such systems. Because the identity 
of an observer is defined in terms of the full extent of its access, this section there-
fore tries to clarify how the identity conditions of such observers are inclusive of con-
ditions external to the central systems responsible for primary access. The identity 
of the observer itself extends to encompass factors like photon trajectories. 
Systems of primary access are structures with distinct temporal and modal 
sustainability relative to a frame of reference. This feature is called stability, and in 
effect, the more stable a system is, the longer the average span of its modal coun-
 
10 For instance, when a photon reaches a photoreceptor linked to a functioning central nervous 
system, the states defining its trajectory contribute towards distal information such as the texture 
of a surface being accessed and integrated. 
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terparts must be.11 The identity of such a system is not treated as dependent on its 
particular constituents: the relevant cross-temporal and cross-modal counterparts 
only require structural continuity of constellations of functionally fungible constitu-
ents. This is not a general claim about identity conditions but in this sense, insofar as 
cross-temporal identity may be attributed, changes in fungible constituents do not 
affect the definitive structural relations. A system’s level of stability would thus be 
defined as the average span of those counterparts which share initial matching states 
defined in terms of structural relations. In practice, the systems responsible for 
primary access would thus include the parts of everyday objects which enable infor-
mation to be transferred towards integration: neuronal subsystems connected to sen-
sory receptors, circuitry from input devices, and so forth. One need not designate 
the whole person. Since the frame of reference is not set, however, systems exceeding 
such cases or sub-systems are also applicable. When a whole planet is put in focus, 
if some species have generated information-integrating loci where relatively inter-
changeable actors provide relatively stable inputs to relatively stable integrating 
systems, such processes constitute primary access for a form of observer defined 
relative to the collective. 
However, the formal identities grounded in definition 1.2 must differentiate 
between observers at a level of granularity greater than such primary systems alone 
allow. Specifying clearly bounded domains in this manner also reveals the limita-
tions of the constructed observers theories of meaning incorporate: the selectiveness 
of the detached observer and the difference between ideal and actual processors 
of meaning. The inclusion of extended access helps define such domains. A system 
of primary access interfacing with compatible information-bearing processes external 
to it makes such processes accretive and therefore, institutive of modes of access. 
One necessary concession to enable this is framing events as four-dimensional struc-
 
11 Modality is invoked to avoid incidentally prolonged conditions becoming treated as parts of a 
primary system. For instance, one may imagine a person staring at a wall. Unless they are bound, 
regardless of how long the actual staring takes, this configuration is not stable since it can be broken 
by the person breaking eye contact. Similarly, incidental termination only has limited effect on such 
averages if the system is otherwise self-sustaining. 
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tures where prior states of involved processes inform their subsequent stages. A 
photon’s trajectory, for instance, would constitute such a structure where its state 
at any stage is sensitive to its state at the preceding stage, and each embodies infor-
mation on its prior position and direction as a result. This is a matter of framing for 
restricted purposes rather than a metaphysical thesis. The result is being able to 
treat such processes as pathways for information which is hardly controversial, given 
how momentary states are compatible with limited preceding states, resulting in 
reduced uncertainty when they are in turn accessed. 
The interfaces between primary access systems and their extensions which 
enable extended access can be characterised as (access-related) affordances.12 These 
systems have evolved to tap the myriad of naturally information-bearing processes 
which are uniform enough to be associated with predictable conditions. Such pro-
cesses include trajectories of photons, diffusion of chemicals, and vibrations across 
mediums. When an interface is formed, these information-bearing processes external 
to the primary system become accretive and therefore fulfil the conditions for access. 
As such, the model may accommodate the direct realist intuition that people perceive 
the world rather than a representation of it (e.g. McDowell, 1994, p. 26). One has ac-
cess not only to their immediate surroundings and internal states (e.g. Clark, 2016, 
pp. 15–16) but also to the distal states which define experience. Access alone does 
not suffice for most epistemic purposes, though, as the next section illustrates. How-
ever, this model of extended access allows the whole process of observation to be 
characterised as a continuous, singular process where each relevant process is re-
duced to access alongside integration. In contrast, more intuitive notions tend to 
starkly differentiate between internal and external forms of access – cognition and 
perception – and model each around familiar forms such as unvoiced speech and 
sight. The benefit of this model in comparison lies in its recognition of the continuity 
between these processes and its generality. As such, the model allows highlighting 
how information transfer as part of internal processes has multiply realisable rather 
 
12 As a reminder, an affordance is ‘an opportunity for use or interaction which some object or state 
of affairs presents to a certain kind of agent’ (Clark, 1997, p. 172). 
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than essential conditions similarly to how perception can be deceived, and it can be 
extended to systems of observation distinct from humans and other mammals.  
3.3 Integration 
Here, integration is defined as the input from multiple channels of access being algo-
rithmically parsed into a unified format. The process must be algorithmic13 to avoid 
invoking higher-order intentionality in explaining the nature of its results.14 When 
observers are defined using embedded layers of integration where each formats the 
input from set points of access, the model accommodates analysing both sub-per-
sonal observers like positions relative to mental spaces and higher order observers 
which use individual perspectives as inputs. The former option matters for purposes 
of explaining the sense in which theories of meaning incorporate standardised ob-
servers without postulating dubious existences. The latter helps explain how a sense 
of objectivity may arise from objectifying one’s usual perspective as one among 
many which one may conceive relative to a state of affairs. In so doing, one appears 
to assume a detached position with multiple embedded positioned observers, 
including one (or more) with which one personally identifies. This section discusses 
the nature of such integration and its role relative to manifest experience. 
3.3.1 Weak Integration 
One brief distinction to made among such algorithmic processes of integration lies 
between the types dubbed weak integration and strong integration, respectively. It 
draws attention to how technologies such as scientific apparatuses modelling sub-
aromic particle behaviour or even cameras are not transparent: they also format in-
 
13 An algorithmic merely obeys a set of rules reducible to univocal input-output pairs. In this con-
text, it involves being explicable based solely on the structural features of a system. Dennett (1995, 
pp. 52–60) deems all such processes algorithmic in this sense (Ibid. 57). 
14 Either the relevant procedures are reducible to sets of algorithms or they are not. If they are 
not, then they are either irreducible or reducible to non-algorithmic processes. Treating the pro-
cedures as irreducible is a non-explanation. Non-algorithmic processes would either have indeter-
minate relations between inputs and outputs or involve arbitration. The former option is another 
non-explanation while the latter is dependent on capacities which presuppose the system itself 
in terms of evolutionary priority. By process of elimination, only algorithmic processing is viable. 
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formation in a manner not inherent in the input accessible to them. While such sys-
tems do not self-modulate and therefore, do not strictly integrate information in the 
strong sense (e.g. Tononi, 2004; Damasio, 2018), they do incorporate information in 
set formats and help relay access over distance and duration. The main difference, 
therefore, is how the entities made manifest in their format are only accessible ex-
ternally due to lack of recursive structures. 
Consider the alternative. Walton (1984) treats photographs as transparent 
in the sense that whatever they depict is itself being seen when the photograph is 
viewed.15 While in this view, the seen photographs are not ‘duplicates or doubles or 
reproductions of objects, or substitutes or surrogates for them’ (Ibid. p. 252, emphasis 
in original), they are still treated solely as relays. In effect, Walton – alongside other 
philosophers of photography emphasising the continuity between the object and 
the image (e.g. Cohen & Meskin, 2004) – appears to consider the form of the pro-
duced images inherited from their objects. According to such a view, what is depicted 
already seems to be present in the input. Despite the extremity of Walton’s position 
that the depicted objects themselves are seen when a photograph of them is being 
viewed,16 the notion that unedited photographs depict things as they appear should 
appear intuitive enough. Yet, this is the position being subverted since treating such 
systems and their products as forms of integration involves attributing characteristic 
formats of parsing to each. 
The issue is ultimately simple: photographs irretrievably transform their in-
put. The most important evidence comes from considering the four-dimensionality 
of photographic input. While the technology has advanced, making exposure times 
effectively instantaneous, the full input does not arrive in a single, continuous wave 
of photons. Rather, successive interactions with a slice from a stream of photons 
ground an image. This input resembles Michael Murphy’s 2015 sculpture ‘Perceptual 
 
15 ‘Photographs are transparent. We see the world through them. […] the viewer of a photograph 
sees, literally, the scene that was photographed.’ (Walton, 1984, pp. 251–252, emphasis in original). 
16 Costello and Phillips (2009) provide an overview of the state of philosophy of photography and 
Walton’s relation to the other positions on the epistemic questions photographs present. 
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Shift’17 – the stream only matches the image relative to an axis orthogonal to the sur-
face. Additionally, the granularity of an image ensures that each functional unit such 
as a pixel is compatible with multiple inputs without differentiating between them 
since minuscule differences between arrival positions do not register. That a photo-
graph manages to regardless provide a satisfactory representation of a scene should 
draw attention to the similarities in the ways both it and human visual processing 
are forced to accommodate the physical facts. In both instances, integration occurs. 
The camera integrates inputs over a set period and formats them accordingly. Be-
cause it is designed to mimic the corresponding scenes visible to humans from the 
same positions, this results in a semblance of transparency. However, since a trans-
formation occurs and neither the order of arrival nor the exact position of inputs may 
be retrieved from the image, this transparency is an illusion.18 
3.3.2 Strong Integration 
The alternative, strong integration, corresponds to what Tononi (2004) just calls inte-
gration. Its defining characteristic is the produced states being causally interdepen-
dent: local changes ripple through the network until a new equilibrium or other stable 
pattern emerges. Tononi (2004) describes the underlying dynamic as shared effective 
information within a complex being greater than nil.19 The quantity of such effective 
information within a system defines the degree to which it integrates information. 
 
17 ‘Perceptual Shift’ consists of 1252 wooden balls of various sizes painted black and hung from 
the ceiling using subtle fibres. When viewed against a white wall from a certain angle, the balls 
produce a halftone image of an eye. Viewing them from any other angle reveals how the balls are 
set along a third dimension – depth – to produce the two-dimensional image. 
18 While the above discussion only addresses the example of photography, the reasoning appears 
generalisable to other media such as voice recordings or video. For instance, fidelity is a factor on 
which recording and playback devices are assessed. In practice, most systems introduce some 
change but even the most fidelitous medium could be expected to bottleneck the recorded sound-
scape as the positioning of the playback devices replaces that of the sources. Thus, while sound 
is more of a continuous medium and therefore does not share the problem with input being 
flattened or coarsened, the directedness of its elements (echoes, etc.) would at least require very 
specific setups to be transparently emulated. 
19 ‘[A] subset S of elements cannot integrate any information (as a subset) if there is a way to par-
tition S in two parts A and B such that EI(A⇋B) = 0 […] In such a case, in fact, we would clearly be 
dealing with at least two causally independent subsets, rather than with a single, integrated sub-
set.’ (Tononi, 2004, section 2, paragraph 15) 
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Complexes are units for the strong integration of information: systems where each 
symmetrical combination of elements embodies a non-zero amount of effective in-
formation and the total effective information of the whole exceeds any combination 
of its parts.20 Effective information between parts of a system consists of the mutual 
information between the maximum possible output of entropy by one part and the 
entropy of another. This value expresses the potential dependence of the latter’s 
states on those of the former, and the definition makes the methodological assump-
tion that any change in the dependent half for a given calculation could be influenced 
by the other half. However, since complexes are defined symmetrically, any external 
influences should be mitigated. Finally, mutual information between two parts is the 
combined (Shannon) entropy of the two parts from whence the entropy of the system 
encompassing both is deducted.21 In effect, it expresses how much information know-
ing only one entity’s state conveys about the state of the other. 
While Tononi focuses on information embodied in contemporaneous states 
of constitutive elements such as neuronal nodes, for current purposes, effective infor-
mation only acts as evidence for strong integration.22 The defining quality it expresses 
 
20 ‘[T]o establish which subsets are actually capable of integrating information, and how much of 
it […] we consider every possible subset S of m elements out of the n elements of a system, starting 
with subsets of two elements (m = 2) and ending with a subset corresponding to the entire system 
(m = n). For each of them, we measure the value of Φ, and rank them from highest to lowest. 
Finally, we discard all those subsets that are included in larger subsets having higher Φ (since they 
are merely parts of a larger whole). What we are left with are complexes – individual entities that 
can integrate information. Specifically, a complex is a subset S having Φ>0 that is not included 
within a larger subset having higher Φ.’ (Tononi, 2004, section 2, paragraph 16, emphasis in original). 
In the notation, Φ denotes the minimum information bipartition between pairs of elements within 
a set and thus corresponds to the degree of (strong) information integration the total set can be 
attributed (Ibid. section 2, paragraph 15). 
21 ‘One way is to divide S into two complementary parts A and B, and evaluate the responses of B 
that can be caused by all possible inputs originating from A. […] In information-theoretical terms, 
we give maximum entropy to the outputs from A (AHmax), i.e. we substitute its elements with inde-
pendent noise sources, and we determine the entropy of the responses of B that can be induced 
by inputs from A. Specifically, we define the effective information between A and B as EI(A→B) = 
MI(AHmax;B). Here MI(A;B) = H(A) + H(B) - H(AB) stands for mutual information, a measure of the 
entropy or information shared between a source (A) and a target (B).’ (Tononi, 2004, section 2, 
paragraph 14) 
22 Correlated states are unsatisfactory because focusing on correlation eschews the temporal delay 
which interaction involves. It is possible for parts of a system to be participating in integration de-
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is the involved components being causally intertwined and therefore, the presence 
of pathways which enable interactions in either direction. Strong integration occurs 
whenever the states of the elements of an information-organising system are 
causally interconnected – whenever changes in the state of one at least potentially 
influence the states of other parts of the system. It is absent when parts of the sys-
tem may be modified without other parts changing materially. Effective information 
between parts of a system therefore becomes a measure of such interconnectedness. 
The linked notion of complexes still matters since it helps express how and why ob-
servers may be defined with a strongly integrating system acting as the terminus. 
The constant modulation between the parts of such a system makes it continuously 
present its state to itself. This feature in turn enables relatively stable retention of 
access and therefore, formats involving manifest identity for involved entities. 
Unlike a weakly integrating system which only presents outward for lack of 
self-modulation, a complex involves bidirectional flow of information. Enabling such 
symmetry requires recursive structures.23 The delay which results from information 
traveling in this looped structure allows information to be retained because parts 
can be reminded of their prior states: the resulting states of subsequent parts of the 
system which it registers later also embody information about said prior states. 
Money lending provides a parallel: when the money is returned, the lender is remind-
ed of the arrangement. As a result, any information accessed by the system is to an 
extent present in the state of the whole system through still affected local states 
which continue to engender appropriate reactions. Ideally, the system is then able 
to reconsolidate the information present in it by replicating functional approximations 
of the states which were originally associated with specific information. 
 
spite their contemporaneous states being uncorrelated. However, inputs having various semi-con-
stants (e.g. presence of approximate generic shapes and colour constants) help synchronise the 
results in practice much of the time since they help the same states recur across this delay. 
23 Recursive structures are distinct from recursive functions (e.g. Hauser et al, 2002) and need not 
involve any even in a cognitive context. References to recursivity are ambiguous (Mota, 2017) (e.g. 
embedment in homomorphous structures, specifying values based on prior values, self-reference) 
but in this context, such structures ground loops of interaction. 
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Such retainment makes the corresponding domain of access co-present to 
the system for purposes of integration which has the crucial effect of enabling it to 
establish relations of identity across instances. Despite differences in terms of termi-
nology and purpose, similar reasons are associated with neuronal recursion possibly 
enabling symbolic representation (e.g. Pulvermüller, 2002; Bickerton, 2003).24 Name-
ly, the rate of neuronal decay and its parallels in other systems enable configurations 
where parts are sensitive to the co-occurrence of different parts’ states associated 
with temporally distinct reactions to functionally equivalent stimuli. Establishing iden-
tity, specifically, requires cross-temporal (or -modal) information.25 While sameness 
can be grounded in similarity or continuity across a momentary input, self-sameness 
appears dependent on relating such instances across other dimensions. Illustrating 
as much takes imagining an arbitrary static image. Whatever identities would be at-
tributed to its constituents appear liable to be overruled based on their behaviour 
if the scene were to move. If, for instance, camouflaged insects were part of the scene, 
what was initially treated as parts of plants or terrain would receive independent at-
tributed identity. 
3.3.3 Integration and Manifest Experience 
As presented, access may only provide statistical information (Shannon, 1948) which 
may never correspond with a singular, definite content without having been restricted 
to a limited set of possible results.26 As a result, the state of any access-enabling 
 
24 ‘The brain is adept at merging series of discrete inputs into coherent wholes (it does this every 
time you look at anything), and it can keep track of the sequence of its own operations through 
the gradualness with which neuronal activity decays […] All that is needed to run [a system with syn-
tax] is a far higher number of neurons and more of both cortico-cortical and cortico-cerebellar con-
nections than we find in the brains of other primates.’ (Bickerton, 2003, p. 90). 
25 Forms of weak integration with temporal dimensions do not qualify. A record such as a long-
exposure photograph which integrates information across a period does not differentiate between 
moments of exposure. Records of extended periods which have a temporal dimension themselves 
such as video or audio records also merely provide a series of such products which manifest as a 
whole once they’re accessed by a system capable of cross-temporal integration. 
26 ‘These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The sig-
nificant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible messages. The 
system must be designed to operate for each possible selection, not just the one which will 
actually be chosen since this is unknown at the time of design. / If the number of messages in the 
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structure objectively conveys the possibility of every compatible preceding state of 
affairs. By itself, a signal does not differentiate between chemical imbalances among 
neurons and an externally induced stimulus. Such statistical information underdeter-
mines the definite, source-oriented, and largely truthful contents of experience, in 
other words. For the model to be minimally viable, therefore, this disparity must be 
overcome. The proposed solution is to account for evolutionary concerns as a factor 
in the priming of the system’s available baseline information relative to which further 
input is formatted. The details an organism-based observer extracts based on 
evolutionary priorities involve wellbeing-related interactions with its environment.27 
The relative invariance of such conditions over evolutionary history optimises 
adapted systems for this set of conditions. In effect, then, such systems are informed 
by millennia of precedent, resulting in their success rate under congruent enough 
later conditions.28 
Experience being definite may appear a given but in principle, the notion of 
a being experiencing a set of integrated possibilities is not inconceivable. Reality 
could, for instance, manifest as a set of overlapped phantom states of affairs to such 
an entity, with each such possibility’s salience being correlated with its approximate 
probability given accessed information. If such an entity is conceivable, one may then 
ask what factors have made experience definite. Epistemically, the alternative seems 
preferable: recognising each possibility extends available knowledge, and the entity 
could directly consolidate its sense of the real through falsifying action directed at 
 
set is finite then this number or any monotonic function of this number can be regarded as a 
measure of the information produced when one message is chosen from the set, all choices being 
equally likely.’ (Shannon, 1948, p. 379, emphasis in original) 
27 ‘[Predictive processing] […] results in the creation and deployment of what Cisek and Kalaska 
(2011) called “pragmatic” representations: representations tailored to the production of good on-
line control rather than aiming for rich mirroring of an action-independent world. Those represen-
tations simultaneously serve epistemic functions, sampling the world in ways designed to test our 
hypotheses and to yield better information for the control of action itself.’ (Clark, 2016, p. 251) 
28 The separate issue of explaining why information integration should result in phenomenal 
consciousness is not addressed here. However, Tononi (Tononi et al, 2016) argues that the informa-
tion integration theory of consciousness on which the presented model is partially based suffices 
to answer this hard problem of consciousness. 
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manifest possibilities. Assuming a suitable degree of cognitive capacity, it would be 
akin to a scientist who may directly observe each hypothesis compatible with the 
data. If the alternative is epistemically preferable, experience being definite instead 
cannot rely solely on epistemic considerations. Minimally, it would be a compromise 
– perhaps a temporary solution afforded by the current stage of development to-
wards ideal realisations. However, the process of evolution is only sensitive to differ-
ential rates of propagation between available variants. In turn, rate of propagation 
is analysable into probability of opportunities, reliability of replication, and persis-
tence. The average number of opportunities depends on their frequency over the 
available span of time, and success at propagation requires a degree of fidelity be-
tween the product and the original. Epistemic proficiency is a means towards these 
ends from that perspective,29 and evolution is the guiding principle of orgasnims’ 
inter-generational development. Thus, if having accessed information manifest as 
definite experience provides the greater edge in these respects, such factors would 
possess greater explanatory power towards accommodating the fact that experi-
ence is definite. Alternative explanations such as a contingent lack of suitable muta-
tions cannot be disproven but their reliance on incidental factors weakens them. 
Since the realities of life involve finite windows of opportunity and energy 
reserves, one must consider the relative processing effort and effects on decision-
making between definite and modally inclusive formats for available information. 
Because the former would be embedded as part of the latter as it corresponds to one 
among many possibilities, given similar fidelity, cross-modal processing is inherently 
more strenuous. This increased effort involves both time and energy consumption, 
including individuals needing to develop the necessary parallel structures. Hence, 
modally inclusive experience has a higher associated cost to be recuperated and yet, 
its epistemic benefits appear to provide diminishing returns relative to survival rate. 
After all, should the function which sense modalities evolve to fulfil be regulating 
externally induced effects on internal homeostasis (Damasio, 2018, pp. 24–26, 49–
 
29 ‘[H]ere-and-now behaviour is enabled by using sensing […] as a channel to enable the organism 
to co-ordinate its behaviours with select aspects of this distal environment.’ (Clark, 2016, p. 190) 
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51), they need only direct relations with entities which afford manageable effects on 
wellbeing. Evolutionarily, only such results have any impact. Focusing on the available 
threats over opportunities, time is of the essence. One must be able to react in a 
directed manner as early as possible. In this respect, the lower processing effort of 
definite representations is vital. Indeed, the clutter of a modally inclusive phe-
nomenology risks decision paralysis or distractions through reduced relative salience 
of evolutionarily possibilities with high expected value (e.g. predators’ outlines). Given 
how reliably the produced definite experience suffices for directing evolutionarily 
relevant behaviour, the added epistemic value of alternatives cannot exceed the 
costs under the circumstances. Similar considerations apply to experience being 
source-oriented rather than pathway-inclusive. There is no means to monitor the 
source of such states independently of a secondary channel. Thus, if the pathway 
developed to inform the organism of evolutionarily significant conditions – whether 
external or internal – any part being in the corresponding state would become inte-
grated as expressing the associated condition. Awareness of the states of the pathway 
would help understand its functioning but such information is evolutionarily worth-
less because it would merely accompany other information without further differen-
tiating between states. If the signal were a sign, such information would just compli-
cate the signifier for the same signified.30 
The accuracy with which states of affairs grounded in the actual are picked 
among the alternatives relies on environmental constants across evolutionary his-
tory. How sensory input is formatted is accurate relative to a set of conditions rather 
than innately. On Earth, such factors include the distribution of liquids, solids, and 
 
30 Calling experience source-oriented is technically misleading because such sources are only de-
fined relative to the evolutionarily significant categories. The processes themselves are continuous. 
The light responsible for vision does not originate with objects refracting it. However, different 
stages afford information relative to different baselines. Dretske (1979, pp. 110–111), for instance, 
comments on how light technically embodies information about the chemical constitution of the 
originating star even if none may extract such information in absence of corresponding prior know-
ledge. With expert training based on accumulated scientific studies, such capacity might be attain-
able but evolutionary environments only afford enough information for more limited capacities 
to extract information concerning refracting surfaces and subsequent mediums. 
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gases and affordances associated with each given the properties of carbohydrate-
based life as well as the availability of light, orientations and textures of surfaces, and 
distortion incurred by common mediums such as air. Just consider cases where such 
conditions are not unambiguous but where set circumstances objectively dominate 
the evolutionary environment such as the difference between an Ames room and 
usually angled spaces.31 That distance can be parsed relative to horizontal lines is 
partly a feature of the environment of a globe with its vanishing points. The informa-
tion that the room is organised diagonally is one possibility the information presents 
– after all, it is the truth. The relevant illusions are notably not pathological or depen-
dent on the fidelity of the senses. That the system of integration regardless defaults 
to the prevailing norm ought to hint at its dependence on extrapolation – a depen-
dence which suffices under most standard conditions because the precedent has 
been established over evolutionary history. Had said evolution occurred within a 
space defined by alternative geometry (e.g. the concave internal surface of a sphere) 
and physiochemical distribution (e.g. primarily semi-translucent semisolids), the pos-
sibilities being accounted for should be expected to differ. For instance, sense of dis-
tance might be tied to colour-filtering where saturation and shifts in hues register as 
a sign of the thickness and number of separating semi-translucent layers. 
Overall, how experience appears to capture something real is best explained 
by the system responsible having adapted to the specific environmental affordances 
which have remained largely invariant throughout the process of evolution. Formats 
which serve environments different from those available on Earth – such as pervasive 
semi-translucent media instead of opaque surfaces – were shown to be conceivable 
above. If the principle that formats for structuring experience are subject to environ-
mental influences applies to some conditions, it ought to also apply to life on Earth. 
However, such results can at best be ambiguous as the information being formatted 
 
31 An Ames room is a construction intended to be approached from a set viewpoint, relative to 
which its diagonal angles are orthogonal. This causes issues with depth perception because from 
said angle, movement along a diagonal axis aligned with the false horizon appears to follow an 
equidistant orthogonal path. As a result, objects appear to shrink and grow along this path relative 
to said frame of reference. 
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is always compatible with multiple possible states of affairs. The system responsible 
for definite experiences cannot rely on deduction as disconfirming the additional 
possibilities would itself require definitive information of the sort which would only 
be deducible if the possibility of all alternative scenarios was disconfirmed. Not only 
is this requirement circular – as people’s susceptibility to illusions demonstrates, the 
method by which experience is derived must be fallible. Assuming that the precedent 
set by ecological invariants has guided the evolution of observational capacities pro-
vides the means to explain why the system succeeds under most conditions but fails 
in niche or evolutionarily irrelevant circumstances, yielding illusions instead. Instead 
of engendering the richest possible representations afforded by the data – such as 
a sense of all the compatible scenarios – the system responsible for the format of 
experience only accommodates evolutionary needs. While extrapolating definite 
scenarios from statistical information reliably requires vast background data, the 
conditions associated with evolutionary history provide exactly that, embodied in 
the structure of the relevant systems. 
3.4 Takeaway 
This chapter substantiated the formal model of observers presented as part of defi-
nition 1.2 for attributed situations. The model is adapted for representing the role 
of observers as part of theories of meaning in the next chapter, but the components 
presented here remain. This characterisation provides a sustainable foundation for 
understanding how such seemingly abstract entities fit within a materialist approach. 
The format of media like text is tailored to prompt people to construct structurally 
similar mental spaces where the exact degree of correspondence between them 
relies on the degree of shared cognitive models. Such mental spaces are presented 
relative to an implicit perspective which may only register what is provided but may 
then be incorporated into the wider perspective of the individual in question. The 
degree of access an observer possesses specifies what information is available to 
them based on the presence of causal pathways feeding into the system. Layered 
systems of integration explain how that information transforms into experience. 
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The provided taxonomy of different types of observers provides a framework 
for differentiating between the kinds of observers involved in theories of meaning 
becoming conceived based on presented prompts. One can distinguish between 
basic and constructed observers based on whether the format in which information 
manifests to them corresponds to actuality or not. All information transfer occurs in 
actuality but for constructed observers, it manifests in a distinct manner. Just consider 
the difference between viewing a DVD under a microscope or using an appropriate 
reader and monitor. Both methods convey the same information about the states 
of the disc but manifest very differently. Basic observers are necessary as the final 
layer of integration but one may also analyse the various constructed observers that 
can be embedded in such systems separately. Among such constructed observers, 
there are both positioned perspectives analogous to basic observers and detached 
perspectives. The main difference between the two appears to be whether the ob-
server is treated as subject to a general set of rules or an individually specified rule-
set. However, in practice, a detached observer tends to be a transparent lens through 
which material is presented without any reference to its presence whereas a posi-
tioned observer like a first-person narrator is explicitly recognised as such. Theories 
of meaning incorporate both types: the constructed but positioned perspective of 
the ideal processor of meaning, and the constructed detached perspective relative 
to which the theoretical model as a whole is presented. 
The important thing about access is how it is always conveyed by physical 
processes through causal interaction and how feeding towards a system of integra-
tion makes any such processes access-defining. As a result, the full domain of access 
for any given observer is not inclusive of only what is immediately present to them 
but also incidental external processes with which the central system interfaces and 
past states of affairs which they can recall, for instance. Additionally, even constructed 
observers rely on underlying causal processes and often a degree of access related 
to preceding facts can be attributed to them (e.g. a non-fiction book formats infor-
mation from observations related to its subject matter). This model simplifies the 
various forms of processes into a unified functional description which allows different 
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forms of available and presented information to be formalised under a framework 
that defines a bounded overall domain: points of access linked to sets of modes of 
access which each represent a degree of sensitivity to some immediate condition. 
Linking access to embedded layers of integration allows the role of various 
sub-systems to be highlighted individually. For instance, a photo conveys informa-
tion in a specific manner which integrates details selectively around a format which 
is suited for people to extract that information and form a corresponding impres-
sion about the depicted situation. A dog may see the same contents but it will not 
make such inferences and a blind person will be unable to interface with the image 
in the intended manner. In the case of theories of meaning, the observer positions 
involved are being instantiated by a sub-system of the brain of whoever is actively 
modelling the contents of the theory by conceiving the presented scenario as they 
understand it. When the cognitive models used for such reconstructions are suffi-
ciently similar – and especially when they are derived from functionally interchange-
able sources or sources with shared origins – the results can be generalised to re-
present how people of the associated demographics typically conceive the theory’s 
contents. When combined with the model of access, this model of integration allows 
representing both basic and constructed observers as well as the relationship be-
tween the two under a shared materialist framework. 
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This chapter adapts the schema inherent in the proposed model for attributed situa-
tions as a framing device for how the contents of theories of meaning are conceived. 
To this end, one must identify the shared structure between the two and map elements 
across the two accordingly. In effect, theories of meaning centre around their desig-
nated signifiers – the entities which instantiate the form of meaning being posited. 
The representations of such central entities are surrounded by the theory-specific 
sets of relations treated as definitive of applicable influences on the meanings of such 
entities. An idealised processor represents how such meaning manifests, linking the 
theory to experience (whether or not the two converge), and in conceiving all this, one 
relies on a detached perspective the viewpoint from which it is all presented provides. 
Representing the range of ways in which theories become conceived involves identi-
fying demographics where members paraphrase the contents of the theory similarly. 
Once such a demographic has been found, one lists potential influences on their con-
ceptions typical of the demographic in question (e.g. cultural capital). The idealised 
representation of how members of that group would typically conceive the contents 
of a theory is reconstructed by considering the cognitive models which the text would 
prompt under only this selection of influences. While the results correspond to no par-
ticular person’s conception, they represent affordances present in the text and real-
ised relative to set conditions.  
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4.1 Schematic Overlap 
Framing the contents of theories of meaning using the template derived from how 
situations are attributed requires mapping the correspondences between the two. 
To be clear, doing so imposes the schema onto the shared elements of theories of 
meaning. It is not being argued that people already conceive of theories of meaning 
in terms of attributed situations. However, there appear to be common structures 
between the two which is an aspect of theories of meaning being highlighted by their 
content being framed around this shared schema. The purpose of this mapping is 
to ground a cognitive metaphor between the two, with the presented notion of at-
tributed situations as the source and a generic model for theories of meaning. As-
pects of the more abstract domain are being characterised in terms of the relatively 
more concrete notion as a means of helping conceive those features of theories of 
meaning.1 With the connection established, it ought to then become possible to de-
rive blends (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) wherein familiar theories are approached 
accordingly, with the framework allowing their scale to be compressed in a manner 
where effects on instantiator identity and the presence of scope become evident.2 
There are three key loci for this task. The pairs of matching components 
consist of (1) core entity and instantiator, (2) definitive relations and meaning-en-
 
1 As Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 59, emphasis in original) state, ‘we typically conceptualize the 
nonphysical in terms of the physical – that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms 
of the more clearly delineated.’ While the exact formulation for the notion of attributed situations 
and some of the instances it allows for might not be instantly intuitive, something being situated is 
more directly familiar in terms of experiences than general explanatory models of meaning. Such 
transfer being non-encompassing is necessary, as well: ‘It is important to see that the metaphorical 
structuring involved here is partial, not total. If it were total, one concept would actually be the other, 
not merely understood in terms of it.’ (Ibid. pp. 12–13, emphasis in original). 
2 Such compression seeks to reduce phenomena to a human scale where familiar models apply. 
This scale allows engaging with the total in a manner which is fully representational of these aspects 
of it rather than quotational or otherwise semi-propositional (Sperber, 1985, pp. 51–53) in the man-
ner problematised in section 2.2.2. As Fauconnier and Turner (2002, pp. 323–324) state: ‘The 
human scale is the level at which it is natural for us to have the impression that we have direct, 
reliable, and comprehensive understanding. This is why achieving a blend at human scale will in-
duce the feeling of global insight. The compression and scale of the blend make it cognitively more 
tractable to deal with, more manipulable, and since it is tied to the complex network, its manipu-
lation gives mastery of a diffuse network, which gives a feeling of global mastery and insight.’ Such 
impressions may mislead, but such scale is also needed to derived a justified sense of insight. 
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dowing relations, and (3) respective observers. The schema embodied in the shared 
structure between the cases involves an enclosed structure wherein a designated 
central entity connects to every entity involved in the relations recognised from an 
observer’s perspective. This section outlines the associated structures within theories 
of meaning to motivate the reframing of theories’ contents using the template. 
4.1.1 Central Entities 
For theories of meaning – understood as models of the principles based on which 
members of a type of entity are treated as meaningful – the central entity involved 
in each key relation is the kind to which the theory attributes the form of meaning 
it posits. Most theories refer to said entities using terms such as ‘word’ or ‘utterance’. 
The default position on the (material) identity of such entities is what Hawthorne and 
Lepore (2011, p. 482) dub sloppy realism. The central cases are considered intuitively 
recognisable and any borderline cases as eliminable given a proper theory of vague-
ness and how to resolve it. It is proposed here that these instantiators’ identities are 
more interesting than that. However, no alternative general model of word identity 
and the like (e.g. Kaplan, 1990; 2011) is being presented. Instead, the question being 
asked is whether the identities of the named entities are determined in part by the 
rest of the theory within which they occur. Since the entity must be able to 
participate in the kinds of relations argued to bestow its meaning, its material 
identity must afford such positioning. 
To illustrate this principle, imagine if any reference to the entities supposed 
to instantiate the sort of meaning under discussion was replaced with an open vari-
able. Instead of ‘word meaning’, a theory would be addressing ‘meaning of x’. The 
task is to determine what constitutes x given claims concerning it – namely, in this 
context, how such things acquire their meanings.3 While the data a theory provides 
in this respect might not suffice to specify exact identity conditions, claims which 
 
3 The choice of term for x – such as ‘word’ – is included in this evidence but it is not treated as fully 
definitive of the matter. Instead, this choice of term provides properties which can uncontroversially 
be attributed to such entities such as ‘x is primarily associated with correlated pairs of written and 
pronounced patterns’ when x is referred to as ‘word’. 
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entail that x must have certain properties are inevitable. A cognitivist theory accor-
ding to which the relations definitive of meaning occur between an external condi-
tion and some internal state, for instance, seems obliged to treat the whole minimally 
meaningful external state as the instantiator. If the relevant relations apply to scenes, 
for instance, a manifest linguistic token isolated from this degree of context would 
not qualify. Instead, the proper instantiators would be the distinct scenes inclusive 
of some linguistic token. Scenes not inclusive of linguistic tokens would similarly not 
qualify. Thus, the linguistic token itself would be necessary but not sufficient and in-
stead, only the pair of a token and set of minimal contextual conditions would sig-
nify under such conditions and therefore act as the proper instantiator. Depending 
on the minimal context, not all instances of a token might qualify, either. For instance, 
one may imagine how theories requiring (seeming) intentional production (e.g. Sper-
ber & Wilson, 1995) of the token might disqualify incidental instances such as com-
puter static generating a sound similar to words.4 
4.1.2 Definitive Relations 
Both attributed situations and theories of meaning involve sets of relations relative 
to which the involved entities are specified. These relations are called the set of de-
finitive relations. For attributed situations, they are the set of relations which involve 
the core entity and which the observer may access. For theories of meaning, these 
relations are those responsible for conferring meaning within a given theory. For 
instance, expert specialists might be granted the power to define proper meaning 
to which others would implicitly be deferring whenever they apply a term (e.g. Put-
nam, 1975, pp. 13–14). The relations definitive of meaning for such a theory would 
include the experts’ perception of the phenomenon, their dubbing of it or overhaul 
of a prior term’s definition, and the result being deferentially designated whenever 
 
4 For a particular example, consider Jenna Sutela’s 2017 art piece Gut-Machine Poetry which trans-
lates the behaviour of bacteria in fermenting kombucha tea into speech-adjacent sound patterns. 
Should a produced sound correspond to a word, its source would reasonably be insufficient to 
ground communicative meaning even if this token might be experienced as meaningful in a differ-
ent sense. 
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the term is used. Similarly to the relations which define the constituents of an at-
tributed situation, such relations are centred on the aforementioned central entity. 
Whatever instantiates meaning is subject to the totality of the relations which define 
said meaning, and these relations define the niche available for such entities to 
inhabit. Additionally, these relations are equally subject to the exact selection be-
ing available to an observer. In the case of theories of meaning, said observer is con-
stituted by the idealised perspectives relative to which the resulting meaning mani-
fests, and such constructs can be non-encompassing in various ways. No perspec-
tive constructed using the available resources replicates the full complexity of the 
world, after all. Any simplification presumes its own justification in terms of the model 
being sufficiently inclusive and eschews some potential contributors. 
Exact layouts of relations are only produced when a theory is applied but the 
same schematic structure can also be attributed to the generic model. Such arrange-
ments result from meaning-attributions having set targets and being dependent on 
select (types of) relations. Even posited innate meaning is relation-dependent since 
potential sources include the instantiator’s relations with its own properties. In diag-
rams of such schemata, such entities would be designated using functional roles like 
‘expert’ but the central position of the instantiator ensures that the related connec-
tions would settle in this arrangement around it in each instance. When the theory 
is applied, the associated roles are merely mapped to suitably positioned entities. 
4.1.3 Observation 
Finally, there is the role of the observer. In this respect, theories of meaning deviate 
slightly from attributed situations because they incorporate multiple observers. As 
is discussed below, theories of meaning must inherently accommodate both the po-
sitions of generic processors of meaning and the detached perspective of the analyst. 
However, using the layered model being proposed, this arrangement can be treated 
as merely a more complex observer. Within the arrangement, the processors’ per-
spective is embedded as a part of the more encompassing position relative to which 
the whole is presented. Just like the constituents of an attributed situation depend 
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on which relations involving the central entity are recognised by the relevant observ-
er, what becomes included in how the contents of a theory are conceived depends 
on what the presentation makes available relative to the perspective provided to 
those studying it. Since the presentation is invariant, this position may be analysed 
as part of the theory in the form it is conceived based on the associated corpus. 
This inclusion of an observer as a necessary part of theories of meaning is 
part of the specific perspective being taken on the nature of said theories where 
the range of possible conceptions prompted by select texts is treated as an aspect 
of what constitutes such a theory. The observers theories are said to incorporate 
represent the positions audiences assume in conceiving the contents of theoretical 
models based on how they are presented. The focus thus lies on analysing the rela-
tively invariant conceptions people form based on the details of designated textual 
materials using the cognitive resources available for the task. Importantly, this per-
spective need not be treated as authoritative on some true nature of theories. The 
thesis is uninterested in privileging set approaches and the intent is to merely pre-
sent a worthwhile, non-exclusionary alternative approach for relating to theories. 
The inclusion of theory-specific observers helps specify the scope being 
implemented by the expression of a given theory – the extent of recognised consid-
erations along various available axes. The effects of such bounded domains can be 
analysed without needing to posit principles to explain why the theory should only 
account for the included considerations. Once the pattern has been approached in 
this manner, such principles can be presented if they provide a better explanation 
than mere perspectival restrictions would. The approach is minimally speculative 
since it involves no reconstruction of complex factors which cannot be verified to 
exist such as authorial intentions. The inclusion of some observational positions is 
incurred if mental spaces are involved in how people understand theories’ contents. 
Such involvement appears unavoidable given how direct observation cannot suffice 
for any comparisons involved in assessing the truth of theoretical claims whenever 
they involve generalisations and hypothetical entities. Accounting for such abstrac-
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tions requires corresponding (mental) models instead. Because one need not specu-
late on the details beyond what is already presented and because the involvement 
of such perspectives is incurred regardless, the approach should at least be reason-
able. If the scope of included considerations possesses a pattern suited for someone 
in the writer’s position, this would evidence an even stronger connection. 
4.2 Conceiving Theories 
The proposed model is intended to represent certain key aspects of the form in 
which theories of meaning become conceived by individuals who interact with sets 
of designated texts. Specifically, it provides a frame around which the contents of 
the states of affairs a theory posits, as they are conceived based on the designated 
texts, may be structured based on patterns shared by different theories.5 Yet, this 
notion of some shared conception as expressing what a theory conveys has some 
potential issues. Mainly, the conceptions people form are not wholly dependent on 
the source material but also subject to idiosyncratic interpretations, and deriving 
singular representations from unique conceptions requires a degree of idealisation 
which bars materially identifying the result with any of them. This section presents 
an overview of the nature of such conceived contents as a valid form of representing 
theories of meaning. In so doing, the section also addresses the aforementioned 
issues. Both issues are resolved when the models are understood as representing the 
sets of properties of the relevant texts which interact with various cognitive models 
to guide interpretation. In this respect, accommodating each interpretation contri-
butes to understanding the overall nature of the relevant texts. Similarly, the resulting 
 
5 Such conceptions are treated as mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1985; 1997) which model the con-
tents of associated theories as states of affairs consisting of the invoked entities. Theories of em-
bodied cognition in general also enter the picture in terms of the dynamics by which the mental 
models for representing the various elements which theories of meaning involve are acquired. 
For instance, how one conceives the proper frame (Fillmore, 1976; 1982) for a communication situ-
ation is treated as subject to the experiential precedent available to someone in a specific position, 
subject to influences such as the generational shift introduced by the spread of the Internet. Such 
precedent gives rise to prototype effects (e.g. Rosch, 1975; 1982), because of which the most familiar 
types of instances are treated as the standard by which categorial fit is assessed and matching 
models are the most readily retrieved for purposes of substantiating related notions. For many en-
tities such as utterances, these defaults involve compatibility with how perception is organised. 
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idealised representations can be treated as a means of capturing which relative pro-
perties are relevant to pragmatic considerations such as approximating how an ex-
pert consensus acquires its form. 
4.2.1 Deriving Conceptions 
Special methods are required to overcome how contingent the relationship is be-
tween a text and its interpretation in order to to derive meaningful representations 
of how theories are conceived. Even without any degree of contextualism being as-
sumed, people are fallible. To assume that everyone familiar with a theory may simu-
late an intricate mental model of the whole thing would be absurd. Quite possibly, 
no individual actively represents a theory in such detail. Once the possibility of con-
textualism is accepted, choosing the proper representation becomes even harder 
since the text itself would at most ground a formal skeleton and the details the model 
requires would depend on the conceiving individual. Much of the time, authorial 
intent is inapplicable as a standard since theories as objects of academic practice 
are what their public record expresses. A text may also fail to match intent given its 
medium and the complications of expressing ideas in words. Under such conditions, 
there would be no one true form of the theory to be indicated and analysed. As 
such, the suggested methods instead help derive representative models of the con-
ceptions canonical texts linked to a theory engender. 
Because the effects of individual traits only matter relative to their cumulative 
effect and only manifest relative to clusters, identifying an idealised conception starts 
with specifying a baseline and the associated set of factors. A baseline is an impres-
sion of a relatively uniform understanding shared by some group of relevantly simi-
lar people. Any systematic similarities between said people are the associated factors 
to be considered. For instance, while Wittgenstein scholars may differ in their inter-
pretations of his work, most would subscribe to some basic tenets being present, 
and each would at least recognise some cluster of viable interpretations. Since the 
current focus does not lie with viable but possible interpretations, one ought to con-
sider what shared factors between the arbiters distinguish the viable from the pos-
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sible but absurd. Using theories of cultural evolution, one may trace such positions 
to dynamics which involve similar socioeconomic conditions: access to lectures and 
reading with set content as well as the results of non-academic factors typical of such 
personal trajectories. However, since individual conceptions are hardly representative 
of any trends given the interference of remaining idiosyncrasies, baselines are 
instead specified relative to the attractors (Sperber, 1996) specific to studied demo-
graphics such as academics from meaning-oriented fields of study (e.g. linguists). 
Such attractors represent those versions of specific types of representations towards 
which the specified ecological affordances bias the construction of such representa-
tions. In this case, then, the relevant attractors consist of conceptions of theories’ 
content constructed under the influence of cognitive models a group shares. 
For purposes of conceiving the sorts of hypothetical states of affairs which 
theories can be framed as expressing, the main, baseline-defining influences being 
considered are available frames and prototypical representations. As Fauconnier and 
Turner (2002, p. 102) state, such mental space constructions ‘are very partial assem-
blies containing elements, structured by frames and cognitive models’. These cogni-
tive models vary in specificity (Ibid. pp. 103–104). However, schematic spaces linked 
to outlining theories are assumed to mainly consist of generic representations and 
only ever contain cognitive models for particulars if said particulars are being repre-
sented in a prototypical manner.6 The reason lies in how schemas function as tem-
plates for structuring particular instances which fit them. Whether such fit is even pos-
sible depends on whether the elements of the specific instance may be mapped onto 
the schema, and while generic representations match the range of particulars they 
encompass, representations of unique entities may only correspond to those specific 
entities. As such, a mental schema which included non-generic cognitive models 
 
6 A theory positing some specific entities to which linguistic items of a certain kind each relate such 
as some Platonic universals are assumed to merely be itemising pre-existing prototypical models. 
Theories which address specific linguistic items such as the demonstratives ‘that’ and ‘this’ might 
seem to represent singular entities but neither linguistic item’s mental representation corresponds 
to some specific instance. In fact, such theories are generally intended to be applicable to demon-
stratives across languages, making the use of a specific expression merely prototypical. 
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would only fit instances in which the specific represented entities were positioned 
accordingly. While the exact cognitive models available to individuals are largely in-
tractable, processes related to cultural evolution help engender a degree of expected 
invariance. Thus, observable social trends within specific fields are preferred as the 
best available approximations of involved cognitive models. 
In the context of epidemiological models of cultural evolution, an attractor 
constitutes a point in Design Space7 towards which transformations during cultural 
material being conveyed are statistically biased.8 No such attractor is absolute. Each 
is defined relative to a field of psychological and ecological factors9 such as the cogni-
tive models available to a set of individuals given their personal trajectories which 
involve various forms of socialisation and habituation.10 Many widespread misconcep-
tions, for instance, likely involve attractors linked to commonly shared factors which 
 
7 While Sperber (1996) refers primarily to the ‘space of possibilities’, Dennett’s (1995, pp. 104–145) 
term is more informative because the possibilities concern the forms such mental and public arte-
facts may possibly take. 
8 ‘To say that there is an attractor is just to say that, in a given space of possibilities, transformation 
probabilities form a certain pattern: they tend to be biased so as to favour transformations in the 
direction of some specific point, and therefore cluster at and around that point.’ (Sperber, 1996, 
p. 112). Such transformations include any change in form or associated content. 
9 ‘The existence of attractors is to be explained by two kinds of factors: psychological and ecological. 
The environment determines the survival and composition of the culture-bearing population; it 
contains all the inputs to the cognitive systems of the members of this population; it determines 
when, where and by what medium transmission may occur; it imposes constraints on the formation 
and stability of different types of public productions.’ (Sperber, 1996, p. 113) 
10 ‘Unlike the estimation of probabilities which science constructs methodologically on the basis 
of controlled experiments from data established according to precise rules, practical evaluation 
of the likelihood of the success of a given action in a situation brings into play a whole body of wis-
dom, sayings, commonplaces, ethical precepts […] and, at a deeper level, the unconscious prin-
ciples of the ethos which, being a product of a learning process dominated by a determinate type 
of objective regularities, determines “reasonable” and “unreasonable” conduct for every agent 
subjected to those regularities.’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 77, emphasis in original). The passage concerns 
the formation and effects of habitus, and the types of conduct being deemed reasonable or un-
reasonable can include interpreting a text or action in some specific manner. The notion of success-
fully interpreting a communicative act using any criterion besides correspondence with either the 
content of the message or its author’s intentions might seem weird in concept. However, that these 
criteria are given such precedence – while practicable in many contexts – would itself be a mani-
festation of the dynamic Bourdieu describes. As works such as Bordo’s (1987) critical reading of 
Descartes show by commenting on the propagated presuppositions linked to historical context, 
interpretations according to which a text conveys more than mere statements or intended mes-
sages are quite possible, though. 
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make the erroneous version likelier to be adopted.11 The differences in interpretation 
between differently habituated people have patterns, and shared repertories of rela-
tively invariant influences tend to cluster, leading to distinct attractors for associated 
demographics. Proposing statistical methods for identifying such convergence points 
for a graph dotting individual conceptions along the various axes of differentiation 
would divert the discussion. However, one should focus on identifying similarities 
between influences on individuals with more concentrated conceptions and estimate 
the directions for vectors associated with their differences. Ideally, a reconstruction 
which accounts for similarities corresponds to a position within the range defined by 
the results of counteracting the effects of vectors for individuals’ differentiating fac-
tors. Influences on academics who study meaning are provided as an example below. 
Given the general features of the modern education system relative to which 
position as academic is defined, invariants would involve (1) abilities beneficial to 
academic achievement, enabling both entry to a field and sufficient success for a 
professional position, and (2) an appropriate degree of familiarity with the canon of 
the field. The set of abilities which advantages pursuing an academic career involves 
some combination of (1) the capacity to parse spoken and written instructions inde-
pendently, (2) acceptable self-expression, and (3) relative financial security.12 Given in-
 
11 Sherlock Holmes, for instance, never says ‘Elementary, my dear Watson’ in the original Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle novels. Yet, this phrase emphasises the difference in competence as detectives be-
tween the two in response to Watson asking for an explanation and embodies both Sherlock’s com-
petence and oft-depicted endearment with condescending tones for Watson. It therefore fits both 
their dynamic and his image. The later propagation of the phrase in popular culture also creates 
an environment where it becomes easy to treat as essential to the original character. 
12 For instance, Eaves and Ho (1997, p. 284, ‘conslusions’ corrected to ‘conclusions’) describe some 
of the results of their study on autistic schoolchildren as follows: ‘In the teachers' ratings of class-
room behaviors, 48%-58% were considered to be average to above average in memory, both im-
mediate and long term, and in fine-motor coordination for manipulation of materials. Weaknesses 
(below or very much below average) were in ability to pay attention (67%), follow instructions (75%), 
express self (75%), think abstractly (85%), complete tasks (58%), work independently (74%) and draw 
conclusions (83%). Except for memory and fine motor skills over half of the pupils were below 
average in all the other skills that are important for school success.’ The focus should be on how 
each such skill is considered important for school success. Bourdieu and Passeron (1990, p. 73) 
discuss in more detail how self-expression which reproduces the dominant culture of discourse is 
considered appropriate in a class setting: ‘The influence of linguistic capital, particularly manifest 
in the first years of schooling when the understanding and use of language are the major points 
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stitutional demands and the features of backgrounds matching them, each such typi-
cal feature can then be associated with further trajectorial similarities to help trace 
available cognitive models. However, such influences do not merely stem from out-
side the academia. The key texts of a given field of study also partly determine how 
theoretically informed matters are discussed and conceived. Such definitive works 
matter because their framing of the issues is common ground for the participants, 
colouring their default understanding of invoked terms such as ‘proposition’. 
Such influences all ultimately follow the same pattern: what a person has 
observed forms the baseline for how they conceive phenomena. Both personal tra-
jectories and the paradigmatic texts of a field provide models for prototypical un-
derstandings of different entities and scenarios. Kuhn, for instance, tends to empha-
sise the importance of recurring illustrations of a principle in generating paradigm-
constituting consensus.13 Similarly, Rosch’s (1978, p. 29) principle of Perceived World 
Structure14 in relation to cognitive category-acquisition emphasises how perceived 
attributes co-occur in non-incidental ways. Depending on the instances available to 
 
of leverage for teachers’ assessment, never cease to be felt: style is always taken into account, im-
plicitly or explicitly, at every level of the educational system and, to a varying extent, in all univer-
sity careers, even scientific ones. Moreover, language is not simply an instrument of communica-
tion: it also provides, together with a richer or poorer vocabulary, a more or less complex system 
of categories, so that the capacity to decipher and manipulate complex structures, whether logi-
cal or aesthetic, depends partly on the complexity of the language transmitted in the family.’ For 
an example of high aesthetic demands favouring simplicity, one might consider the influence of 
early modern British aristocracy on academic discourse (Shapin, 1991). Finally, while economic back-
ground by itself should perhaps not be considered a strong determinant of academic success 
(e.g. White, 1982), Tokarczyk and Fay (1993, pp. 12–13) preface a collection of articles on the inter-
section of class and gender inequality in the academia by noting how dependent careers in the hu-
manities are on external financial security which complements the low pay to allow participation in 
conferences and access to literature early in one’s career. 
13 ‘The student discovers, […] a way to see his problem as like a problem he has already encoun-
tered. Having seen the resemblance, grasped the analogy between two or more distinct problems, 
he can interrelate symbols and attach them to nature in the ways that have proved effective before. 
The law-sketch, say f = ma, has functioned as a tool, informing the student what similarities to look 
for, signalling the gestalt in which is to be seen. […] He has […] assimilated a time-tested and group-
licensed way of seeing.’ (Kuhn, 2012, pp. 188–189, emphasis in original). 
14 ‘The second principle of categorization asserts that unlike the sets of stimuli used in traditional 
laboratory-concept attainment tasks, the perceived world -is not an unstructured total set of equi-
probable cooccurring attributes. Rather, the material objects of the world are perceived to possess 
[…] high correlational structure.’ (Rosch, 1978, p. 29) 
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different groups based on their relative position and typical experiences, they can 
be expected to develop different conceptions or at least conceptions with differently 
weighted judgements of typicality. Constructing comprehensive mock-ups of aca-
demical types15 in this respect is beyond the current chapter but some influences en-
gendered by both typical personal backgrounds and a field’s definitive works can 
still be illustrated.16 
4.2.2 Example Influences 
The manner in which both personal and institutional factors affect the propensity 
to derive specific understandings of concepts, especially when that understanding 
is considered standard within a field needs to be illustrated. Personal factors are chal-
lenging since prior research on the relation between specific factors and specific con-
ceptions is scarce. As such, the first example is more speculative, and one must re-
member that such influence is not claimed to be definitive but merely directional – 
the totality of such influences orients how a person conceives related things, and 
each individual influence is but a vector. Both examples relate to propositions being 
conceived as analogous to full sentences in natural languages. In effect, this con-
ception involves natural languages being treated as inherently mappable to states 
of affairs in a univocal fashion and exceptions as subversions of this presumed norm. 
 
15 Despite the above considerations, there are obviously more than a few viable trajectories to be-
coming a professional linguist or philosopher of language. For instance, instead of inheriting cul-
tural capital, some academics adopt such norms primarily through formal education, becoming 
what Bourdieu and Passeron (1990, p. 161) dub a wonderboy – ‘the working-class child who “suc-
ceeds against all the odds”’ (Ibid. p. 175). 
16 Given the range of considerations being accepted – the provided examples not even being con-
sidered exhaustive – it is a fair worry whether the method can yield anything tractable. The risk is 
how the requirements of this approach might simply be overwhelming, especially when factors 
can interact with each other, such as when acquaintance with different fields might recontextualise 
the claims made in each (e.g. sociology and psychology). Perfect tractability is almost certainly 
impossible but not only in this context. It is an issue with most queries involving people. Once it 
is accepted that the degree to which the method is tractable will be imperfect, one must ask if 
the available level of tractability is worthwhile. Since the approach registers systematic factors 
characteristic of the demographics of interest, the required common or functionally equivalent 
grounding ought to constrain the number of explanatorily significant factors. Ethnography, for in-
stance, tends towards even greater holism without the field’s value being undermined by this. The 
provided examples focus on less obvious considerations to draw attention to their potential effects. 
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The chosen example of a pre-institutional influence is early exposure to writ-
ten fiction.17 The reasoning for this choice relies on how conceiving the described fic-
tive states of affairs relies solely on written sentences. The result is access to experi-
ences of sentences corresponding to relatively well-defined worlds.18 Specifically, 
there are two key factors enabling the relation between text and imagined states of 
affairs. Firstly, the reader of fiction has grant to conjure a world without being subject 
to checks and balances. There is no external examination of whether the imagined 
results match the text. Arguably, they never do given the degree of enrichment ne-
cessary to transform what is described into definite states of affairs. This is masked 
by the second consideration: published fiction provides an extremely biased repre-
sentation of how descriptive language operates because the context for any given 
description is so curated. The provided descriptions embody the combined effort 
of authors and editors to provide a maximally evocative whole. The rest of the text 
provides a context which is tailored to make individual statements unambiguous. 
As a result, when the notion of propositions is later introduced along the 
lines of them being the proper descriptions of sentences’ content which are com-
pared with the world to determine truth and falsity, habitual readers of fiction already 
have access to corresponding experiences. Such experiences are neither universal 
nor necessarily central to one’s experiences with the relationship between words and 
states of affairs. However, in the absence of experiences subverting the expecta-
 
17 This example obviously assumes a connection between familial socioeconomic status and early 
access to fiction. Some evidence supporting this assumption concerns differences in how literature 
is valued based on class (Bodovski, 2010) and how economic stability enables higher exposure. 
As Mol and Bus (2011, p. 288) note, the number of books at home is a rather reliable measure of 
the extent to which a child is exposed to literature. Books cost money and both how they are valued 
and available resources contribute to the what proportion of income they merit and what that pro-
portion may buy. In this regard, lower income families tend to be disadvantaged compared to mid-
dle-class ones (e.g. Chin & Phillips, 2004, pp. 199–201). 
18 While this aspect is tangential to the mechanism being discusses, exposure to fiction apparently 
also stimulates and helps develop portions of the brain central to social cognition and empathy 
(e.g. Mar et al, 2006; Tamir et al, 2016). Given the role Theory of Mind plays in communication 
situations even without contextual penetration and the primacy of intentions being assumed, such 
cognitive resources being recruited and developed may also well contribute to sentences appear-
ing to correspond to immediately retrieved content. 
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tions which result from such unchecked imaginings based on purposively manufac-
tured material, they can become definitive of one’s understanding of the relation 
between language and truth. In the absence of comparable experiences, the standard 
notion of propositions is relatively less intelligible and given the choice, a person may 
be relatively more sympathetic to alternative accounts of what language conveys 
such as global expressivism (e.g. Barker, 2007).19 For contrast, consider the alternative 
scenario where the experiences of language central to a person’s understanding of 
what they involve consist of dog-whistling (e.g. Haney López, 2014) and veiled insults 
or threats. Such language inherently avoids matching form with message. Indeed, 
the message itself may largely contend to point and suggest instead of anything 
being asserted. The audience’s intended takeaway need not be translated into fur-
ther sentences. The takeaway may just be an action-guiding association, for instance, 
such as when cyberterrorists harass someone for public participation. 
Obviously, such potential background influences constitute but part of an 
academic’s personal trajectory. A more readily analysable influence are the authors 
whose work suffuses their field through direct and indirect references. Among other 
things, presence affects availability and often engenders prestige. Availability includes 
both probability of being encountered and afforded forms of acquaintance. Often, 
inclusion in taught curriculums ensures meaningful exposure during students’ forma-
tive stages of intellectual development. Views reliant on exposure through indepen-
dent research reach limited audiences, including among those otherwise primed to 
be sympathetic to them. Similarly, while widespread enough acclaim to secure such 
a position is generally a sign of merit, relative lack of awareness does not signal 
demerit. Obscurity may fallaciously be associated with relative lack of merit but more 
importantly, it ensures that judgements of merit lack corroborating public evidence. 
Hence, such judgements have lower associated confidence. 
 
19 According to Barker (2007, p. 49), an assertion involves the produced sentence signalling the ut-
terer’s disposition to express the grounds for some specific pre-doxastic mental state in this manner. 
Naming a designated entity (e.g. ‘dog’), for instance, would convey that its presence grounds a state 
which is necessary for forming beliefs about it. Global expressivism seeks to reduce semantics to 
non-rule-governed practical competence, eschewing all prescriptions of proper meaning (Ibid. p. v). 
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For instance, while Davidson (2001; 2005a) is not the only philosophical 
proponent of truth-functional semantics whose analysis is based on Tarskian theo-
rems, he is a core influence on a generation of philosophers of language. While the 
mantra ‘”snow is white” is true iff snow is white’ and its derivatives do not originate 
with him, Davidson is a major distributor of such schemata in the philosophical 
mainstream. Such T-schemata equate propositional content with the form of corre-
sponding sentences in natural languages.20 Unlike deeply formal representations of 
propositional content such as ‘Ǝx((Fx˄Ɐy(Fy→x=y))˄Gx)’ which represents a 
Russellian definite description (Russell, 1905), such schemata thus readily tap prior 
conceptions of the sort presented above, grounded in the experientially immediate 
everyday relationship between words and meaning. That they tend to invoke sen-
tences with limited uses in most contexts also helps in this regard. Unlike contextual-
ist rallying cries such as ‘The leaves are green’ (Travis, 1997, p. 111) or ‘I’ve eaten’ 
(Wilson & Sperber, 2002, p. 66), example T-schemata require no lengthy elaboration. 
Properly understanding T-schemata may take time and study but forming a memory 
trace does not, unlike when examples only make sense alongside either symbolisa-
tion keys or detailed descriptions of context.21 
4.2.3 Ontology of Conceived Models 
Once a reasonable catalogue of the most impactful influences has been mapped 
alongside the mechanisms through which each factor has an effect, predicting how 
any given detail of a theory would typically be conceived becomes possible. While 
choosing a baseline representation helps designate a reference group and approxi-
 
20 This claim is made independently of Davidson’s own use of T-schemata to eschew propositions 
(e.g. Davidson, 2005b). More accurately, perhaps, T-schemata equate the functional role shared by 
propositions with natural language sentences. As Davidson’s own commentary on Horwich’s (1990) 
propositional deflationism (Davidson, 1996, pp. 30–32; 2000, pp. 9–10) hints, even professionals risk 
equating the sentences quoted in T-schemata with propositions. This observation corroborates the 
presented notion that such a prior tendency exists and that T-schemata are poised to feed it even 
when that result is not being intended. 
21 Despite how the example might seem to imply that there is an issue with treating propositions 
as analogous to natural language sentences, it only demonstrates possible non-rational reasons 
why people would be receptive to said conception. Any rational reasons are beside the subject of 
this analysis. 
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mate how an encompassing model of a theory would be conceived by said group’s 
members, the actual models depend on individual details being derived relatively 
independently. Where people often rely on non-encompassing, pragmatically suffi-
cient impressions, the idealised representations of set demographics’ conceptions 
accommodate the theory in full detail. In effect, establishing an appropriate sample 
of reference group-specific influences in relation to the identified attractor for them 
allows reconstructing the mental space equivalents for how passages describing a 
theory would be understood relative only to said definitive influences. These are the 
set of influences which best explain why members of the demographic tend to grav-
itate towards their main attractor. In this manner, it is possible to derive each key 
component separately (while noting any contextual effects the order in which they 
are presented may have) and aggregate them to form an encompassing represen-
tation of what conceiving the total schematic form of a specific theory would involve. 
Such idealised forms represent how such schemata would be conceived indepen-
dently of cognitive load and incidental idiosyncrasies. Even if the results correspond 
to no actual person’s conception, though, they represent what those conceptions 
approximate rather than a top-down prescription. 
Properly speaking, the sorts of models derived in this manner selectively 
represent a set of relational properties or capacities attributable to a selection of texts 
which express a theory of meaning. What is being recorded and then reconstructed 
are qualities which the texts afford and which are manifested under specific condit-
ions – namely, when the texts are interpreted in the presence of set influences. Hence, 
even though the resulting idealised models represent no particular actual ways the 
theories are conceived (even when a model coincides with such a conception), they 
remain grounded in reality. Importantly, such analyses are agnostic towards the 
degree to which different sets of influences might result in convergent conceptions 
on the theory’s content. This indifference is motivated by how the proposed met-
hods accommodate both the possibility of extensive contextual penetration and 
maximal invariance across conceptions. If the distribution of people’s conceptions 
is highly dispersed, appropriate sets of influences can be specified relative to prag-
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matic considerations linked to the task at hand. Such analyses capture aspects of 
the total. While the results are therefore partial and cannot be generalised into a 
true representation of what the theory encompasses, they remain grounded in 
objectively analysable relative qualities. Under such conditions, they would provide 
the best approximations of how the theory becomes conceived for various pur-
poses. If conceptions across the board converge and any deviation may be traced 
to contingently made errors rather than systematic differences, the associated form 
may be treated as a placeholder proper representation of the theory.22 
To illustrate how such properties operate, they can be treated as macro-
scopic parallels to the affordances responsible for phenomena such as ambiguity. 
While any linguistic pattern may acquire any meaning based on the totality of facts 
which hold, affordances encompass the states of both interacting entities (e.g. San-
ders, 1997) and therefore, only properties sensitive to realised conditions properly 
speaking contribute to them.23 Consider the term ‘title’, for example, which is mul-
tiply ambiguous with no interpretation sufficiently dominating to extend to neutral 
contexts as the default meaning. Among the common readings, each would seem 
to predominate in the lexicon of different professions, resulting in authors, lawyers, 
and military officers being likely to have different distributions for how probable they 
are to default to a given reading. If the differences between groups are statistically 
significant, associated institutional conditions can be treated as a definitive influence 
of the sort this method seeks to identify. These details would therefore interact with 
the properties of the term ‘title’ endowed to it by whichever conditions are respon-
sible for the available readings. The very same sort of dynamic seems applicable to 
how theories come to be understood based on designated corpuses of associated 
texts. The properties of the text afford a range of differing conceptions of a theory. 
 
22 Such considerations include a temporal dimension. Hence, aggregating the conceptions until 
any given time may only corroborate the expectation that future conceptions will also converge 
but never prove that they will. 
23 As a reminder, an affordance is ‘an opportunity for use or interaction which some object or state 
of affairs presents to a certain kind of agent’ (Clark, 1997, p. 172). The ‘agent’ in this context need 
not be a properly intentional entity; steep slopes afford for rounded rocks to roll, for instance. 
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4.3 Situated Meaning 
The products of the method suggested above are indices specifying how different 
elements of a theory are conceived such as whether set demographics are liable to 
represent words primarily as written or pronounced. There is implicit structure in the 
connections grounded by conceived relations but its exact format of presentation 
depends on template-based framing. Such framing does not adjust the relations. It 
merely highlights specific aspects of the total in a manner conducive to comparisons. 
The template based on the schema derived from attributed situations maps onto 
the contents of theories of meaning, and this mapping emphasises the relationship 
between the sources of meaning and its instantiators as well as the role of involved 
observers in defining the scope of available sources. It also helps ground the identities 
of involved entities since the positioned observers in particular must have identifiable 
forms of access to said entities for them to contribute to the processors’ impressions. 
4.3.1 Formal Template 
Definition 2 maps the schema from definition 1.2 onto theories of meaning. While 
the notation is adjusted for the context, most involved formal structures remain the 
same. The largest adjustment involves incorporating two designated observers – 
one positioned and the other detached – by embedding one in the other. Similarly, 
coordinates are defined in relative rather than absolute terms given the structure of 
the involved mental spaces, and all constituents are treated as generic by default. 
Definition 2, Template for Reframing Theories of Meaning: 
Sx = {O
g, Pg, Rg, Ag, Cg} 





Ei = {e1, e2, … en│ n≥1, ex∈〈p
i, ey〉} 
Epr = {e1, e2, … en│ n≥1, ex∈〈p
d, ey〉} 
Og = {o1, o2,… on│n≥0} 
Pg = {〈p1, e1〉, 〈p2, e1〉, … 〈pm, en〉│m≥0, n≥0, {e1, e2, … en}∩O
g} 
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x= 〈e1, e2, … en│n≥2〉, 












x = {e1, e2, … en│n≥2}} 
Cg = {〈ra, 〈e1, 〈l1, t1〉〉〉, 〈r
a, 〈e2, 〈l2, t2〉〉〉, … 〈r
a, 〈em, 〈ln, tq〉〉〉│m≥0, n≥0, 
        q≥0, ra∈R} 













W = {〈Inw, 〈I1, 〈I2, … 〈In〉〉〉〉〉│n≥1, I
nw∈I, Inw=E, Inw⊇Ipr, Ix∈I} 
I = {I1, I2, … Im│ m≥1, Ix=〈〈e1, 〈e2, … 〈en〉〉〉│n≥2〉} 





Explanation of Definition 1.2: 
Sx: theory-specific schema for nature of meaning 
E: set of elements in the schema for a theory of meaning 
 ex: element of a schema for a theory of meaning 
Ei: set of constituents of the meaning-instantiator 
pi: the property of having been designated as a meaning-instantiator 
Epr: set of constituents of the processor of meaning 
pd: the property of having been designated as part of the processor 
Og: set of generic objects in the schema 
 ox: conceived generic object 
Pg: set of generic properties in the schema 
 px: type of property 
 〈px, ey〉: px is instantiated by ey 
Rg: set of generic relations in the schema 
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 rx: type of relation 
 〈rx, E
*
y〉: rx is instantiated by the elements of E
*
y 
Ag: set of generic partial states of affairs in the schema 
Cg: set of generic spatiotemporal coordinates in the schema 
 ra: relation of arrangement 
 lx: relative location 
 tx: relative time 
 〈ra, 〈ex, 〈ly, tz〉〉〉: r
a is instantiated by ex relative to ly and tz 
Rb: set of relations of observation 
 rbx: type of relation of observation 




x is instantiated by W relative to relation 〈ry, E
*
z〉 
W: set of layers of integration which correspond to the observer 
 Inw: layer of integration corresponding to detached perspective 
 〈Ix, 〈Iy〉〉: Ix is a single level higher order of integration than Iy 
I: set of layers of integration 
 Ix: specific layer of integration 
 〈〈e1, 〈e2, … 〈en〉〉〉〉: set of inputs up to en is ordered according to the
 format of a layer of integration Ix 
Ipr: layer of integration corresponding to the positioned processor 
 ra: relation of access 
Definition 2 uses set-theoretic notation to state (1) that the cognitive schema for how 
a theory of meaning becomes conceived can be specified using sets of mental mod-
els of various entities as the basic elements and (2) that the selection of such entities 
is based on relations involving the designated meaning-instantiator being recog-
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nised by the appropriate observer. The baseline components are treated as repre-
sentations of generic entities because the resulting models are schematic rather than 
representations of particular scenarios. For conceived situations, even when proto-
typical representations are involved, they substitute for particular entities, whether 
verified or hypothetical. Theories are schematic in the sense that the associated struc-
ture has general applicability and gets fitted onto particular instances which it must 
suit. As such, they only encompass singular entities’ representations insofar as those 
specific entities are essential to every single application of the schema. Consider how 
one might conceive their situation in a manner inclusive of some entity which they 
insert based on testimony or indirect evidence such as another person behind a cor-
ner. In the absence of further evidence, the person would be represented using 
available generic models for people. However, the resulting conception would in-
volve a particular person being represented thus rather than a representation of a 
generic person even despite the inclusion of a generic representation of a person. 
Meanwhile, theories of meaning must accommodate the possibility of anyone being 
an utterer. Hence, even if the image of a particular person were involved, they would 
represent a generic role reserved for any person. 
4.3.2 Relative Coordinates 
Generic coordinates involved in how theories of meaning are conceived are specified 
as relations of arrangement involving the schema’s elements and relative spatiotem-
poral positions. An ordinal organisation is proposed since attributing measure-based 
spatial organisation to the associated mental spaces would overstate how analogous 
they are to actuality. In practice, this formalisation tries to capture how significance 
is occasionally attributed to factors such as antecedence, co-occurrence, or presence. 
For instance, a Kaplanian approach (Kaplan, 1989) to the referents indexicals (here, 
now, etc.) makes a speech act’s time and place definitive of the associated propo-
sition for the expressions which require inputs related to them. There is no pre-set 
number of available values for either coordinate since different theories recognise 
different relative positions as significant. However, insofar as coordinates are involved, 
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the corresponding model seems to include some origo for each dimension. If the dif-
ferent available values were represented using numerals, this position would corre-
spond to zero: available directions and relative distance from central foci are defined 
relative to it.24 One must note how the set of generic coordinates specifically lists the 
functionally relevant set of coordinates. Each entity involved in relations of arrange-
ment may participate in multiple such relations involving distinct pairs of spatial and 
temporal coordinates. However, what matters are the pairs in relation to whichever 
functional role the associated entity represents. When an entity is associated with 
multiple such pairs, they define the range of positions available to it, and each such 
position is defined relative to both dimensions rather than either individually. Such 
pairs are used to avoid implying that a position’s inclusion as part of a model means 
that its combinations with any available value for the other dimension become viable. 
For instance, assume that the speech act and resulting utterance inhabit po-
sition 〈0, 0〉 in Kaplan’s (1989) theory of demonstratives’ meaning. The reason is how 
Kaplan lets the time and place of an utterance define the values for the context 
which contributes to its meaning.25 Correspondingly, 〈1, 0〉 would represent some 
approximation of the immediate surroundings at the time: the here and now.26 Fo-
cusing on distance, if a value of 1 is associated with immediate surroundings – the 
Here – then 2 might be specified as ‘elsewhere identifiable’ – the There – and so on, 
for each functional spatiotemporal category Kaplan’s theory implements. The numer-
ical representations of these categories are merely a notational shorthand which 
helps capture relations of difference and direction. What matters are the relative po-
sitions of the model’s elements – the functionally relevant potential contributors to 
 
24 For instance, negative values can be associated with the past and positive with the future on 
the temporal axis but no theory need include either. Most ignore the possibility that future events 
may modulate contemporaneous meaning, for instance. Spatial relations may standardly include 
three dimensions but no reasonable theory of meaning distinguishes between them. This makes 
distance a natural fit for the spatial axis, and therefore, only positive values would be involved. 
25 Kaplan (1989, p. 494, emphasis in original) specifically identifies contexts with ‘possible occa-
sions of use’. Hence, when a term is used – namely, uttered – the context extends from the corre-
sponding spatiotemporal coordinate. 
26 ‘Here’ is defined as 1 rather than 0 since the value of 0 is associated with the utterance itself 
and while things may be contemporaneous with it, its immediate spatial surroundings are distinct. 
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meaning – whenever a theory recognises such positions themselves as potential 
contributors to meaning. Said elements may range from individual objects such as 
neurons to scenarios such as pointing with a finger to itemised coordinates such as 
‘tomorrow’. Bare relative coordinates not associated with any such items are not in-
cluded as an option since doing so would imply that the corresponding mental 
spaces possess spatial organisation beyond some arrangements being recognised. 
The template is intended to also accommodate cross-modal considerations 
but modality is excluded as a dimension for coordinates because relative modal po-
sition cannot meaningfully be reduced to a universal set of distinct values. Instead, 
representing cross-modal relations using the template involves specifying distinct 
objects or states of affairs which are linked by a counterpart relation. The exact axes 
along which and the extents to which theories accommodate cross-modal consider-
ations depend on the nature of applied counterpart relations. In effect, what a theory 
treats as the foundation of counterparthood and the extent to which it pursues each 
resulting direction help approximate the cross-modal scope the theory is applying. 
Given that counterpart relations across mental spaces are a major connector (Fau-
connier, 1985, pp. 18–22) and that blending the thus linked spaces only requires some 
appropriate cognitive template, the solution is sustainable in relation to people’s cog-
nitive capacity. Exact details depend on the kinds of counterpart relations being 
applied. Some template options for blending include framing branching develop-
ments of a scenario as a brood with common ancestry or rigid designation as contin-
uous essence between the counterparts within schematic scenarios. A familial meta-
phor like the former invokes imagery such as the vertically oriented charts for lineages 
and how progeny cluster around their parent as imperfect miniature replicas of it. 
These kinds of image schemata provide a spatial mapping for modal relations (e.g. 
tree structure), allowing a single mental space to accommodate the whole. Thus, 
while the template itself does not explicitly specify the means to represent a modal 
dimension, it regardless affords the means to do so in a manner consistent with how 
people appear to visualise modality. While modal scope is later defined in terms of 
differentiation along various axes, theories themselves may apply different relations. 
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4.3.3 Observer Positions 
Definition 2 incorporates a definition of observers which designates two layers of 
integration. The template also eschews reference to points and modes of access de-
spite their integral role in observers’ constitution. The reason for the former detail 
is how each theory of meaning must accommodate both a positioned processor’s 
perspective and the detached viewpoint underlying its approach. The former repre-
sents the generic processors of meaning as they are conceived as part of the theory 
while the latter is the detached perspective relative to which the total theory gets 
presented. Both are treated as necessary for reasons addressed below. As for points 
and modes of access, both are assumed to be involved were the corresponding ob-
servers defined relative to their actual implementation. However, the idealised model 
is multiply realisable and represents the common structure of the associated con-
structed spaces. Being multiply realisable, this structure need not coincide with the 
underlying material structures even though its elements are mappable onto the latter. 
As such, while points and modes of access are involved in each implementation, they 
are not contained within the model itself. 
Formally, the generic processor’s perspective is treated as a layer of inte-
gration which constitutes a subset of the detached position’s input and therefore 
belongs among the layers of integration which define the position relative to which 
a given theory is presented. The detached observer is identified with this total view-
point on the posited schema. In this manner, the embedded more limited perspec-
tive can be extracted when necessary such as when it is compared to one’s concep-
tion of people’s observational capacities outside any theoretical commitments. Such 
comparisons are involved in assessing how realistic a theory’s demands on people 
are, for instance. This positioned observer has no set distance from the layer identi-
fied with the detached observer such as always immediately preceding it to allow 
for the possibility of intermediate layers of integration as part of the physical system 
responsible for implementing the model. While such layers are not themselves 
represented within the model, it must allow the possibility. 
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These two perspectives are both needed. The generic processor provides 
the means for the theory to explain how the meanings it posits relate to experienced 
meaning. The relation between the two cannot be left open-ended because experi-
enced meaning ultimately grounds any discussion of meaning. Without a tractable 
relation to how meaning is experienced, theories of meaning have no subject matter 
to motivate them. How meaning is experienced and what the theory posits may dif-
fer but this would need to be addressed regardless to show how there would still 
exist a relation which leaves room for the latter despite the former – preferably as 
a means to partly explain such manifest meaning. The alternative is plain unsustain-
able since the resulting theories would be circumventing the very phenomenon they 
supposedly address. Meanwhile, the detached perspective is needed because a the-
ory is general: the involved elements cannot represent only particulars, and posi-
tioned perspectives are limited to treating the entities of the space they share as 
particulars. Specifically, regardless of the perspective from which the phenomena 
being explained are approached, the results must be presented in a generalisable 
manner.27 Otherwise, they would only describe particular instances instead of pro-
viding explanatory models. 
What exactly constitutes the perspective of a positioned processor within a 
theory can be illustrated using Jaszczolt’s (2005; 2016) notions of Model Speaker and 
Model Addressee. Within Default Semantics, any given Model Speaker or Model Ad-
ressee represents an idealised particular interlocutor with specific traits. In effect, they 
are bundles of defaults – mental associations specific kinds of people will retrieve au-
tomatically in specific kinds of situations.28 According to the theory, the set of defaults 
 
27 For instance, someone like Keller (1995) who criticises the objectifying and forceful aspects of 
the standard conception of scientific objectivity as a view from nowhere (e.g. Nagel, 1986) might 
propose approaching the phenomena in a more mindful manner focused on personal relations 
with the subject and their significance in relation to its nature, given what is known of oneself 
(Keller, 1995, pp. 116–120). Yet, the results remain such that the relevant relations can be character-
ised in generic terms rather than only in relation to the researcher’s personal involvement. The 
results are objective despite the approach not bracketing the positioned subjectivity of the re-
searcher in the manner Nagel (1986, pp. 5–6), for instance, advocates. 
28 ‘Situation-based defaults of Default Semantics are just situation-based, automatically retrieved 
meanings.’ (Jazsczolt, 2016, p. 14) 
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retrieved in a given kind of situation involving an utterance constitutes its meaning 
which can be predicted by considering what kinds of immediate associations would 
be expected of model interlocutors with specific traits.29 Thus, while any given Model 
Speaker or Model Addressee will not constitute the sort of generic interlocutor which 
can be considered a part of a schematic understanding of a theory, they each em-
body claims about how meaning is processed. In this respect, both can be framed as 
templates belonging in a schematic representation of the theory. The sorts of things 
which may correspond to a Model Speaker or Model Addressee are possessors of 
cognitive defaults in general. Within the schematic representation of a theory’s ele-
ments, they possess the ability to acquire defaults through ecological factors and the 
ability to automatically retrieve said defaults in response to utterance-involving sce-
narios. The corresponding perspective can then be reconstructed given how these 
processes are characterised. Since a given individual may act as either speaker or ad-
dressee depending on circumstances, each role is being applied to a singular type 
of entity, defined by its ability to process meaning.30 
Within how a theory becomes conceived, the positioned processor is there-
fore the entity to which the theory predicates the qualities it associates with proces-
sors of meaning. Its perspective applies to a mental space of prototypical representa-
 
29 ‘A semantic representation so understood is called in DS merger representation. […] The word 
“merger” and the Greek letter sigma (∑) that symbolizes summation, reflect the fact that informa-
tion coming from different sources merges to produce one semantic structure. […] at the current 
stage of its development, information is being allocated to the following sources: (i) world know-
ledge (WK); (ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS); (iii) situation of discourse (SD); (iv) 
properties of the human inferential system (IS); (v) stereotypes and presumptions about society 
and culture (SC).’ (Jazsczolt, 2016, p. 80) 
30 Few theories make the constructed nature of how processors of meaning are presented as ex-
plicit as Default Semantics. However, presenting them as just people does not remove the theory-
specific framing which defines how people would process meaning should the theory be correct. 
For instance, when Borg (2004, pp. 197–198) provides an example of how ‘Anne’ would interpret 
a demonstrative-involving utterance of ‘That is mine’, produced by ‘Bob’, the posited mental pro-
cesses are characteristic of how processors of meaning are conceived within the theory. While Borg 
does not veil this, given how she mentions the description being an image she would like to present, 
the theoretical schema being imposed on an analogue for a natural situation may mask how the 
participants remain theoretical constructs. Both ‘Anne’ and ‘Bob’ are particular instantiations of mi-
nimal semantics’ generic schema for a processor of meaning. This being the case, abstracting from 
such examples helps model how the theory conceives a processor in the abstract. 
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tions for explanatorily relevant categories such as ‘utterance’ or ‘proposition’.31 How-
ever, actual perspective-taking involving this positioned processor appears largely 
limited to its instantiation within the specified parameters of illustrative scenarios. 
The suspected reason is how the relevant schemata may well not involve kinds of 
prototypical representations which correspond to well-formed imagery.32 An example 
scenario’s prompts would be needed to make the involved scenery recognisable 
enough to be pictured. However, this strong connection to example scenarios should 
not distract from the general demands on what the observer must be able to access. 
Accounting for the expectations on processors helps assess whether a theory’s de-
mands are realistic. For example, whenever a theory reduces meaning to cognitive 
processes, the posited perspective of the generic processor also defines the maxi-
mum scope within which meaning-defining considerations may be aggregated. 
As stated, the detached observer associated with a given theory corresponds 
to the perspective relative to which the totality of a theory’s contents is presented. 
While each individual has their own perspective into which this position is embed-
ded when the model the material provides is being conceived, the interface between 
text and a given individual regulates their relationship. As Sperber (1996, pp. 34–35) 
emphasises, the contents of such public representations are reconstructed using 
personally available cognitive resources during the process of interpretation. How-
ever, the effects are mostly benign because the details of involved cognitive models 
have limited effect on the associated organisation which is the main focus of theories. 
For instance, one’s prototype for ‘person’ may have unfortunate implications in many 
a context but associated sex and appearance are unlikely to restructure one’s under-
 
31 A prototypical representation of an utterance might be speech, for instance, despite the techni-
cal sense of the term also including both writing and sign languages. It need not be well-defined 
and can likely vary contextually between semi-structured nonsense and salient example phrases. 
32 Despite a common misconception and the kinds of prototypical representations with which this 
thesis is mainly concerned, representations exhibiting prototype effects need not be constituted 
by mental imagery of a typical member of a category, given a person’s experiences. As Rosch (1978, 
p. 40) states herself: ‘Prototypes do not constitute a theory of representation of categories. […] Pro-
totypes can be represented either by propositional or image systems […] As with processing models, 
the facts about prototypes can only constrain, but do not determine, models of representation.’ 
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standing of the person-involving dynamics relevant to theories of meaning.33 The 
arrangement involving a person and the relations being posited takes precedence, 
and such arrangements are what texts which express theories provide. Thus, texts 
embody general perspectives to which people’s individual reconstructions of states 
of affairs based on the provided prompts manifest. These prompts’ contents define 
a given perspective’s identity. 
The resulting perspective therefore positions readers in a view from nowhere 
(Nagel, 1986) relative to the presented contents: since the relevant corpus delineates 
the hypothetical states of affairs a theory posits, it grants total access to this whole. 
Yet, despite being detached, the involved perspectives are not strictly objective, and 
as such, they warrant individual analyses. Where Nagel (Ibid. pp. 5–6) states that ob-
jectivity is achieved through a succession of advances which gradually shed idiosyn-
crasies in perspective, the current approach treats such an approach as an approxi-
mation of the associated ideal at best. There is no necessary connection between this 
ideal of detachment and objectivity since viable alternatives to said ideal for produc-
ing epistemically optimal representations such as intersubjectivity (e.g. Longino, 1990) 
and disentanglement (e.g. Bordo, 1987; Keller, 1995)34 are available. Even assuming 
that total detachment would constitute a form of objectivity, no available implemen-
tation would suffice to achieve it. While distancing oneself from one’s usual, personal 
perspective is possible and occasionally indispensable, the result inevitably remains 
anchored in that starting position. Hence, views from nowhere are considered a type 
 
33 Any such impact appears more likely to occur during the construction phase should there be 
idiosyncrasies between demographics which are ignored based on a biased experiential sample. 
For instance, social class may conceivably influence how communication is understood – whether 
it primarily involves well-formed descriptions or more freeform and ostensive naming conventions, 
and so forth. 
34 In the introduction to a collection of articles on objectivity, Megill (1994) differentiates between 
four senses of objectivity: (1) absolute, (2) disciplinary, (3) dialectical, and (4) procedural. Outside 
dialectical objectivity, the ideal of detachment seems shared to different degrees among the alter-
natives. For instance, Daston and Galison (2007) discuss the historical development of how objec-
tive methodology is understood and while there have been phases which emphasise good 
judgement, the trend has been towards minimising the subject. Thus, even under a shared ideal, 
different implementations remain possible. 
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of perspective rather than an absence of perspective or some uniquely privileged 
singular perspective. The limit on available implementation concerns how in distanc-
ing oneself from one’s usual perspective, one would be approaching a mental space 
constructed based on expectations rather than reality as such. One’s actual position 
relative to reality remains grounded and positioned, and if a mental space is being 
substituted, its construction is dependent on available material. Where the results ex-
ceed direct perception, they would therefore rely on inference and extrapolation. 
Whether the result resembles reality is not dependent on the distancing but the relia-
bility of these expectations which remain dependent on prior interactions determined 
by personal trajectories. This underlying dependence on the personal prevents the 
total elimination of idiosyncrasies. Hence, detached perspectives retain identities dis-
tinct from each other instead of instantiating a singular, objective viewpoint, and 
the differences between such perspectives can be analysed meaningfully. Such differ-
ences include the inclusivity of their scope and the selection of recognised entities. 
4.4 Takeaway 
The presented model for attributed situations works as a suitable framing device 
which allows structuring the contents of theories of meaning as they would be con-
ceived because both share a schematic structure where the focus is on defining some 
central entity’s relationship with its surroundings. Approaching theories of meaning 
from this angle locates the kind of entity responsible for instantiating meaning at the 
heart of a set of relations which the theory treats as definitive of the influences on 
the meaning of such entities. These sets of relations determine the meanings a theory 
attributes to the relevant instantiators. As such, the instantiators must be compatible 
with their designated position relative to each kind of relation involved. Such theory-
internal demands based on the coherence of such models may require that the ma-
terial identities of associated instantiators exceed (or subceed) whichever manifest 
entities the names used for them would usually be understood to designate. Addi-
tionally, the parallel with attributed situations reveals how any conception which re-
presents such models must involve a perspective from which they are viewed. Such 
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perspectives are constructed based on the material provided to a conceiver which 
may only ever present a selective, limited picture even when the theory alleges to ac-
count for meaning in some absolute sense. As a result, in being conceived, every 
theory implements a scope for the considerations which it registers, and this scope 
is limited by what is being presented. 
In discussing how theories are conceived, one must specify whose concep-
tions are being used. Modelling particular individual conceptions alone would be of 
limited general significance, however. As such, the presented approach involves re-
constructing idealised models of how specified demographics’ typical members 
would conceive the contents presented in the designated texts based on the specific 
influences characteristic of the experiences of members of these groups. Since in-
variance in how a theory gets conceived cannot be guaranteed, the possibility of 
variance must be accommodated in this manner. Even when a range of potential 
conceptions results from such analysis, the idealised models each represent some-
thing objective: the properties of the text which afford such interpretations relative 
to the specified sets of influences. Any variance detected between such models of 
the same theories ought to invite discussion about the preconditions for arriving at 
specific conceptions and whether such reliance is justifiable. 
This discussion on how theories are conceived – which results in the versions 
of those theories with which people actually operate in practice – provides the means 
to reconstruct such models using the inventories of involved components and the 
relations between them based on definition 2. This approach to theories also high-
lights the details which motivate the sorts of further analyses proposed in the remain-
ing chapters. If theories do not directly describe reality but rather, schematic states 
of affairs to be superimposed onto reality, there are demands of internal consistency 
which can limit the possible material implementation of functional categories like that 
of the instantiators of meaning. When conceived models are necessarily limited in 
their scope and their contents are tied to what texts expressing a theory present, 
there must be a range to the considerations being implemented. 
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Structuring the contents of a theory of meaning using the framing derived from at-
tributed situations puts in focus the necessary relationships between sources of in-
fluence and the designated instantiators of meaning. The minimal meaningful unit 
suited for a theory’s purposes consists of whichever entities are required to fulfil that 
role of recipient. Such entities are not guaranteed to correspond to the experientially 
manifest instances being indicated. Even when the inclusion of said constituents is 
considered necessary, their sufficiency for the role has not yet been proven. 
As basing judgements on the criteria for sufficiency on any theory-external principle 
risks privileging certain approaches, one ought to instead contend with what a given 
theory considers the basic level of meaning. This principle minimises the complexity 
of these instantiators and provides grounds for comparisons in terms of parsimony. 
While terms that designate manifest meaningful entities like ‘word’ provide a baseline 
for what instantiator identity ought to include, judgements of their self-sameness do 
not converge to provide clear material identities. Thus, sufficiency relative to a given 
theory’s requirements is instead specified relative to the demands of the definitive 
relations in which the instantiator must participate in set roles. In effect, once the rela-
tions involved in basic meaning and the manifest core identity have been identified, 
one must analyse the conditions for participating in said relations and identity which 
kinds of entities materially present in (all) the relevant scenarios may fulfil them. 
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5.1 Boundaries 
An instantiator of meaning is whichever material configuration such that a meaning 
is attributable to it given some theoretical framework, or the corresponding theory-
internal counterpart. In terms of the schema used to frame theories of meaning, an 
instantiator parallels an attributed situation’s core entity: once it is designated, its sig-
nificance lies in its participation in various observable relations for which it acts as 
the locus. Definition 2 highlights this functional role by modelling theories in a man-
ner which requires each such definitive relation (type) as well as the involved kinds 
of entities to be specified. This framing emphasises the instantiator’s relational qual-
ities – all the ways in which it is expected to relate to whichever entities bestow it its 
supposed meaning. Thus, the instantiator’s material identity is subject to restrictions 
derived from consistency requiring it to be compatible with its designated position 
in said sorts of relations. Naming such entities using terms such as ‘word’ or ‘utter-
ance’ designates some core identity but consummate material identity is substanti-
ated in relation to such theory-specific functional requirements. For instance, whether 
a broadcast qualifies as one utterance, many, or just a medium for proper ones de-
pends on such details. Some general theory of utterances or the like might pose its 
own set of identity criteria but it would not change the criteria theories taken as 
wholes embody. This section discusses the nature of this theory-specificity by con-
sidering the theory-internal criteria by which an instantiator is identified. 
5.1.1 Minimalist Closure 
That meaning must be instantiated somehow – that there must be states of affairs to 
which it can be attributed or which embody it – is a premise for this section. A notion 
of meaning removed from any such instantiation appears vacuous since no fact could 
evidence or otherwise ground any claims about such forms of meaning. However, 
once such instantiators are dissociated from what terms such as ‘word’ or ‘utterance’ 
intuitively designate, new criteria for distinguishing them from theories’ total explana-
tory apparatuses are needed. Naïve understandings do not suffice since the way they 
capitalise on recognisability masks how theoretically loaded the notions become 
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when attributed functional roles within a theory. Authors such as Kaplan1 or Barwise 
and Etchemendy2 also provide alternative understandings of such basic notions, and 
such presence of alternative understandings turns advocacy even for the naïve un-
derstanding position-involving. However, abolishing this intuitive boundary entails 
that some more formal distinction between the instantiator proper and the sources 
of its meaning must be introduced in its stead. Otherwise, instantiator identity risks 
extending to incorporate each source of meaning since from the detached perspec-
tive from which such analysis is conducted, the whole system is necessary for a given 
meaning to emerge. 
The proposed approach is based on a principle of minimalist closure which 
refers to associating the instantiator proper with the smallest functional unit which 
suffices for the task the instantiator performs. Identifying said task is a separate is-
sue. Differently oriented analyses might even apply different criteria. However, the 
underlying reduction to the smallest functionally sufficient unit reveals the baseline 
commitments of a theory relative to the designated criterion. At that level, the inclu-
sion of any involved entities becomes non-negotiable because each is necessary. 
This crystallises the differences between theories and provides an absolute boundary 
whereas any intermediate criterion would fail to differentiate between necessary and 
potential similarities and differences. Even if one had an interest in the potential, dis-
tinguishing it would require first identifying the domain of the necessary to be sub-
tracted from the total. Meanwhile, focusing only on necessary inclusions shows the 
most fundamental differences between theories in this respect such as whether their 
instantiators should even be considered commensurate in practice. 
The exact criterion being applied concerns the minimal unit for expressing 
whichever forms of meaning analysed theories treat as basic.  Because the criteria for 
 
1 ‘[U]tterances and inscriptions are stages of words, which are the continuants made up of these 
interpersonal stages along with some more mysterious intrapersonal stages.’ (Kaplan, 1990, p. 98, 
emphasis in original) 
2 ‘[O]n the Austinian view all propositions contain an additional contextually determined feature, 
namely, the situation they are about.’ (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1987, p. 29). Immediately prior, the 
authors refer to designated situations as a component of Austinian propositions. 
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basicness are internal to each theory, they need not be imposed externally in a man-
ner which risks begging the question by being biased either in favour of or against 
some theories. Regardless, the criterion remains applicable across the board since 
each theory must identify some basic level of meaning. This basic level is effectively 
the minimal point of closure: anything sub-basic constitutes an incomplete repre-
sentation of a theory’s total requirements for the emergence of meaning. Such com-
ponents’ comparative relevance can then be established once it is established where 
theories differ overall in terms of involved components. 
5.1.2 Basic Meaning 
In this context, basicness involves theory-specific criteria for a given form of signifier 
to function as one. It is not a matter of hierarchy between forms of signifiers such as 
sentences and words. Within a given approach inclusive of multiple forms of signi-
fiers such as sentences and words, unless they were conflated as subject to the same 
dynamics, each would possess distinct criteria for what constitutes the base level of 
their meaning. For instance, some theories may set the threshold for sentence mean-
ing at expressing a well-formed proposition and word meaning at being associated 
with (sets of) distinct concepts. These are theory-specific criteria even when minimally 
distinct variants may be shared by multiple theories. Whenever a single approach 
includes multiple levels of instantiators, it should be treated as a cluster of semi-dis-
tinct theories of meaning3 which are each separately analysable. Even when mean-
ings attributed to forms of signifiers might rely on factors derived from the mean-
ings of their constituents, the latter are not treated as more basic in the current sense. 
Such circumstances merely require analysing one level before the considerations 
involved with another may be properly understood. 
Basicness is thus to be understood in terms of what a theory treats as basic 
rather than somehow enriched or developed forms of meaning for each type of sig-
 
3 For instance, relevance theory is primarily a theory of utterance meaning as the proposition being 
intended to be conveyed using an utterance. Yet, Sperber and Wilson (1995) also take a stance on 
word meaning, identifying it as a concept (or set of concepts for ambiguous words) involving a 
logical, encyclopaedic, and lexical entry (Ibid. pp. 86–93). 
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nifying unit. A theory-internal criterion is being applied because theory-external cri-
teria are each either theoretically motivated or judgement-dependent, and either of 
those features involves privileging a viewpoint based on considerations under con-
tention. To illustrate the issue, consider semantic well-formedness (Chomsky, 2002) 
as an example of both.4 Applying semantic well-formedness would be theoretically 
loaded since the notion of well-formedness involves structured organisation of dis-
tinct elements, but not all theories require strict organisation or even complete de-
marcability of meaning due to aspects such as its openness to connotation.5 Addi-
tionally, asserting semantic well-formedness – or acceptability which acts as evidence 
for it – depends on the judgements of people with native speaker proficiency. Yet, 
whether any particular set of native speakers may spontaneously imagine a context 
in which a linguistic token could be used meaningfully is subject to contemporane-
ously available and salient cognitive models (e.g. Stock, 2005). Their judgements are 
therefore affected by incidental factors, including their degree of familiarity with a 
theory or relevant scenarios. This inherently disadvantages theories which demon-
strate potential avenues for deriving meaning by tapping otherwise non-salient sce-
narios like Travis’s (2008) radical contextualism.6 The underlying, seemingly general-
isable issue concerns how expectations based on prior understanding are required 
for pinpointing meaning given its insubstantiality, and how such expectations in 
turn rely primarily on personal experience and theoretical models. The example of 
 
4 Admittedly, semantic well-formedness is also largely vacuous as a criterion given how it is nigh 
synonymous with ‘meaningful’ or ‘not nonsensical’. 
5 Garza-Cuarón (1991, p. 3) specifically names semioticians such as Eco and literary theorists such 
as Cohen and Barthes as examples of treating connotation as ‘essential to the analysis of meaning’. 
Barthes (1974, p. 7), for instance, states that ‘others (the semiologists, let us say) contest the hierar-
chy of denotated and connotated; language, they say, the raw material of denotation, with its dic-
tionary and its syntax, is a system like any other; there is no reason to make this system the privi-
leged one, to make it the locus and the norm of a primary, original meaning, the scale for all asso-
ciated meanings’. In-context, the implication is that theories may treat connotation as part of the 
most basic meaning attributable to a text 
6 The so-called Travis cases include scenarios demonstrating how basic sentences such as ‘the 
leaves are green’ (Travis, 1997) can be used to assert different claims which may even have oppo-
site truth values while the facts remain the same. For this example sentence, it matters whether the 
greenness is understood in terms of visual impression or biological disposition when a Japanese 
maple’s naturally red leaves have been dyed green. 
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semantic well-formedness shows why being theoretically motivated or judgement-
dependent biases evaluations based on a criterion. While all criteria require some 
such grounding, the seeming plurality of meaning expressed in the variety of avail-
able theories makes generalisations across them systematically risk begging the 
question based on different priorities. Until the universality of some set of criteria is 
established, theory-internal criteria such as basicness constitute a safer bet. 
While basic meaning according to any given theory is defined using theory-
internal criteria, basicness itself is universal because each theory of meaning must 
identify some conditions sufficient for meaning-acquisition.7 Thus, while basicness 
can be defined autonomously, using primary theory-internal factors, unlike those 
conditions alone, it grounds meaningful cross-theoretic comparisons. Were primary 
theory-internal criteria applied in this manner, they would constitute external criteria 
relative to any alternative approaches, and the aforementioned issue of set approach-
es being privileged would recur. For instance, radical contextualist theories utilise cri-
teria which differ considerably from others’ standards and may even seem to lack a 
basic level of meaning because context penetrates all the way which precludes any 
underlying invariant meaning. Yet, even in such cases, the floor is merely being 
raised to include more considerations instead of basicness being eliminated. 
Consider how Searle (1994, p. 179) argues that ‘[t]he same literal expression can make 
the same contributions to the literal utterance of a variety of sentences […] and yet 
[…] the expression will be interpreted differently in the different sentences […] [b]e-
cause each sentence is interpreted against a Background of human capacities’. In 
effect, meaning only occurs once the required intentionality is being grounded in 
specific practices within which things receive a significance through their contribution. 
Searle’s example of ‘cut’ which is exemplified in ‘cut the grass’, ‘cut the cake’, and 
 
7 For example, one might treat as basic the type of meaning subject to pragmatic effects which re-
quire a prior meaning such as implicatures. However, this criterion is merely an example of how 
to approach basicness within contextualist theories (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Recanati, 2002), 
given how contextual penetration prevents tying basic meaning to preceding any pragmatic effects 
like Borg’s (2004, p. 38) distinction between minimalism and dual-pragmatics implies she does. The 
criterion cannot be fully definitive of basicness, either, as it would primarily apply to (full) utterances. 
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‘cut the sun’ (Ibid. pp. 178–180) demonstrates the principle: each activity involves dis-
tinct forms of separation, and attributing set significance to cutting the sun requires 
imagining a scenario which substitutes as background. The variety of such scenarios 
together with an absence of some actual standard leaves the notion of cutting the 
sun effectively meaningless within Searle’s framework. However, this threshold sets 
the baseline which can be identified as a form of basic meaning. If meaning ceases 
in the absence of a linguistic item and its Background, whatever emerges as such 
minimal conditions are met constitutes the theory-specific basic level of meaning. 
The comparisons which linking closure to conditions for basic meaning sup-
ports mainly concern how demanding different theories are towards processors of 
meaning. Once the minimal criteria for instantiating basic meaning have been 
identified for each in a set of theories, the theories may be ranked from least to 
most demanding. Assuming that a meaning must be accessible to a definitive set 
of people such as all users of a term, the majority of them, or only the experts, this 
ranking is linked to the conditions for accessing whichever factors a theory considers 
necessary. The more entities are involved and the less accessible they are, the higher 
the risk of the theory turning infeasible becomes. Since the meanings a theory at-
tributes must remain grounded on actual judgements (even when they do not cor-
respond to them directly),8 the relevant people must afford access to whichever 
facts cognising said meanings requires. Proper access to the instantiator – whether 
exhaustive or not – is part of this requirement since the instantiator provides an 
anchor for attributing said meanings. 
 
8 Again, the claim being made is not that such meaning must match actual judgements of mean-
ing, A theory may well represent meaning in a divergent manner or derive it from sources unavail-
able to (most) individuals. However, unless an explanation of the relationship between the phe-
nomenon being addressed – and it appears the experience of meaning, whether first-personal or 
not, is the primary explanandum – and the results can be provided, it is unclear what purpose the 
theory even serves. Computational linguistics, for instance, includes a corpus-based approach to 
language-recognition which tends to operate on statistical tendencies. By itself, such an approach 
would not constitute a theory of meaning since it only seeks to enable machine-based language-
recognition. However, when similar rules are put to serve an explanatory role such as in combi-
natory categorial grammar (e.g. Gildea & Hockenmaier, 2003; Steedman & Baldridge, 2006), one 
ought to expect this relationship to be clarified when the explanans is related to the explanandum. 
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The value of such ranking lies in identifying the priority for assessing theo-
ries in terms of parsimony. As Simon (2004, p. 35, emphasis in original) notes par-
simony is defined relative to both the data set and the corresponding formula: ‘par-
simony is the ratio of complexity of the data set to the complexity of the formula.’ 
As such, the extremes in terms of complexity warrant special attention. Increased 
parsimony approaches an ideal balance between explanatory power and simplicity: 
highest explanatory power sets the standard but given equal explanatory power, the 
simpler option is preferred. This results in parsimony being breached whenever a 
theory either oversimplifies or overstates explanatory requirements. With respect to 
instantiators, the most relevant theories for assessing parsimony are therefore the 
least and the most demanding ones. The more peripheral a theory is in terms of its 
requirements, the greater the impact of establishing that level as the threshold for 
one of the factors becomes. Vindicating a theory’s claim that the explanatory power 
of a minimal instantiator matches or exceeds alternatives would prove further criteria 
redundant, and comprehensive frameworks being proven to require more encom-
passing instantiators would turn any simpler option insufficient. 
5.2 Manifestness 
The current discussion is premised on there being a real possibility that instantiators’ 
identities fail to match distinctly perceptible entities such as individual words (recited 
or written) and utterances. This section discusses the reasons for this assumption 
and the relationship between instantiators proper and said entities. Theories of word 
meaning, for instance, appear intended to apply to ‘words’ in an everyday sense even 
when they might reconstruct what underlies such impressions.9 Understanding the 
difference between such manifest entities and theory-internal full instantiators is re-
quired to appreciate the distinction. Specifically, this section seeks to demonstrate 
 
9 This is a comment about material identity. Theories may affix various forms of explanatory appa-
ratuses such as unarticulated constituents (e.g. Perry, 1998; Recanati, 2002) to such entities with-
out explicitly extending their material identities. Whatever sets of entities are ultimately required 
for the material identities of meaning-instantiating entities which are suitable for a theory’s explana-
tory apparatus constitute the full instantiators discussed below. It is merely presumed that authors 
have more everyday senses linked to manifest instances in mind when formulating their theories. 
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that is misleading to treat said theoretical constructs as equivalent to these experien-
tially manifest entities. They do act as minimally designated loci which help direct 
expectations but the systems posited by theories also embody their own conditions 
for suitable entities. The resulting instantiators are defined functionally, relative to 
the rest of the system: they consists of whatever is necessary for embodying the at-
tributed meaning, given the nature and posited sources of the latter. 
5.2.1 Manifest Instantiators 
A manifest instantiator is whichever observable entity is designated by the standard 
use of a term used to refer to a type of meaningful entity such as ‘utterance’. In the 
case of ‘utterance’, the manifest instantiators would be the immediate products of 
individual acts of speech, whether recited or written: patterns of vibration registered 
as word sounds or either visual or tactile patterns which incorporate letter shapes 
forming words. There appears to exist an intuitive understanding of any meaning-
carrying entity named using familiar terminology. Needing to accommodate the 
variety of cases complicates the provided specification of the entities constituting 
utterances yet each designated instance remains familiar. This focus on familiar forms 
demonstrates how inadequate such basic understanding can often be, though. Con-
sider unprinted digital writing. While words do appear on screen whenever the con-
tents are accessed using a program with the appropriate decoder and interface, the 
act of writing enabling this actually produces changes in the magnetic properties of 
hard drive disk platters. Only the text resembles what would be considered an utter-
ance by the historic precedent of handwriting and print but the changes constitute 
the independent, enduring product which embodies the utterance’s message. 
The evident appeal of manifest instantiators over alternatives involving sets 
of familiar entities or lack of continuous boundaries matches expectations grounded 
in categorisational prototype effects (Rosch, 1978; 1981).10 In effect, people are pre-
 
10 ‘[T]he task of category systems is to provide maximum information with the least cognitive 
effort; […] maximum information with least cognitive effort is achieved if categories map the 
perceived world structure as closely as possible.’ (Rosch, 1978, p. 28, ‘structructure’ corrected to 
‘structure’) 
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disposed to favour categories which track the forms of differentiation their percep-
tual systems afford: physical covariation, material continuity or punctuated duration, 
and so forth. Moreover, the cognitive models representing such categories are de-
rived primarily from available experiences and therefore tend to exclude viable but 
marginal candidates. Consider the speech act, for instance. A singular person orally 
uttering words in a near-continuous and contained manner is the assumed norm. 
Considerations such as whether some act may misfire – i.e. fail to be committed – 
based on the quantity of collective utterers are nigh-inconceivable when such cases 
are treated as uniquely representative or otherwise normative. Another issue compli-
cated by the dynamics of a collective are abuses, given how they are largely treated 
as a matter of intention.11 After all, some participants being insincere seems insuffi-
cient to corrupt the speech act. Even if the lines are spoken individually, a mutual 
pledge where any given speaker only represents the collective appears irreducible to 
individuals’ speect acts.12 Possibilities involving discontinuous or indefinitely long or 
non-traditionally mediated speech acts are similarly left open when the prototypical 
cases remain in focus. The wider observation this issue illustrates concerns the default 
understanding of each nominated manifest instantiator being potentially subject to 
similar limitations given their susceptibility to contingent prototype effects. The very 
manifestness of these entities risks such bias which is grounded in affordance-priori-
tising perception. However, while the resulting recognisability helps categorisation, 
it does not ensure sufficiency for instantiating each associated form of meaning. 
To further demonstrate these issues, consider attempting to designate lin-
guistic tokens demonstratively. Some cases – such as a handwritten instance of ‘dog’ 
or saying ‘[dɒɡ]’ yourself – provide satisfactorily well-defined boundaries for material 
identity. However, such demonstrative identity being paired with attributing meaning 
turns the fact that no token may truly be isolated from its surroundings into an 
issue. Specifically, each token occurs within some set of circumstances. While they 
 
11 Austin (1975, pp. 16–18) largely equates abuses with insincerity which is a matter of intention. 
12 Meijers (2007), for instance, discusses the status of collective speech acts and criticises the pre-
sent individualist bias in speech act theory. 
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may be in focus, stripping all context is impossible. Even ignoring how absence of 
circumstances is itself a specific circumstance, as situated entities, observers import 
their own context. Because there exists no possible control group for which context 
is absent, whenever some designated linguistic token is being attributed meaning, 
there exists no means to conclusively assert that the designated token rather than 
the pair it forms with its circumstances suffices to instantiate said meaning. The only 
way out involves attributing said meaning to a type being betokened since types 
may be conceived independently of context given how they stretch across many 
while seemingly retaining an independent identity and invariant meaning. Yet, this 
move invites its own issues such as types’ material identities being considerably 
more contestable because they lack the immediacy of designated tokens. 
Linguistic items’ type identity13 is already theoretically loaded (e.g. Kaplan, 
1990; 2011; Gendler Szabó, 1999; Wetzel, 2009; Hawthorne & Lepore, 2011), involving 
criteria ranging from formal similarity (orthographic, phonological, morphological) 
to genetical or onomastic (Kaplan, 1990), and to statistical (Gildea & Hockenmaier, 
2003). However, as Gendler Szabó (1999, pp. 147–148) mentions – citing Davidson 
(1979) among others – similarity is used as a self-evident criterion for word identity. 
This default position should thus reflect a supposedly theoretically naïve position. 
Yet, as both needing to bridge the pronunciation-spelling14 gap and homonymity 
show, even the naïve linguist is not happy with simple self-similarity for word types. 
 
13 For purposes of this analysis, linguistic types are given a nominalist treatment: the material iden-
tity of the universal is the aggregate of its tokens (Armstrong, 2009, p. 43). Criticisms of the approach 
come both from type-realists (e.g. Wetzel, 2009) and those critical of either set-based conceptual-
isation (e.g. Simons, 1982; Kaplan, 1990) or instantiation as the relation connecting tokens and types 
(e.g. Gendler Szabó, 1999). Simons (1982) prefers a pattern-based approach wherein types are asso-
ciated with patterns that may contain open variables (e.g. pattern ‘αα’ would be exemplified by 
each instance involving two subsequent instances of a single symbol such as ‘aa’ but closed pat-
terns are also possible). Gendler Szabó (1999) argues that tokens represent rather than instantiate 
types, leaving room for variation without inviting issues with thresholds or multiplication of types. 
However, in the current context, this approach need not constitute a metaphysical stance. The 
treatment of linguistic types is merely a means to identify the totality of associated entities based 
on whichever principles different theories promote. 
14 While archetypically only vocalisation and standard alphabets are considered, this issue extends 
to signing, Morse code and braille. 
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As a result, they must instead (also) invoke expressed concepts. Because the sole 
function of such an appeal to concepts ends up being to justify preceding judge-
ments of word identity, attempts to reconcile the two intuitions constitute immunisa-
tion in Popper’s (2002b, p. 48, emphasis in original) sense:15 ‘introducing ad hoc some 
auxiliary assumption, or […] re-interpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it 
escapes refutation.’ In effect, word identity is defined one way when it is convenient 
and the other whenever the original criterion would fail but the latter criterion is not 
generalised because by itself, it would be vacuous. The alternative approach of pro-
viding more substantial criteria in support of either approach, on the other hand, 
turns theoretically loaded and thus fails as a representation of a naïve understanding. 
More fundamentally, even the very sense of recognisability which grounds the asso-
ciated sense of manifest identity likely depends mainly on conservatism bias, as the 
example provided below is intended to show. 
Conservatism bias involves resistance to belief revision based on novel evi-
dence. In the case of linguistic types, it would manifest as greater preference for ac-
cepting more familiar expressions as sharing an identity in an otherwise inconsistent 
manner. As an illustration, consider how ‘ドッグ’ constitutes the proper Japanese kata-
kana transliteration of ‘[dɒɡ]’. Despite this, one likely has serious reservations about 
calling ‘ドッグ’ being instantiated instances rather than perhaps representations or 
parallels to the English word betokened by ‘dog’. To speculate on the reasons, expla-
nations for such exclusion would perhaps involve orthographical differences since  
‘ドッグ’ does not map directly to the Latin alphabet and given the symbols being 
used, would directly translate to an utterance of ‘[do̞ɡ̚ɡ̊ɯ̟ᵝ]’. Any such reasoning 
turns hypocritical, though, if ‘inu’ is treated as an instance of the same word as ‘犬’ 
as is common among English speakers despite this case mirroring the initial scenario. 
Both conventions exist but the former is specific to an outgroup relative to most 
users of English. Hence, the difference appears to involve matters of arbiter identity 
where only conventions adhering to their expectations qualify as definitive of word 
 
15 As Popper (2002c, p. 43) notes, the term ‘immunization from criticism’ was originally others’ 
way to describe what is called ‘conventionalist stratagem’ in his own work. He embraces the term. 
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type identity. If the existence of corresponding conventions were the deciding factor, 
a Japanese author having a character in their written work state ‘ジス イズ マイ ドッグ’ 
would involve the use of English words to the same extent as ‘kore wa watashi no 
inu desu’ written by a British author consists of Japanese words.16,17 After all, were the 
latter sentence written by the Japanese author, few would question whether it con-
stitutes or merely represents a sentence in Japanese, and the author’s identity is not 
a part of manifest type identity. As such, if type identity being considered manifest 
depends on such reactive exclusion of any subversive candidates, such manifest iden-
tity merely constitutes a reflection of preconceptions which embody non-generalis-
able and therefore incidental factors dependent on systematic contingencies. 
5.2.2 Full Instantiators 
Full instantiators consist of the sets of entities which must participate in expressing 
the sort of basic meaning discussed above based on theory-internal criteria. They 
must minimally incorporate the core manifest instantiators linked to the terminology 
a theory uses (e.g. ‘word’) but their identity conditions are otherwise unconstrained 
by theory-external conditions. While full instantiators can be specified regardless of 
whether manifest instantiators can act as a satisfactory standard for instantiator iden-
tity, such analyses are made more significant by naïve conceptions’ demonstrated 
inadequacy. Were manifest instantiators’ identity conditions near-unequivocal in-
stead, they could act as neutral, cross-theoretic standards relative to which any devi-
ation in what specific theories require would constitute breaches. Under such con-
ditions, a theory aimed at ‘word meaning’ which required the corresponding full in-
stantiators to incorporate utterers’ intentions as part of words’ identities would fail 
to properly qualify as a theory of word meaning, for instance. Since intuitions about 
 
16 The katakana spell a transliteration of the pronunciation for ‘This is my dog’, and the Latin trans-
literation expresses the matching Japanese sentence ‘これ わ わたし の 犬 です’. 
17 The Latin alphabet does see some use for Japanese words. Most notably, keyboards and touch-
pads are designed to translate inputs of Latin characters to corresponding native alphabets (Gott-
lieb, 2010, p. 77), and there are three official systems of representing Japanese words using the Latin 
alphabet (Ibid. pp. 78–79). The system of representing foreign words in katakana is no less official, 
though, even if the only native users of said languages who apply the system are specially educated. 
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manifest identity cannot be eschewed, they remain part of necessary identity con-
ditions. However, their inadequacy leaves the extent of sufficient conditions open-
ended. Under these conditions, each theory’s take on full instantiator identity instead 
presents a candidate to be accepted as a general category of signifiers. Whether 
such candidates qualify depends not on the manifestness of the designated entities 
but on their utility – either as familiar terms’ proper referents or novel concepts. 
As an example of restrictions entailed by a theory’s details, consider how 
Kaplan (1990, p. 95) speculates that Kripke’s (1981) causal theory of names implicitly 
requires words being understood causally rather than orthographically – as parts of 
a continuum originating at the initial baptism. According to this common currency 
view of word identity which Kaplan (1990, p. 98, emphasis in original) promotes, ‘utter-
ances and inscriptions are stages of words, which are the continuants made up of 
these interpersonal stages along with some more mysterious intrapersonal stages.’ 
Thus, when discussing distinct words, a causal theorist would be treating such branch-
ing causal pathways (or at least their concurrent participants) rather than the total 
set of matching patterns as the proper instantiator. The variant involving orthograph-
ical word identity would need to differentiate between mutated expressions (e.g. pro-
nunciation of ‘ration’ going from [ˈɹeɪʃən] to [ˈɹæʃən]). Given Kripke’s theoretical ap-
paratus, this view would likely need to treat first instances of such mutations as novel 
initial baptisms.18 This move would in turn rob the concept of its explanatory power 
by removing any constraints on applicable situations involving novel expressions. A 
baptism occurring would no longer depend on the presence of set mental states, for 
instance. However, if there remains a sense in which orthographically specified word 
 
18 ‘An initial baptism takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of 
the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is “passed from link to link”, the receiver 
of the name must, I think, intend when he learns to use it with the same reference as the man from 
whom he heard it.’ (Kripke, 1981, p. 96). Thus, were the name in question linked to exact form of 
expression, a changed expression would be best described as another initial baptism whereby the 
object is denoted using a description referencing the object of the preceding form of expression. 
Thus, ‘[ˈɹæʃən]‘ would name ‘the object named by [ˈɹeɪʃən]’. Given how such descriptions would 
largely be provided after the fact and from the outside because most linguistic mutation is inci-
dental, an orthographically based causal theory of names would turn vacuous. After all, no fact 
internal to an event suffices to invalidate such post hoc external descriptions. 
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type identity undergirds some form of meaning distinct from what a causal theory 
explains,19 even if one subscribed to the causal theory of names, one may also specify 
word identity along orthographical lines in another context. The principle is effectively 
the same as between contextually viable taxonomical principles for speciation (e.g. 
Dupré, 1993, pp. 26–34): different categorisation schemata suit different purposes. 
Because word choices for naming the relevant instantiators (e.g. ‘word’) do 
in part help specify them, full instantiators remain seeded around associated mani-
fest instantiators. Given its relation to experience, meaning cannot be isolated from 
manifest instantiators regardless as their presence prompts attributing any meaning 
in the first place. Even when manifest instantiators may not suffice, they remain ne-
cessary. Hence, each full instantiator of a named kind (‘word’, etc.) must at least en-
compass the minimal, uncontentious presence ascribed to the associated manifest 
instantiator. Such minimalist definitions might not qualify as theoretically naïve proper 
understandings given how they merely omit all issues in the periphery, but a shared 
requirement should be kept minimal. Thus, for instance, whatever conditions a 
theory ultimately embodies for the material identity of ‘words’ (in the type-related 
sense), in using that term, the author is minimally designating at least the sets of to-
kens co-associated with a shared word identity (each instance of ‘dog’, ‘[dɒɡ]‘, etc.). 
While a required full instantiator might therefore exceed the minimal manifest in-
stantiator, meaning remains associated with the presence of said kind of entity. 
The methodology for extracting full instantiators employs the relations which 
involve the instantiator within a theory-specific model. Among said relations, some 
are treated as meaning-bestowing and have the instantiator or parts thereof as their 
object. Others specify what entities are involved in expressing (basic) meaning and 
thus have the instantiator as their subject. For instance, a deferential semantic ex-
 
19 For example, terms with shared referents may differ in tone or connotation. Consider ‘disabled’ 
relative to ‘handicapped’, for instance, in the sense both terms share. Both are used to denote peo-
ple who would struggle to perform some standard actions unaided because of a distinct bodily 
(including neural) difference relative to the norm. However, the former connotes the absence of 
ability or even negative ability to perform while the latter is associated with added challenges which 
merely complicate rather than prevent performance. 
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ternalist (e.g. Putnam, 1975) treats subject-specific, communally authorised experts’ 
declarations as definitive of word meaning. The resulting relation connects a posited 
type or unique entity to the expert’s epistemic state (internal or extended) and an 
appropriately positioned betokening of a linguistic pattern (and associated entities) 
within their declaration or set of declarations.20 The pattern is the recipient or object 
of the complex relation and deferential externalism attributes it a corresponding 
meaning. Thus, the definitive relations specific to the deferential externalist approach 
should specify corresponding full instantiators orthographically. 
5.3 Extraction Methods 
Isolating theories’ full instantiators using the structuring which models based on def-
inition 2 embody involves five main steps. The first two have already been mentioned. 
One should first specify a minimal manifest instantiator based on the terminology 
used to refer to the relevant kind of instantiator within a theory. One should also 
identify what the theory treats as the basic form of meaning for said kind of entity. 
This can also be done afterwards to sift through all recorded relations and informed 
by the available selection but access to said guiding principle helps focus textual ana-
lysis. This sub-section focuses on the remaining three steps. Firstly, while browsing 
the relevant corpus, one must identify mentions of the processes which engender 
meaning and identify the associated relations being posited. Ideally, the same should 
be done for processes resulting in meaning being experienced. These relations help 
restrict the possible instantiators based on which kinds of entities fit the relevant 
 
20 The classic example is the (simplified) claim that ‘water is H2O’ in which ‘water’ is positioned 
such that being (identical to) H2O is predicated of it. The definition of ‘H2O’, one assumes, relies 
on similar specifications for its constituents, the referents of which are ultimately designated non-
verbally. Given the floor manifest instantiators set, ‘[ˈwɔːtə(r)]’ would also be included. Further, 
whether contested instances such as the katakana transliteration ‘ウォーター’ become included would 
assumedly be decided on by experts of related fields. Though, such matters appear even less 
grounded outside just arbitration in a manner which presents the expert more as an interpreter 
with trained judgement (Daston & Galison, 2007, Ch. 6) than an observer of categories true to 
nature (Ibid. Ch. 2) as presented by Putnam (1975). Notably, of course, both views of objectivity 
involve judgement, as opposed to the more mechanical notions which currently dominate much 
of science. While this feature does not disprove deferential externalism, it may diminish the view’s 
attractiveness since expert views would lack their directly fact-based epistemic superiority. 
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positions. The next step involves relating the resulting affordances to the set of enti-
ties which the relevant situations afford in turn. This helps substantiate the instantia-
tors by tying them to specific constellations of available entities – should there be 
any which match the entailed criteria. Finally, one should double-check whether any 
of the designated entities are involved in relations which would complicate matters. 
The result of this process is a detailed, tractable representation of the full instantia-
tors a theory necessitates. 
5.3.1 Laying Groundwork 
One analysing how a given theory treats ‘words’ or ‘utterances’ must first denote the 
corresponding minimal manifest instantiator. This floor for physical identity helps save 
the phenomena, and it provides a point of focus around which the full instantiator 
can be specified. For utterances, for instance, the minimal core unit appears to be 
whichever substrate betokens language – whether vocalised, inscribed, or gestured. 
Claims such as that the utterance is essentially the product of a creative subject (Bakh-
tin, 1986, p. 84), as opposed to the language replication of a machine, for example, 
would enrich this minimal position but should be bracketed. While such enrichment 
leads to better-defined sets with fewer contestable cases (such as computerised error 
messages21), any additional criteria such as intentional production materially extend 
the corresponding minimal instantiator which undermines its purpose.22 The minimal 
manifest instantiator need not be the ideal representation of what a term such as 
‘utterance’ denotes. Its purpose is to provide a floor which directs how the distinct 
further criteria specific theories embody are applied. Effectively, the domains for ap-
plying said criteria are centred on the relevant minimal manifest instantiators. The 
 
21 The message has been written by a person but it being uttered by them in that instance (or 
constituting a part of an ongoing utterance embodied in the code) is controversial. On the other 
hand, excluding the message from being an utterance also entails conditions involving direct 
interaction with an intentional agent or the like. 
22 Attempts to rigorously define ‘utterance’ relative to dialectic theory have been made, for exam-
ple, by Bakhtin (1986) as well as Haye and Laraín (2011). More analytic meaning theories appear 
content to treat utterance identity as given. 
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same is true of the minimal manifest instantiators designated by ‘word’ (either as a 
token or type), ‘sentence’, and so on.23  
Since the manifest instances define the minimal manifest instantiator and 
since the inclusion of said minimal instantiator should be shared across applicable 
theories, the method for identifying them ideally has both a phenomenological and 
an interpersonal aspect. Personal experience of what entities embody specific kinds 
of meaning grounds such analysis but one’s experience ought not to be generalised 
without evidence of others’ conceptions of such instantiators sharing said minimal 
components. In practice, answering these demands would likely involve freeform sur-
veys to avoid anchoring people’s opinions when the question is one on which they 
will have hardly reflected.24 More structured surveys risk the listed options priming 
people to mainly consider those alternatives.25 At its simplest, such a survey might 
consist of the question ‘What elements constitute an utterance?’ with further tasks 
asking people to list the components of written and articulated utterances as checks 
on the reliability of their answers and support for categorising said answers. Because 
categorising answers to open questions relies on interpretation and good judge-
ment, the full data set should be made available for review. Lacking such evidence, 
available examples are merely hypothetical illustrations of the concepts at play. 
 
23 While the set of entities to which the minimal criteria apply including controversial instances is 
not an issue for utterances which are tokens rather than a type, a type-specifying notion such as 
‘word’ – when used in that sense – would be properly constituted by the set. Thus, the criteria for 
type-instantiators should be restricted to the prototypical cases and may then be extended beyond 
that minimum to cover more instances through theory-specific criteria. 
24 ‘Closed questions with pre-coded response options are most suitable for topics where the pos-
sible responses are known. […] Open questions should be used where possible replies are unknown 
or too numerous to pre-code.’ (Kelley et al, 2003, p. 263). Vinten (1995, p. 28) concurs by listing 
as advantages of open questions ‘freedom and spontaneity of the answers’, ‘opportunity to probe’, 
and ‘[being] useful for testing hypotheses about ideas or awareness’. 
25 ‘It is hazardous to pose a closed question where the respondent has not yet formulated an opin-
ion clearly. It is likely to lead to an initial reaction which could be quite different from that which 
would transpire if the respondent were motivated and assisted to think through and express an 
opinion on the topic. The respondent will need to go through the process of recall, organization 
and evaluation of experience.’ (Vinten, 1995, p. 29). Specifically, the issue is how closed questions 
prompt no reflection to retrieve options because those available need only be recognised. 
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Where specifying the minimal manifest instantiator helps define a floor for 
the theory-specific full instantiator, identifying what the theory treats as the basic 
level of meaning provides minimalist closure conditions for the ceiling. Using this 
criterion, the instantiator proper is differentiated from the total system responsible 
for the emergence of meaning. The real issue lies in specifying a method by which 
a theory’s commitments in this regard can be systematically identified. The form of 
meaning a theory treats as basic need not always be the most impoverished but 
recognisable kind of meaning associated with the relevant instantiators. Instead, 
some theories might associate basicness with the total content which is retrieved by 
default (e.g. Jaszczolt, 2016) – without conscious effort – or even with external defini-
tions available to select few processors. In the absence of hard and fast rules, only 
indicators for theory-internal basic meaning can be designated. 
Firstly, the most obvious evidence is the focus of discussion within the the-
ory – or the balance thereof. Relevance theory (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Carston, 
2002), for instance, admits the presence of encoded meaning in concurrent means 
of communication and treats it as an influence to be aggregated for relevance-based 
inferences which yield the functionally basic meaning for communication.26 The two 
foci within relevance theory are the explicature27 and the total message involving both 
explicature and implicature.28 Given the choice between these two foci, since implica-
 
26 ‘The code model and the inferential model are each adequate to a different mode of communi-
cation; hence upgrading either to the status of a general theory of communication is a mistake. 
[…] [V]erbal communication involves both code and inferential mechanisms. In trying to construct 
an adequate description of these two types of mechanism and their interaction, it is important to 
realise that they are intrinsically independent of one another, and that communication in general 
is independent of either.’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 3). Notice the recurrent use of ‘adequate’. 
That meaning may be encoded and that this data can partly underlie what meaning becomes de-
rived is not being denied but said kind of meaning is being treated as functionally inadequate as 
the basis for a general model. 
27 The explicature is ‘an explicitly communicated assumption’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 182) of 
an utterance, wherein being explicit equals being a ‘development of the logical form encoded by 
[the utterance]’ (Ibid.). A logical form, on the other hand, consists of the aspects of an utterance 
by virtue of which it is admitted to participate in logical relations (Ibid. p. 72). 
28 ‘Any assumption communicated but not explicitly so, is implicitly communicated: it is an implica-
ture.’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 182, emphasis in original). However, since the explicature is not 
Instantiators  146 
       
 
    
tures are partly reliant on the explicature and may be absent, considering explicatures 
the basic option seems reasonable. Secondly, one may dissect how the material ad-
dresses (its representations of) alternative theories. Namely, if rival conceptions are 
called ‘inadequate’, ‘insufficient’, or ‘excessive’ – or otherwise quantified relative to 
the promoted view – then relating such mentions to how said alternatives are being 
characterised and the reasons being provided for such claims helps outline where 
the threshold is being set. Relevance theory, for instance, contrasts itself with both 
code-based models of meaning in communication (e.g. Chomsky, 2002; Borg, 2004; 
2012) and inferential models which Sperber and Wilson (1995, p. 2) associate with 
Grice (1989) and Lewis (1979a). Thirdly, one occasionally finds a rather explicit formu-
lation of what the basic level of meaning is supposed to be. For instance, Borg (2012, 
p. 3) whose minimalist approach specifically attempts to carve a niche for invariant 
semantic content states: ‘According to minimal semantics, natural language sen-
tences mean things, the things they mean are in some sense complete (that is to say, 
they are propositional, truth-evaluable contents), and these literal meanings are de-
termined entirely as a function of the lexical elements a sentence contains together 
with its syntactic form.’ It can thus be predicated of the basic meaning of whichever 
full instantiator might correspond to a ‘natural language sentence’ in this sense that 
it is propositional and therefore conceptual, that it is truth-evaluable, and that each 
effect on it must be mediated by lexical or syntactic aspects of the instantiator. 
5.3.2 Relations’ Affordances 
The nature of the required full instantiator depends largely on what forms of entities 
may participate in the necessary relations in its designated role. One must therefore 
index the relations in which a theory includes its intended recipients for meaning and 
their positions within said relations. The two significant forms of relations involve 
either being the object of meaning-bestowing relations or being the subject of mean-
ing-expressing (or -conveying) relations. To illustrate, assume that the instantiator 
 
fully retrievable and may require inference, unlike in Grice’s (1989) work, the implicature is not iden-
tified as whatever is inferred about an interlocutor’s intentions based on an utterance. 
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a contextualist theory posits must both be (1) the object (y) of a relation wherein the 
utterer intends to produce it (‘x intends to produce y’) and (2) the subject (x) of a rela-
tion where it expresses a specific content to the interpreter (‘x signifies y to z’). A 
contextualist theory treats any such content subject to some contextual factors and 
therefore, the latter relation cannot be fulfilled solely by a sound pattern the utterer 
produces directly. However, intentions to produce instantiators are not restricted to 
willed acts of producing sound patterns. Assuming that intentions need not be identi-
fied with discrete mental states with contents transparent to the subject (e.g. Paul, 
2012; 2015), one may specify the content of an intention leading to an act in various 
ways.29 Thus, the two defining relations’ demands can be reconciled when y in ‘x in-
tends to produce y’ is understood as an event or state of affairs which encompasses 
the relevant facts – including the person having produced the sound pattern. The 
minimal instantiator with which each posited relation is compatible would therefore 
minimally extend past the mere sound pattern to include a set of contextual elements. 
The full instantiator would need to be specified as a state of affairs which encom-
passes such elements, each defined with a suitable level of generality.30 
 
29 ‘Since a single action can have many different descriptions, e.g. “sawing a plank”, […] “making 
a great deal of sawdust” and so on and so on, it is important to notice that a man may know that 
he is doing a thing under one description, and not under another.’ (Anscombe, 1963, p. 11) 
30 For instance, since most contextualist theories involve free pragmatic enrichment, the kinds of 
components involved would need to be formalised in theory-specific ways. Hall (2014, p. 16) at-
tempts to resolve the alleged issue that free enrichment over-generates content by restricting it 
to local rather than global inferences, except when the premises independent of the logical form 
of the utterance are immediately relevant (e.g. location for ‘It’s raining’) (Ibid. p. 22). (The differ-
ence between local and global inferences is based on whether the total content of what is said or 
merely some fragment is used as a premise for pragmatic inferences.) Thus, while Hall does not di-
rectly address the principle(s) by which the appropriate context is specified, her response provides 
two disparate conditions – local inference dependent on (1) logical form or (2) immediate relevance 
– which embody an underlying principle. In relevance-theoretic terms, the associated facts are highly 
manifest: the degree to which they can be entertained as factual through perception or inference 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 39) is heightened. Specifically, the manifestness of such data appears 
linked to immediate presence, given how being presented with the utterance itself grounds its 
developments and what is being observed directly is generally readily cognised. Thus, characteristic 
degree of manifestness could be used as an example principle: Some facts in a communication 
situation are naturally manifest beyond a critical threshold (e.g. produced sound waves) and the 
rest can be categorised based on their likelihood of passing the threshold based on their features 
(e.g. ‘the attendable’ as prototypically unobstructed manipulatable objects). 
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The primary problem is defining the affordances characteristic of each in-
volved kind of relation. This issue is aggravated by how some of the relations involved 
do not necessarily have recognised names to which prior senses can be attached. 
However, such cases are treated here as a special case of the larger issue and not 
inherently more problematic besides the associated analyses lacking the background 
more familiar cases invite and needing to be supplied with more extensive discus-
sion as a result. In either case, the basic issue involves systematically delineating which 
forms of entities may in actuality (rather than in principle) occupy each position in 
a given type of relation – possibly in ordered sets rather than each being able to pair 
with any entities viable for the other positions. Thus, given a relation such as ‘x sig-
nifies y to z’, one must identify the features enabling an entity to participate in the 
role of x, y, or z. The instantiator in this instance would be defined relative to x. 
In discussing affordance-based ontology, Sanders (1997) suggests treating 
affordances as ontological primitives rather than dispositional properties dependent 
on more primitive existents.31 However, since such an approach limits verifying the 
presence of affordances to direct epistemic means – namely, observation  – and 
blocks treating other facts as sufficient evidence for them, it would be unfruitful for 
current purposes. Should Sanders be vindicated, though, the best available option 
becomes analysing the affordances of different relations on an individual basis, and 
that would become a necessary part of the process. To explore the other alternative 
in hopes of a more systematic and prescriptive approach, one should consider affor-
dances incurred dispositional properties defined relative to both sets of properties 
attributable to specific entities and the space of possibilities they inhabit. Sets of pro-
perties rather than properties as such define associated affordances since some may 
interact in affordance-entailing ways (e.g. elongated appendices only allow grasping 
given ability to curl with enough grip strength, but their lengthiness is equally cru-
cial). The inhabited space of possibilities – a defined domain within the realm of pos-
 
31 ‘[…] I argue that a much more promising approach takes affordances themselves as ontological 
primitives, instead of treating them as dispositional properties of more primitive things, events, 
surfaces, or substances.’ (Sanders, 1997, p. 97) 
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sible states of affairs that may inhabit it32 – are included since affordances are relative 
rather than inherent.33 Each is properly specifiable only given the possibility of interac-
tion. Thus, for instance, grasping behaviour can only be defined in the presence of 
what the entity can or could grasp. A human hand in an otherwise liquid or gaseous 
world cannot afford grasping anything. 
In a sense, when conceived as part of a space of possibilities, relation types 
are capable of limited behaviours: they may compile when applicable or fail to ap-
ply.34 For current purposes, the relevant space of possibilities may be conceived as 
sets of scenarios not dissimilar to the abstract situations of situation semantics (Bar-
wise & Perry, 1999, pp. 8–9) – arrangements of (prototypically represented) genera – 
being approached from the outside. This external position allows relating relation 
types across such situations which provides the variable (allegorical) environment 
relative to which the relation type may react differentially. Namely, in being conceived 
thus, the relation type is enabled to exhibit adherence or aversion. From a perspective 
internal to the scenarios, the relation type may only be found present or absent. How-
ever, this description is only detailing the sense in which the worldly, action-oriented 
notion of affordances applies to relation types which are generally considered de-
tached and static instead. 
5.3.3 Syntax-Compatibility 
An illustration of identifying relation-specific affordances based on a tentative analysis 
of the role of syntax in minimal semantics is provided below. The case is interesting 
since Borg (2012, p. 4) minimises the available influences on minimal semantic mean-
 
32 Wittgenstein’s (1921) notion of logical space (Glock, 1996, pp. 220–223) comes close, though 
in this context, the space of possibilities is primarily defined relative to real rather than formal (or 
logical) possibility (Gibbs, 1970). 
33 While the notion of an effectivity – the subject-side complement to an environmental affordance 
– has been proposed by later Gibsonians, Sanders (1997, pp. 103–104) points out how this con-
cession to the subject-object distinction wastes what makes affordances ontologically interesting. 
34 Behaviours continue to be treated in terms of intentional systems theory (Dennett, 1971; 1987): 
all activity counts as behaviour, and intentionality is but one explanatory framework. Please note 
how these behaviours are attributed to relation types which are being conceived rather to some 
objective, abstract entities. 
Instantiators  150 
       
 
    
ing: ‘Semantic content for a sentence is fully determined by its syntactic structure 
and lexical content: the meaning of a sentence is exhausted by the meaning of its 
parts and their mode of composition.’ Since the meaning of said parts – mainly words 
– is treated as (largely) invariant, while minimal semantics is primarily a theory of 
sentence meaning, it must also present (or reference) a suitable theory of word mean-
ing. The contribution of word meaning is not addressed here. Instead, the example 
concerns the relations necessary for syntactic structure – modes of composition – 
to contribute towards set meaning. As outlined above, the task involves (1) consider-
ing the conditions under which such contribution becomes possible, (2) identifying 
the key types of entities, and (3) analysing at least some of the relations linking sen-
tences to such enablers. 
In general, syntax consists of the combinatorial patterns of lexical items 
which modulate the structure of interpretations (e.g. Tallerman, 2011). The main ex-
planations for the emergence of syntax are Universal Grammar (e.g. Chomsky, 2002) 
and Constructivist Grammar (e.g. Langacker, 1987; 1991). Broadly speaking, the former 
posits evolved, innate restrictions on possible grammar while the latter explains the 
same invariance using ecological factors during development such as perceptual 
and attentional affordances. Borg (2004, pp. 80–85) certainly considers syntax men-
tal – indeed, modular in the Fodorian sense – rather than socially constructed. On 
the issue of innateness, she states (Ibid. p. 6) that the relevant processor is innate in 
the sense that its functions are not learnt. Thus, while Borg may not be strictly Chom-
skian in this respect, syntax being tied to universal grammar provides a framework 
within which its conditions can be approached. Specifically, this affinity would mini-
mally extend to a shared rationalism in Chomsky and Katz’s (1975, p. 74) sense of 
structures enabling language acquisition being ‘conceived as an innate schematism 
that determines the scope and limits of knowledge of languages’. In virtue of being 
innate, such syntactic schemata must operate within pre-specified parameters. To 
have the explanatory role Borg attributes to them, they must also be universally 
shared since minimal semantics focuses on general rather than individual interpre-
tations of linguistic form. Thus, there must be some neural structures – possibly 
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multiply realisable but within evolutionarily defined confines – which embody the 
templates enabling one to recognise syntactically sound (linguistic) structures. The 
presence of such structures (and their necessary enablers) is the minimal condition 
enabling mentalised syntax. 
Thus, the structure of accessed, lexically realised (given the other condition) 
instantiators becomes syntactic in relation to the appropriate neural configuration. 
The relevant relation connects this brute structure and the associated neural appa-
ratus. Just calling said relation ‘correspondence’ would be vacuous, though. What 
exactly occurs depends partly on the pervasiveness of top-down processes in per-
ception since it determines the point at which the schemata are applied and whether 
this precedes experience. If Borg’s focus on information encapsulation extends not 
only to language processing (Borg, 2004, pp. 89–90; 2012, pp. 12–13) but to perceiv-
ing utterances, any application of prior information must be module-internal.35 For 
the sake of this illustration, let language perception be treated as encapsulated.36 In 
this case, the relation would be one where the corresponding module-internal struc-
ture responsible for syntax-checks matches incoming data of the linguistic patterns 
to available templates for well-formed syntax. Since syntax concerns pattern-recog-
nition, it appears this relation involving the neurally realised module therefore ap-
plies to whatever structure implements suitable patterns. 
The question then becomes what affordance-defining features the relation 
of matching with neurally implemented syntax templates involves. Two such features 
stand out. The first is seriality and the second lexical affinity. While non-serial syntax 
 
35 See Appelbaum (1998) on how Fodorian modules could accommodate data on top-down pro-
cessing in language perception. She recounts the possible ways in which Fodor’s (1983, pp. 76–86) 
suggestion that the relevant evidence is compatible with encapsulation could be realised. Appel-
baum concludes that such a project would be unviable, though, since grammatical information 
would need to be replicated wholesale between modules and the language perception module 
would need to account for an indefinite number of environmental variables such as background 
noise and lexical expectations. 
36 Borg (personal communication) has clarified her position to be that language is only processed 
modularly after context-sensitive disambiguation (e.g. whether ‘vice’ is being used to refer to a tool 
or a reprehensible pattern of behaviour). The example thus instead applies to a hypothetical form 
of semantic minimalism wherein language perception is also treated as encapsulated. 
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is conceivable,37 the grammatical rules which apply require serial ordering. Thus, while 
Borg’s criteria of lexicality and possessing syntax could be extended to novel syntaxes, 
under current conditions, the pattern the relevant instantiators exhibit must be serially 
orderable relative to the sub-patterns associated with at least lexicon-adjacent items. 
This is only part of the reason such lexical affinity is required, however.38 Lexical affinity 
denotes morphological parity within the parameters a lexicon sets. The lexicon proper 
is being incorporated for simplicity’s sake. Effectively, whatever the underlying neu-
roanatomy for catching linguistic cues (verbal and written) may be, relative to human 
perceptual capacities, the sorts of sounds and inscriptions people use to communi-
cate consist of patterns not otherwise present in people’s environments. Thus, ob-
servable patterns which fall within this unique range are suitable to be processed as 
though they were lexical in absence of prior access to an existing lexical entry for 
them. Syntactic matching requires such lexical affinity because algorithmic matching 
of the sort to which a module would be restricted may only act within strict formal 
constraints.39 This loosened condition is used instead of strict lexicality because re-
quiring prior association with a lexical entry detailing available grammatical roles 
would risk trouble with language acquisition and neologisms. 
 
37 Such non-serial structure might involve concurrently presented visual blocks which have syn-
tactic units based on relative angle rather than serial ordering, for instance. Within such a system, 
the meaning of a single unit might be multiply modulated since angles are non-exclusive, making 
the equivalent of ‘glue’, for instance, possibly act as both an active verb and a noun simultaneously. 
38 The issue being resolved is how no structure is associated with only a single pattern and indeed, 
each can be specified to contain an indefinite number of patterns within a specific frame of refe-
rence (e.g. McAllister, 2010). For instance, consider a sheet of paper dotted only where the corners 
of a grid would lie. In one sense, there is just this pattern of equidistant, orthogonally ordered dots 
but this description is no more valid than identifying the pattern as equidistant spots on equidistant 
diagonal lines relative to the edges of the sheet or even an angular spiral pattern with specifiable 
termination conditions. Thus, for the relevant pattern to be considered serial for purposes of syn-
tactic processing, its seriality must be grounded in some other point of reference. 
39 Assuming that this principle is sound, censoring words actually appears to present an interesting 
challenge to modularly realised syntactic processing. It is common practice to replace offending 
words with non-human (or at least non-word) sounds such as mechanical bleeps or humoristic 
sound effects. Clearly, however, people still understand the grammatic role of the word for which 
the bark stands in instances such as ‘Oh, just [woof] off.’ Therefore, either suitable inputs seem lax 
which brings to question the modularity of the process or contextual inference either precedes or 
coincides with syntactic processing in which case it is certainly not encapsulated. 
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5.3.4 Situational Candidates 
Once a full instantiator has been outlined by combining the restrictions which each 
definitive relation specific to a theory entails, this outline can be related to the ele-
ments present in relevant situations. Such situations include those appropriate for 
the sort of theory under analysis: a theory of meaning in communication would be 
related to the range of communication situations, and a theory of sentence meaning 
to situations in which sentential meaning manifests. Applying the set of conditions 
in this manner substantiates what entities would actually constitute the instantiator. 
Prior to the application, the outline only consists of the abstract conditions derived 
from the relevant relations such as an entity targeted by ostensive demonstrations 
needing to be directly observable.40 The task itself amounts to constraining the space 
of possibilities relative to which the relevant affordances are defined to only the sce-
narios wherein said relations may engender the intended form of meaning. Even 
though each particular situation is unique, they are typified by the presence of cer-
tain sorts of entities which may either be defined categorically or functionally, and 
relating the identified conditions to such situation templates helps check the range 
of available material identities. 
To develop on the above example on a more speculative note, one might 
consider what sorts of entities present in situations which invite language processing 
fit Borg’s (2012, p.4) criteria. In most such situations, the evident answer involves only 
the manifest written and spoken utterances which instantiate the relevant lexico-syn-
tactic patterns. However, because of the involved neural implementation, the initial 
criteria are slightly misleading. While syntax from an external point of view requires 
seriality and lexical affinity, Borg is addressing the products of meaning becoming 
processed. Input-encoded seriality and lexical affinity satisfy the systems responsible 
as there exists no second order monitoring channel and these features may there-
 
40 Borg (personal communication) suggests that examples where an ostensibly demonstrated object 
acts as a metonym for an unobservable entity might disprove the principle. Her example is ‘that 
painter’ being uttered while their work is gestured towards. It seems reasonable to think that in 
such cases, the object is still being designated and the author becomes the referent through which-
ever further relation underlies the metonymy. 
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fore be either simulated or occurrent. In other words, insofar as the immediate input 
from associated systems (e.g. baseline hearing module under the Fodorian paradigm) 
matches what perceived serial (near-)lexical patterns would entail, whether the corre-
sponding pattern occurred is irrelevant. Since Borg is addressing sentence meaning 
rather than utterance meaning, available instantiators are not limited to any external 
manifest instantiators. Such external instances remain viable candidates but halluci-
natory sentences, for instance, are also sentential. Thus, since lexicality appears to 
make no difference in this respect, linking meaningfulness to syntax and lexicality 
would define instan-tiators which can also be substantiated by hallucination-induc-
ing internal states.41 In contrast, a theory of sentence meaning incorporating a more 
social, externalist theory of word meaning such as Putnam-style deferentialism (e.g. 
Putnam, 1975) would at least superficially avoid this specific implication even if the 
corresponding instantiators might subvert expectations in other ways. 
The remaining step is double-checking whether interpreting the original ma-
terial in light of the results engenders further adjustments. One should once again 
focus on the relations in which the designated instantiators are participating. This is 
mainly a means of assessing intra-theoretical coherence and an opportunity to adjust 
the results as needed in case one had overlooked a key relation which would restrict 
applicable instantiators even further. If the results have unreasonable implications 
such as each instance requiring a factually demanding and rare state of affairs, for 
instance, this phase helps confirm or disconfirm such issues. Should the results need 
to be adjusted because of some overlooked consideration (which might only apply 
once previously seemingly uninvolved entities become integrated into the instantia-
tor), this step should ideally be repeated until a stable identity is established. In this 
respect, the step is self-explanatory: you are effectively testing an initial hypothesis 
and iterating based on the results it yields until a satisfactory fit is established. 
 
41 This speculation is hardly authoritative since whether the relevant corpus includes other quali-
fiers has yet to be studied. Avoiding this implication would also only require some independently 
motivated addenda from Borg regardless should she find it troubling. Depending on one’s priorities, 
the feature is either a boon which extends explanatory power or an issue to be remedied. 
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5.4 Takeaway 
When a theory of meaning is framed as involving a posited set of influence-defining 
relations around some central kind of entity which it treats as meaningful in the sense 
the theory is addressing, it helps view said central entities from the perspective of 
their functional role alone. These entities – the instantiators of meaning – must be 
constituted by sets of available elements minimally required to participate in each 
kind of relation being posited in the appropriate position. Even when a familiar term 
such as ‘word’ is used to denote an instantiator, the rest of a theory imposes a distinct 
set of conditions which specify the full material identity being required of the entities 
suited for said position. Incorporating the manifest instances of what such terms 
refer to is necessary but not necessarily sufficient. Establishing the conditions for 
sufficiency requires accounting for the demands of the relevant relations. 
If an everyday understanding of linguistic items is not enough to identify 
the proper instantiators for whichever kind of meaning a theory posits, one must 
find some principled way of separating instantiators proper from the total states of 
affairs responsible for meanings according to a theory. However, the principle must 
be neutral across the range of theoretical commitments instead of privileging any 
sub-set of theories. Minimal closure linked to theory-internal conditions for basic 
meaning provides just that. The resulting instantiators are the simplest entities which 
the theory may treat as meaningful in themselves rather than as contributing to 
meaning. As a result, once the corresponding entities have been identified, they 
may be compared across theories in terms of parsimony. If the sort of meaning a 
given instantiator would suffice to express covers more of the phenomena associ-
ated with whichever task the corresponding theory attempts, it inherits such greater 
explanatory power. Yet, given equal explanatory power relative to a task, the simpler 
instantiator ought to be preferred. 
After the basic level of meaning and the set of relations associated with it 
have been identified alongside an uncontroversial baseline identity associated with 
the manifest entity being named (e.g. ‘word’), full instantiator identity is derived using 
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the requirements of said relations. The entities involved must afford to participate in 
the necessary relations in their designated position and they must be available in all 
relevant situations. For instance, (contextualist) theories of communicated meaning 
might require either that idealised processors interpreting a message have access to 
the utterer’s intentions or grounds for reconstructing such intentions. From the inter-
preter’s perspective, there are no suitable grounds of attributing meaning in the ab-
sence of whichever a theory requires. Entities suited for this relation of being available 
to the interpreter in a certain way must be identifiable in each relevant situation, and 
together with the manifest utterances, they would constitute the full instantiators for 
those theories. The text can then be read with such initial results in mind to determine 
whether they invite further relations to consider. 
While there are no satisfactory pre-theoretical understandings of the proper 
material identities of manifest instantiators, it is possible full instantiators identified 
in this manner could prove to largely cohere with expectations. Any given theory’s 
demands could also prove to have unanticipated results. This method provides the 
means to systematically extract such details instead of coherence with intuitive jud-
gements being taken on faith. Once results begin accruing, any differences in com-
peting theories’ requirements can be assessed accordingly. Different models have 
different benefits relative to which associated theories can be assessed, and perhaps 
the instantiators of seemingly competing theories are different enough for both 
kinds of meanings to co-exist across partly overlapping but distinct instantiators. 
The method provided here is intended to highlight this possible avenue of further 
study and to outline one possible means of approaching it. 
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Scope expresses the extent of the domains within which a theory’s principles operate. 
It consists of variable distances along the directions afforded by spatial, temporal, 
and modal dimensions. Scope may either be relatively static or subject to adjustments 
based on some further principle(s) such as processors’ epistemic limits. Distinct forms 
of scope express what a theory implements, its potential range, and its target ideal. 
The three dimensions along which scope varies each possess distinct directions and 
corresponding factors relative to which distance is measured. Spatial distance mea-
sures separation from the instantiator. Temporal dimensions include the past and the 
present. Modal scope varies along axes of differentiation where distance is measured 
by aggregating corresponding vectors for quantifiable individual changes. 
Three different forms of scope which may be specified for each theory. Implemented 
scope consists of the full extent of considerations expressed within the corpus and 
inherited by how the theory is conceived. Potential scope expresses the range a theo-
ry’s definitive principles afford before producing deviant results, and ideal scope is 
the proper minimum extent of considerations a given task requires. 
Implemented scope corresponds to the positions of the elements available from the 
detached observer position within a theory. Extracting potential scope involves finding 
the point at which applying the proposed principles would result in influences which 
no longer adhere to the standard a theory applies. Ideal scope is task-specific. 
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6.1 Aspects of Scope 
Besides instantiator identity, the other detail which applying the proposed framing 
highlights concerns the extent of the domains characteristic of different theories of 
meaning. Consider the role of such domains. In the absence of a domain, there are 
no available entities to act as influences. Treating the relevant domain as unlimited 
does not constitute such an absence. Rather, such domains would be all-encompass-
ing – but nothing compels one to only apply all-encompassing domains, and 
conceiving them in practice involves its own limitations. The proper extent of domains 
being contested is one way to understand the disagreement between Austinian 
(e.g. Austin, 1950; Barwise & Perry, 1999; Recanati, 2000) and Russellian (e.g. Russell, 
1905) semantics. The former treats the domains relative to which meaning is defined 
as being bounded – situational – while the latter applies to consummate worlds.1 
While the Russellian approach may seem all-encompassing, even its applications 
generally eschew the future as a viable source of contemporaneously applicable 
influences – unlike temporal externalism (e.g. Jackman, 1999; 2005). Scope ex-
presses the characteristic extent for theory-specific domains within which influences 
on an instantiator’s meaning are aggregated. As this chapter illustrates, it has various 
key aspects and each theory may be analysed relative to at least three kinds of scope: 
implemented, ideal, and potential. Where instantiators match attributed situations’ 
core entities, scope – especially implement-ed scope – appears dependent on the 
limitations of associated observers. 
This section details the various aspects which forms of scope appropriate 
for theories of meaning involve: (1) the relevant dimensions (spatial, temporal, modal), 
(2) directions along those dimensions, and (3) distance in each given direction. Since 
dimensions define the associated directions and the nature of distance along them, 
each dimension and associated factors is addressed separately. Scope is treated as 
extending from the instantiator and as continuous in its coverage across the span 
between the instantiator and the furthest applicable points relative to it. Excluding 
 
1 Do note that even the Russellian approach leaves room for variation in scope. For instance, it is 
possible to be a presentist about definite descriptions and therefore ignore the temporal axis. 
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sections within the resulting generic domains must be systematic and independently 
motivated but the option is left available. Depending on the form of scope in ques-
tion, the resulting generic domains provide the template for those within which the 
meanings of individual instantiators are, can be, or should be specified according to 
the principles a theory applies. Scope itself consists of vectors along the spatial, tem-
poral, and modal axes, and said vectors possess both a direction and a distance based 
on the details of the dimension in question. A given axis may even house several 
vectors in different directions such as both the future and the past along the temporal 
dimension. The factors underlying each vector define the associated range of avail-
able values. For instance, a positioned observer tasked with processing meaning 
may only access facts and counterfactuals based on the observer’s degree of access 
and cognitive processing capacity. 
6.1.1 Spatial Scope 
Spatial distance might appear inconsequential to defining meaning, especially if one 
has Russellian inclinations. For the purposes of specifying domains, the three spatial 
dimensions are reduced to one which only possesses one relevant direction: away 
from the instantiator. The exact axis along which such relative distance is measured 
matters not because they would only be defined when framing a specified space, 
and the directions of height, width, and depth depend on the applied frame.2 Since 
this framework ought to be simple enough and the main issue with understanding 
spatial scope concerns its contribution to meaning, the discussion below focuses on 
overcoming resistance to treating relative distance as a factor in defining meaning. 
After a brief illustration of its effects, concerns about anchoring spatial scope on in-
stantiators which may be discontinuous or displaced are addressed. 
Definite descriptions which reference no proper names provide an illustra-
tion of how the spatial dimension is relevant even to theories of absolute meaning. 
 
2 The default assumption for most purposes involves a surface of an object with a centre of gravity 
around which proximal entities orient themselves – such as the surface of Earth. However, 
imposing any absolute spatial coordinate axes is arbitrary in terms of its orientation. 
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Russell’s (1905) classic example of ‘the present king of France’ references ‘France’ 
and therefore denotes a particular geopolitical configuration. Because such links limit 
spatial scale by anchoring possible referents, focusing primarily on them hides the 
effects of spatial scope. In contrast, examples such as ‘the inventor of the zip’ (Evans, 
1982, p. 50) at most implicitly reference particulars other than their unique referent. 
In Evans’s example, the possible implicit reference concerns ‘the zip’: it may refer to 
the instances linked causally to the terrestrial event whereby the general form be-
came associated with set function(s). Assuming that no such particular reference is 
made and ‘the zip’ is instead used to denote the associated pair of form and function 
which its inventor brought together, the spatial reach of the domain for potential 
referents for ‘the inventor of the zip’ determines whether the referent is knowable. 
After all, the limits of human knowledge also include a spatial component through 
(lack of) access. Just the pair of form and function is generic enough to likely have 
been discovered multiple times somewhere in the universe, assuming that the esti-
mates of the number of (near-)type I (‘planetary’) civilisations on the Kardashev scale 
are realistic.3 Given this estimate, since ‘the inventor of the zip’ is supposed to have 
a unique referent, there can be no certainty of the referent’s identity independently 
of recourse to speaker intentions and similar extraneous factors. 
Thus, were an unbounded spatial scale being applied to Evans’s example and 
if the reference to ‘the zip’ denoted the morphic and functional type rather than the 
members of a causally linked set, the referent for the definite description ‘the inventor 
of the zip’ would be epistemically inaccessible. More specifically, while a belief about 
the identity of said inventor might be true, available reasons for concluding as much 
would be unable to exhaust open alternatives. If the outlined conditions stand, no 
conclusive judgement concerning the identity of what such non-demonstrative, non-
 
3 The Fermi Paradox (e.g. Hart, 1975) concerns the probability of interstellar (type III) civilisations 
relative to lack of evidence for them, and even a conservative estimate assures that in absence of 
unknown, hyper-restrictive filters (e.g. Hanson, 1998) they should statistically exist. Approximations 
for the ratio between pre-type III civilisations and type III civilisations assume orders of magnitude 
between them. Therefore, if the zip is a good move in Design Space (Dennett, 1995, pp. 77–78, 
306) for needs basic enough to be shared by alien life, it has likely emerged independently else-
where in the universe. 
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naming definite descriptions denote is concurrently possible.4 This principle is gener-
alisable: whenever the conditions a definite description specifies may be fulfilled out-
side the known universe to which humanity has access, if possible referents are being 
defined relative to an unbounded space, the identity of the actual referent cannot 
be confirmed. Meanwhile, limiting possible referents to concurrently accessible en-
tities incurs a spatial scope tied to that total degree of access – and motivating said 
principle would likely involve some form of intentionality towards the referent. While 
it is possible to bite this bullet as part of insisting on unbounded spatial scope, the 
demonstration ought to show how presuppositions about the results introduce spa-
tial limitations on the domain relative to which referents are defined.5 
That the scopes which theories apply possess such a spatial aspect does not 
yet demonstrate why the relevant domains ought to be anchored on the instantiator 
itself – as the proposed model suggests doing. Spatiality-involving considerations 
in particular invite two problem scenarios: (1) discontinuous instantiators, and (2) dis-
placed instantiators. The former includes arbitrary states of affairs without material 
continuity – a possibility for which the proposed notion of instantiator allows – and 
the worry concerns turning the corresponding domains into blotchworks wherein 
influences based on satellites may influence manifest, central instantiators’ meaning. 
 
4 Some inferences involving identity conditions would still be possible, of course. Besides truisms, 
both deductions about independently sufficient and disjunctively necessary sets of conditions for 
fulfilling the description and various forms of probabilistic reasoning would be possible. 
5 The horns of the dilemma are therefore that either claims about proper referents of definite de-
scriptions (not anchored using proper names or other designated unique instances) are all under-
determined, or some means of specifying spatial scope for associated domains is necessary. Inso-
far as Russellians present themselves as providing knowable definite referents in such instances, 
they must thus be opting to apply domains limited in some manner, whether consciously or not. 
The literature on quantifier domain restrictions (e.g. Gauker, 1997; Stanley & Gendler Szabó, 2000) 
can be considered an attempt to provide such proper guidelines for specifying domains with ideal 
scopes for purposes of coordinating linguistic intuitions with formal notions of quantification, for 
instance. Though, such restrictions already relate to a more contextualist approach than a world-
oriented Russellian might allow. It should also be clarified that the existence of prior literature on 
questions concerning proper scope does not invalidate the approach being proposed: the primary 
interest of this approach lies in uncovering the scopes individual theories in fact implement in the 
texts expressing them and the extents of the scopes the principles of such theories support. These 
are values to be compared with the forms of overarching ideals the aforementioned debates instil. 
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The issue with the latter type of scenario involves the possibility of instantiators with 
meanings dependent on specific conditions being isolated from them and thereby 
having their meaning change depending on location. Twin Earth (Putnam, 1975) 
thought experiments where a person from Earth is spirited away to Twin Earth which 
only differs from their home by having all H2O be substituted by functionally nigh-
indistinguishable chemical XYZ help illustrate the considerations involved in either. 
Given the set-based nominalist treatment of type identity for linguistic units being 
applied, any instance of them produced in Twin Earth risks re-defining the meaning 
of the rest.6 Meanwhile, uniquely individuated instantiators such as utterances are 
fully subject to the effects of these abnormal conditions unless scope can somehow 
be anchored or extended to include the expected conditions within the range of 
which their meaning would usually be defined. After all, centring scope on the instan-
tiator itself does not ensure that tokens are subject to the central, meaning-defining 
conditions a theory posits. As a result, displacing such instantiators risks them being 
defined wholly independently of any associated baseline meaning whenever restrict-
ed spatial scope is centred on them. For instance, in the Twin Earth scenario, such 
repugnant cases might include earthlings’ utterances of ‘water’ denoting only ‘XYZ’. 
 
6 Under most circumstances, the possibility of detached instances is benign at least to any theory 
of type meaning which relies on the presence of specific psychological or societal arrangements 
such as whatever is required to ground appropriate conventions. Such circumstances being specific 
enough to only be realisable locally or even uniquely means that any far-flung extensions in the 
domain for defining meaning will not risk further influences needing to be registered. As such, any 
such extensions involving discontinuity would be inconsequential. As linguistic types tend to mainly 
matter to forms of semantic invariantism which in turn require either innate meaning which is de-
pendent on the features of the instantiator itself or such complex psycho-social arrangements, this 
consideration ought to cover the central cases. Lewisian conventions (Lewis, 1969), for example, 
require the presence of knowers with access to the states of affairs the formation of common 
knowledge necessitates. This includes others as each must know what at least some others know, 
derived from epistemic contact with them. After all, in Lewis’s (1969, p. 56) definition of common 
knowledge, the relevant part concerns how a state of affairs (A) indicates to every member of a 
population (P) that the rest have reason to believe it holds: ‘A indicates to everyone in P that 
everyone in P has reason to believe A holds.’ One condition for this condition is everyone in P be-
ing aware of the existence of the rest and their access to A. They need not be acquainted but 
must minimally recognise that a discrete set of others with access to A exist. A capacity-based 
reading of ‘indicates’ is insufficient since potential knowledge does not contribute to actual com-
mon knowledge. 
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The solution to such issues lies in differentiating between one’s mental re-
presentation of the scenario and the scenario actually occurring. The main difference 
lies in one’s own presence as the observer in the former case. The objects to which 
meaning is being attributed are the cognitively realised representations of the rele-
vent entities. The conditions under which the significance of such representations is 
ascribed are inclusive of the conditions with which one is familiar, and given their 
relative status as facts as opposed to the speculative fictiveness of Twin Earth, these 
status quo considerations may easily take precedence. Supposing that the potential 
issues being raised are legitimate, the problem they share would be resulting instan-
tiators’ meaning being mismatched with the familiar default. Either the whole type is 
affected by an errant token or a token’s meaning bears no resemblance to similar 
predecessors. Such manifest default meanings are derived from established facts 
and they are being projected onto the instantiators prescriptively – independently 
of the total set of conditions. Herein lies the issue with such worries. Were the exact 
conditions realised, they would change the set of facts on which such judgements 
depend. The criteria based on which theories define categories are constructed based 
on available specimens, and being presented with Twin Earth parallels constitutes a 
genuine choice for whether they are allowed to qualify or not. Depending on one’s 
priorities, the resulting classification may be gerrymandered whichever way. The 
people of Twin Earth, for instance, would not count as human by phylogenetic 
standards that track evolutionary lines but in being informed of their existence, one 
might instead prefer a behavioural or structural definition to accommodate them. 
Hence, the mismatch ought to be expected before definitions get adjusted 
to avoid repugnant conclusions. For instance, Searle (1983, pp. 93–97) argues that 
when the earthling on Twin Earth calls XYZ ‘water’, they establish a convention 
whereby ‘water’ forms a super-class inclusive of two chemically distinct but func-
tionally similar substances, similarly to ‘jade’.7 Previously, this would have been a 
 
7 ‘We could define “water” as H2O, which is what we have, in fact, done; or we could just say that 
there are two kinds of water, and that water on Twin Earth is constructed differently from water 
on Earth.’ (Searle, 1983, p. 93, emphasis in original) 
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possibility which heeded no consideration since only H2O possessed the qualities 
definitive of water. Given their unique circumstances relative to their contempora-
ries, the initial earthlings in Twin Earth are arguably in a position to dub XYZ in Earth 
English. Being the only earthlings acquainted with XYZ makes them the de facto 
community-specific experts on the substance for purposes of a deferential account 
like Putnam’s externalism. For such an account, other users being unaware of the 
inclusion of XYZ under ‘water’ would not matter since deferential usage already 
makes personal acquaintance with proper meaning irrelevant. Any such designative 
definitions can then be consolidated or re-negotiated as usual. As this example 
shows, the potential effects of discontinuous or displaced instantiators are ultimately 
benign because the resulting need to reflect on prior categorisation principles is no 
different from what any other such discovery prompts. The acceptable range of 
results should not be prescribed based on what the results would have been prior 
to such shifts in circumstances.8 
While the spatial dimension remains perhaps the least relevant aspect of 
scope for purposes of analysing ideal conditions because few theories seem willing 
to exclude any prevailing considerations based solely on relative distance, its value 
lies primarily in analysing implemented scope. The discussion on definite descriptions 
ought to demonstrate how an alleged commitment to all-inclusivity does not pre-
clude the form in which a theory is expressed from having such limitations. This con-
trast between professed ideals and how their extent is being understood may reveal 
inconsistencies which compel choosing which scope takes precedence. Russellians, 
for instance, may limit the relevant domains to the known universe if determining 
unique referents takes precedence or accept most referents being impossible to des-
ignate conclusively if world-relative truth-conditionality is retained. While the centring 
of scope on the instantiator rather than it being defined independently is merely a 
 
8 However, if a theory is sensitive to the psychological states of the uttering individual, the 
displaced individual continues to embody the original conditions which moulded their personal 
psychology. Thus, unless the product is magically shunted away from them at whichever exact 
moment its identity conditions as an instantiator are fulfilled, their presence will provide some 
default influences. 
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methodological assumption, it is benign relative to spatial considerations and helps 
highlight how the instantiator is in focus whenever influences are aggregated. 
6.1.2 Temporal Scope 
In contrast to the unidirectionality of spatial scope, temporal scope extends bidirec-
tionally from the extended present set by the instantiator, both towards the past and 
the future. Past states of affairs influencing meaning ought to be understandable. 
While etymology, for instance, is not definitive of concurrent meaning and may even 
be set aside whenever there is a clear historical break in proper usage, it can also 
transmit past influences. Future states of affairs influencing concurrent meaning is 
more exotic but also conceivable, as seen below. Despite these facts, the relevance 
of defining temporal scope may be questioned by arguing either that only the pre-
sent representations of the past rather than past occurrences themselves may influ-
ence meaning or that each theory is encompassing but relation types have charac-
teristic reaches. The former can be answered with counterexamples such as mean-
ings dependent on trajectorial influences. Given the influence of change in their 
manifest meaning, reappropriated slurs (e.g. ‘queer’) seem to qualify. The latter critic-
ism, meanwhile, must be answered with a counterexample of a meaning-contribut-
ing relation which affords greater temporal range than the ideal scope for applying 
it. Theories which reserve a role for situational contextual effects (e.g. Lewis, 1979a; 
Heim, 1982; Clark, 1996) qualify since situation duration is arbitrary. 
Influences with temporal aspects are present in many approaches to mean-
ing. Consider how the theory of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; La-
koff, 1987), for instance, uses etymological evidence to track implicit metaphorical us-
age which is traceable to factors involving embodiment. While the embodied basis 
remains in the present, its effect is historically motivated because there exists no nec-
essary link between the involved concepts. How the target has been conceptualised 
determines whether merely compatible representations are being connected in virtue 
of the later conception having been modelled after the etymologically evidenced 
mapping. The etymology of ‘to foresee’, for example, is obvious and refers to for-
Scope  166 
       
 
    
ward-facing vision in the context of predicting the future, implying that the future 
can be envisioned clearly and lies ahead. This can be contrasted with the Finnish 
equivalent ‘aavistaa’ which shares its root with ‘aave’ (‘ghost’), referring to matters 
one recognises instinctively without seeing them (Häkkinen, 2013). While both lan-
guages include synonymous notions, each example arguably retains at least an ety-
mologically tractable connotation concerning the availability of the future. Another 
obvious instance of past influencing present meaning is Kripke (1981) style causal 
externalism according to which referents are determined by demonstrative or de-
scriptive baptisms. Effectively, people’s proper names, for instance, would derive their 
referents from the existence of unique past events where the individuals were thus 
named. While the ideal distance extending to the past is likely infinite for a Kripkean, 
etymology-based analyses almost certainly want to limit it to avoid needing to ac-
commodate dead languages separated from the target by several etymological steps. 
As with spatial scope, the implementation of either embodies a finite scope because 
of the limited resources (processing effort, writing space, etc.) available. 
Comparably speaking, future states of affairs influencing contemporaneous 
meaning is posited considerably less often. The archetypical case is Jackman’s (1999; 
2005) temporal externalism. According to Jackman (1999, p. 158), ‘what we mean by 
our terms can be affected by “accidental” developments in their subsequent usage.’ 
Namely, specific forms of adjustment may retrospectively determine meaning. Posit-
ing either determinism or four-dimensionalism results in a sense in which the proper 
meaning at the time was always connected to yet unrealised states of affairs even 
if people could not identify it due to limited future-oriented access. Since external-
ism reduces individual intent to deferential gesturing, a person not realising what 
their expression meant would be deemed unproblematic. A classic case is ‘Evening 
star’ and ‘Morning star’ having both been used for Venus when people assumed 
the names denoted different celestial bodies. A temporal externalist would call any 
past usage of either name synonymous with ‘Venus’ despite people’s conceptions 
and the assumed non-synonymity between the two at the time rather than a refer-
ence to Venus in specific relative positions or relative to alternative frameworks. 
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Despite these examples showing how theories may differ in the temporal ex-
tensions of their characteristic domains for specifying meaning and that influences 
may be defined four-dimensionally, reason for scepticism persists. Firstly, it may ap-
pear as though any past-based influence is actually based on the concurrent states 
of affairs which embody the original conditions. The resulting semantic presentism 
is tempting because such immediate conditions are generally both explanatorily suffi-
cient and not dependent on the associated event having actually occurred. After all, 
as has been established in chapter 3, any given state of affairs is multiply realisable 
and therefore only conveys the possibility of each compatible preceding condition. 
The proposed counter to this temptation involves influences which must have a 
temporal extension and which are necessary for some manifest meanings. Even if a 
presentist reading remains possible given the manner in which concurrent states of 
affairs embody the stages of the temporally extended influence, it must acknow-
ledge that the associated history is explanatorily prior. The contemporary states of 
affairs only contribute insofar as they may be treated as a representation of that 
history rather than on their own merit. Even if the process may be described 
independently of this connection, that description only acquires explanatory power 
in relation to it. 
A fine example of a linguistic phenomenon dependent on historically ex-
tended sets of circumstances independently of the theory being applied are so-called 
reappropriated slurs. They are historically derogative terms which have acquired at 
least some positive senses applicable in certain contexts such as when they are used 
non-deferentially by in-group members (e.g. ‘queer’, ‘nerd’).9 The status of such ex-
pressions as reappropriated slurs involves acknowledging the sense in which they are 
derogative and the construction of a positive, identity-expressing sense in contrast 
 
9 For empirical research on the power of reappropriation, there exists a study by Galinsky et al 
(2013) which shows that both outsiders and insiders judge the person using a derogative applied 
to their disempowered reference group as more powerful – possibly because they are actively re-
futing the negative definition or evaluation derogative use conveys. Croom (2013) also notes how 
important the possibility of reappropriation is for the semantics of slurs because they cannot be 
treated as inherently and definitively expressive of disdain as a result. 
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to that retained association as an act of defiance. The power of the latter sense de-
rives in part from the fact that the same term has been used derogatively by an au-
thoritative out-group. A feminist who proclaims ‘I am a bitch so beware’, for instance, 
self-applies a label used to criticise women who do not conform to the norms which 
define behaviour considered appropriate by patriarchal standards (deference, 
mildness, etc.). Since the latter is defined in relation to the former, both the preced-
ing practice and its antithetical complement together must constitute the state of 
affairs necessary for an expression to act as a reappropriated slur as part of its total 
meaning. This temporal extension makes the relevant considerations impossible to 
express directly by a temporally simple state of affairs unlike when an influence con-
sists of the presence of an entity with some temporal extension. The contempora-
neous state of affairs which conveys the effects of this historical trajectory instead 
derives its explanatory power from how it expresses that history indirectly by acting 
as a representation for it. This difference makes the explanatory power of the present 
state of affairs dependent on the occurrence of the associated history (or an illusion 
thereof). Even if the effects contemporaneous states of affairs have can be described 
independently of that history, an explanation would require a degree of generalis-
ability the momentary cannot afford because the possible implementations of such 
effects are too multifarious. One cannot generalise why these specific states of affairs 
have their effect without invoking the shared connection of what each represents. 
Since the purpose of analysing scope lies in potential differences between 
theories, the other potential issue concerning temporal scope in particular is whether 
any such conditions exist outside implemented scope. If all cross-temporal relations 
have their own limitations in terms of available reach and each should always be ac-
counted for, no separate scope need be defined. For instance, the causal theory of 
names (e.g. Kripke, 1981) should in principle never yield misleading results regardless 
of how long the chains between baptisms and name-incorporating utterances be-
come because each name has a unique candidate for its baptism. While some theo-
ries may accommodate unlimited temporal scope in this manner, if this feature can 
be proven not to be universal, defining intermediate scopes has value. Besides how 
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theories dependent on limited scopes such as a restricted rather than world-bound 
theory of definite descriptions are conceivable, a variety of scorekeeping theories (e.g. 
Lewis, 1979a) dependent on situational common ground rely on such restrictions. 
Such theories mainly concern indexing expressions such as the use of definite articles 
and Lewis’s term ‘scorekeeping’ is used for them here since each treats a communi-
cation situation as a mostly fresh board wherein each common ground establishing 
move must occur. However, situations embed indefinitely so lines must be drawn. 
Consider the prototypical communication situation: one or more individuals 
interact for a discrete period between an opener and a closing line. That period pro-
vides a context wherein each statement may be related to everything preceding it, 
including parts of itself. The sense in which said situations is embedded involves how 
most such conversations may be constructed as parts of wider discourses, either be-
tween the specific individuals or representatives of key demographics. Perhaps the 
easiest conceptualisation is a social media thread such as a private message ex-
change: any given active period is an extension of the recorded history of the total 
set of interactions. While this example makes the continuity explicit, it applies to all 
interactions. Since some active exchanges may involve weeks, months, or even years 
between contributions – consider pre-modern academic correspondence – the fre-
quency of such contributions does not differentiate between suitable independent 
communication situations and wider discourse. However, within such extended situ-
ations, it is clearly possible that principles like Lewis’s (1979a, pp. 240–243) principle 
of definite referent based on greatest salience10 produce deviant results. For instance, 
since the greatest salience involves a superlative quality, for any set of candidates, at 
least one qualifies. Thus, unless there are further restrictions on the appropriate do-
mains of discourse (which mainly extend along a temporal axis), any definite descrip-
tion has an acceptable referent relative to some shared conversational context. A 
random proclamation such as greeting someone by stating ‘The pig is the fattest in 
 
10 ‘The proper treatment of descriptions must be more like this: “the F” denotes x if and only if x 
is the most salient F in the domain of discourse, according to some contextually determined 
salience ranking.’ (Lewis, 1979a, p. 241) 
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the litter’ would therefore technically possess viable referents because Lewis sets no 
minimal threshold for acceptable salience.11 
How discourse extends along a temporal axis means that any further restric-
tion on viable communication situations engenders a principle which defines tem-
poral scope. Such principles could be treated as merely further conditions on viable 
influences on par with other definitive relations, of course – formally, they are no dif-
ferent. The real difference lies in their contribution and the associated motivation: 
baseline definitive relations contribute positively by engendering novel influences 
whereas such scope-restricting principles selectively limit this range. The former are 
used to define the nature of sources for meaning while the latter specify their extent 
within that group. Thus, while it is possible to treat the two on par, doing so would 
obstruct this difference in their contributions and therefore the need for theories to 
specify the extent of appropriate scopes for their purposes. Such scope is not invar-
iable across cases but different principles ground characteristic ranges for distinct 
types of scenarios which are subject to comparison. For instance, communication 
situations for scorekeeping purposes could be specified in terms of constituents’ 
availability to active memory or the concurrent salience of an exchange. Either solu-
tion privileges immediate situations but allows its own range of further influences. 
6.1.3 Modal Scope 
Spatiotemporal influences are relatively simple compared to the final dimension for 
defining scope, modality. Some theories of meaning (or meaning-adjacent phenom-
ena) accept that counterfactual considerations possess relevance. For instance, Krip-
kean rigid designators (Kripke, 1981, pp. 47–49) are terms which denote the cross-
modal counterparts of the same entity across possible worlds.12,13 Kripke specifically 
 
11 In fact, he explicitly brushes the question aside: ‘I shall pass over some complications. Never 
mind what happens if two F’s are tied for maximal salience, or if no F is at all salient.’ (Lewis, 1979a, 
p. 241). This move may be excused if the relevant domains are limited somehow since then it be-
comes possible for there to be no viable candidates for non-empty descriptions. 
12 ‘Let’s call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object’ 
(Kripke, 1981, p. 48, emphasis in original). 
13 Stalnaker (1978; 2012) provides another example of explicitly modal semantics. 
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calls (proper) names such as ‘Nixon’ rigid designators which grants the notion the 
semantic role of helping identify cross-modal referents. However, the inverse effect 
of said referential function is that whatever entities within the relevant cross-modal 
domain fit Kripke’s identity criteria contribute to how the associated term should be 
understood once they are recognised. Hypothetically, for instance, if some Nixon 
counterpart was crustacean under Lewis’s (1973, p. 20) closest parallel criterion for 
modal counterparts and the two theories were co-applied, the meaning of the proper 
name ‘Nixon’ would come to embody the possibility of denoting a crustacean. To 
avoid such absurd scenarios one will generally impose some restrictions either ex-
plicitly or implicitly and therefore implement scope-defining criteria. Yet, for there to 
be scope, direction and distance must be specifiable. This discussion of modal scope 
primarily explores how these two aspects of modal scope can be modelled for pur-
poses of the proposed analyses. The answer lies in degrees of similarity (Stalnaker, 
1968; Lewis, 1973) relativised to Dennett’s (1995; 2013, pp. 220–226) by now familiar 
notion of the Design Space. In effect, by plotting possible worlds into Design Space, 
all the dimensions along which they vary may be conceived as axes for summative 
vector analysis. By combining the totality of vectors along such paths, the results 
can be represented by singular vectors between the designated starting point (i.e. 
actuality) and the result. 
In describing the dimensions of Design Space (or rather, its direct inspira-
tion, Borges’s (1941) Library of Babel), Dennett (1995, p. 111) states that the hyperspace 
for representing the required relations involves an arbitrary number of axes set in 
right angles. The corresponding construct, he claims, is conceivable but not visual-
isable. In effect, each possible dimension of variation afforded by the medium to 
which Design Space is relativised must be represented. For his purposes, Dennett 
(2013, p. 225) contends with configurations of atoms as the unit of Design. Given the 
materialist underpinning of the current project, any level of physical base constituent 
with observable effects associated with variation within it suffices. With this in mind, 
if the ordering of possible world is then related to their degree of similarity, as Stal-
Scope  172 
       
 
    
naker (1968) and Lewis (1973) propose doing,14 such variation can be tracked along 
each such axis with the values for actuality acting as the origo. In principle, the gran-
ularity of Design Space accommodates details at the level of local atom density or 
electron positions but this scale can be adjusted to match the level of detail relevant 
to meaning theory by aggregating such factors and focusing on comparisons be-
tween functionally equivalent locales. Such locales are likely best defined relative to 
humanly salient details such as phenotypic differences or scale. One can imagine an 
organism which is largely structurally identical to Richard Nixon at the time he was 
elected and which was elected POTUS in the counterpart to 1968 US presidential elec-
tions but which has congenital lobster-like feelers in place of the nose. This organism 
fits most criteria for being a counterpart of Nixon yet whether it constitutes one is an 
open question because people being lobster-faced would be expected to redirect a 
world’s available trajectories, making the world of this ‘Nixon’ unviable15 and therefore 
only formally possible. Cutting a theory’s modal scope off at Gibbs’s (1970) real pos-
sibility would be one available, relatively lax principle of bounding which possibilities 
invite consideration for purposes of defining meaning once recognised. 
Modal direction and distance, then, may be expressed in terms of the multi-
tude of axes along which possible worlds vary relative to actuality. For purposes of 
analysing scope, each such world should be treated as a total state of affairs within 
the bounds of the spatiotemporal scope extending from the instantiator and inclu-
sive of the entities the theory requires to be represented. The associated modal scope 
 
14 Lewis’s (1973, p. 10, emphasis in original) Ordering Assumption, for instance, states that ‘for 
each world i, comparative similarity to i yields a weak ordering of the worlds accessible from i.’ This 
ordering is weak in part since Lewis realises a strict ordering based on similarity is effectively im-
possible due to the variety of incommensurable axes: ‘To avoid the questionable assumption that 
similarity of worlds admits somehow of numerical measurement, it seems best to identify each 
“degree of similarity to i” with a set of worlds regarded as the set of all worlds within that degree 
of similarity to i.’ (Ibid. p. 12). 
15 A key feature of Design Space is how the vast majority of possible designs are non-functional, 
as Dennett (1995, p. 113) states in relation to genetics: ‘[N]ot every such sequence in the Library 
of Mendel corresponds to a viable organism. Most DNA sequences – the Vast majority – are surely 
gibberish, recipes for nothing living at all. That is what Dawkins means, of course, when he says 
there are many more ways of being dead (or not alive) than ways of being alive.’ The Library of 
Mendel corresponds to the set of possible organisations of DNA within Design Space. 
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involves accounting for both the individual vectors involved in any examples used 
as evidence and their sum. To simplify matters, unless a central element such as the 
constituents of the instantiator are being modified, any change can be generalised 
along aligned axes – i.e. the same kinds of variation such as rescaling are not sensi-
tive to identities of involved particulars. While there is a difference between worlds 
based on which entities are subject to similar changes, when any entailments are 
bracketed, the same degree of difference is involved, and scope is only defined re-
lative to the extent of such differentiation. These movements along aligned axes show 
the minimum distances supported in said directions which is why each is registered 
individually. The associated vectors must ultimately be summed to define the peak 
total difference but ideally, each involved combination’s results should be mapped. 
These combinations plot out each enabled trajectory if one assumes that modal 
scope is inclusive of each sub-set of changes which a scenario includes.16  
Summing the associated vectors along the various axes defines points in 
the modal hyperspace which can themselves be connected to the origo to define 
new vectors with set lengths and directions. The longest vectors involving an approx-
imate direction help define the associated minimal modal scope. Thus, plotting out 
the possible trajectories using the set of differences mentioned in a given exemplar 
scenario (as well as any associated immediate adjustments) defines a field of com-
patible possibilities which extends from the actual (or a theory’s representation there-
of). Despite the use of mathematical notions such as ‘vector’, though, the involved 
values should be considered suggestive and relative rather than absolute. As Lewis 
(1973, p. 12) points out, attempting to straightforwardly quantify degrees of similarity 
is dubious. While each axis of differentiation might be measured on some numerical 
scale, their overall incommensurability prevents any univocal overall scale. Instead, 
similarly to filling in evolutionary history between available fossils, the path between 
 
16 This is by no means a trivial assumption since different changes might in principle only be 
allowed in specific combinations. However, should some theories require accounting for such 
synergistic effects, it can be done on an individual basis where the specific details override the 
general methodological principle. 
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actual variants and meaning-affecting functional alternatives can perhaps be extrap-
olated by considering which intermediates may impact meaning. For example, stars 
within the same luminosity group are categorised based on their size (supergiant, 
subgiant, dwarf, etc.), and the size-based trajectory between a star and its modal 
counterpart could be specified in terms of these categories. 
6.2 Forms of Scope 
While the above section largely refers to scope only in relation to the involved di-
mensions, a further classification in terms of role distinguishes between the forms 
which scope takes for a given theory. The first one is implemented scope which is de-
fined relative to the actual corpus based on which the theory gets reconceived. 
Implemented scope involves the limits of non-extrapolated mental spaces founded 
on material the text explicitly provides. Implemented scope is therefore linked to 
the theory-internal observer positions which act as the perspectives relative to which 
the totality of such material is presented. Because of this material basis, implemented 
scope is always bounded and should thus be specified to determine available 
venues of expansion and relative extent between theories. On the other hand, ideal 
scope is defined relative to the tasks a theory adopts, and it provides a success con-
dition: if a theory’s predictions match the results for such domains and these results 
have some application, the theory is adequate for its purpose. Finally, potential scope 
expresses the true extent of the domains the theory may support. Potential scope is 
derived from exemplars which demonstrate standards for expected meaning togeth-
er with the affordances of the applied set of principles. Together, the three define 
how well the theory realises its alleged purpose relative to available domains. 
6.2.1 Implemented Scope 
Implemented scope only applies to the actual corpus expressing a theory. It is defined 
relative to the coordinates provided by presented elements. Besides the constituents 
of any provided examples, such elements include any non-specific entities to which 
relative coordinates are attributed. The latter option includes any mention of poten-
Scope  175 
       
 
    
tial influences referred to only in terms of their position relative to other elements, 
mainly the instantiator, such as ‘immediately preceding states of affairs’. Because it 
is tied to actually invoked elements, implemented scope is necessarily finite. This fact 
is particularly pertinent when analysing theories of absolute meaning which allege 
to apply across all-encompassing domains since the mental models for even such 
theories are bounded by the limited selection of considerations finite texts and hu-
man minds may accommodate.17 Relative to such theories, analysing implemented 
scope may reveal the author’s blind spots: any dimensions and directions they fail to 
consider in practice ought to be tested before stretching the distance along already 
included directions. While implemented scope is necessarily non-comprehensive of 
an author’s full personal perspective, its dependence on that perspective makes any 
exclusion indicative of either attentional or imaginative boundaries. For instance, as 
Clark (1997, p. 190) emphasises, the prior cultural artefacts one’s environment affords 
define much of an individual’s learning potential. Thus, an author without access to 
the notion of space-time as a four-dimensional object, for example, would either 
need to discover some comparable conceptualisation themselves – likely at great 
personal effort – or their theory could hardly accommodate the future as a potential 
influence in the vein of temporal externalism (Jackman, 1999; 2005).  
Such actualisation defines implemented scope in contrast to ideal scope be-
ing hypothetical and potential scope implicit. While the individual values associated 
with specific instances a theory lists matter as evidence of the range being incorpo-
rated, the emphasis lies on the highest values for each functionally distinct direction 
given the included dimensions. They act as signposts for the extent of the consider-
ations included in the text – whether the author had a wider perspective available 
or not. Unless some scope-defining principle can be specified for the range of cases 
 
17 Consider how Nagel (1986, pp. 5–6) describes achieving objectivity as a succession of steps from 
the subjective, thereby emanating from one’s own prior understanding and generalising on that 
basis based on further data. While this thesis disagrees with Nagel on the possibility of people 
ever realising a view truly from nowhere, even he appears to consider the subjective the starting 
point which is shed gradually when one reaches out towards the ideal of detached impartiality. 
Since one is attempting to capture an infinite reach using finite resources, any resulting extension 
can then be retraced to its source and analysed in terms of what it affords and why. 
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a theory incorporates (e.g. further criteria within the category of otherwise viable in-
fluences or meta-explanations matching the evidence), these signposts effectively 
define the overall scope being implemented. Even when a corresponding explanation 
such as availability to the model processors presents itself as a means to adjust im-
plemented scope for further cases, this limit reveals the extent of incorporated con-
siderations – the material for constructing corresponding mental models. 
Outside its methodological significance relative to determining values for 
the other forms of scope, implemented scope by itself acts as a threshold for falsi-
fication. Specifically, in a scenario where applying said scope results in some prob-
lematic deviation from predicted meaning, the alternatives for resolving such cases 
without modifying a theory’s core principles are either curtailing or extending applied 
scope. Unless a scope-defining higher order principle which fits the established pat-
tern is available, attempts at curtailing implemented scope would curtail the cases 
from whence it was originally derived. Extending scope, on the other hand, only 
works as a solution if the theory already includes means for meanings to be defeasi-
ble rather than incremental – i.e. when extending the accounted for circumstances 
may modify previously established meanings instead of merely complementing 
them. Options include rules for defeaters that can negate other influences18 or open-
ness to overriding influences such as the presence of greater examples as referents 
of superlative expressions.19 However, such defeasibility conditions make any scope 
extension endanger established cases accordingly. The effects of their inclusion 
among applicable influences within a domain may only be remedied by excluding 
them or through further defeaters but only the same sorts of general considerations 
based on which overall scope is adjusted avoid turning ad hoc. Additionally, any 
 
18 Dancy (2004, pp. 41–42) discusses a similar phenomenon for moral reasons, under the title of 
‘disablers’ which prevent other reasons from taking effect, such as how incurred danger to one’s 
own person may remove obligation for certain acts for supererogatory cases. Normally, one would 
(arguably) be morally obliged to save another life but diving into icy waters to save a drowning 
person who fell through the ice is near-suicidal, making the supererogatory act fully volitional. 
19 For instance, ‘the tallest mountain’ would usually be taken to denote Mount Everest but if the 
associated spatial domain extended to cover even the solar system, Mars’s Olympus Mons is ap-
proximately two and a half times as tall, being nearly 22 kilometres high. 
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damage incurred by extending scope – such as the referents of definite descriptions 
changing being solved by limiting it anew – would reinvite the initial issue which was 
being resolved. Thus, in the absence of such outlets, extending scope can only com-
pound the issue of deviant meanings and defeasibility risks irreversible issues. As 
such, if a problem case is identified within the range of implemented scope, theories 
without defeaters or other forms of overriding have no (moderate) outs and the rest 
are similarly compromised should the required scope-extension invite any issues. 
6.2.2 Ideal Scope 
Where implemented scope provides a baseline the theory must minimally support, 
ideal scope (where applicable) acts as the threshold for a theory’s success at the 
tasks it sets for itself. The ideal scope for a theory may either be professed, often in 
relation to expressing the intended task, or implicitly entailed by the task a theory is 
addressing. Since issues of scope are mostly tacit, the best examples of professed 
scope involve theories of absolute meaning which effectively state as their purpose 
to specify the unique meanings associated with the relevant expressions.20 Mean-
while, the task of explaining meaning in communication (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1995; 
2012; Borg, 2004; 2012) implicitly sets its own limitations on appropriate scope. No 
set values are involved but one must respect the limitations of real communicators 
by having the corresponding positioned observers reflect them. Since the commu-
nicators must have access to all required influences, addressing meaning in commu-
nication entails more of an upper limit than a minimum threshold. This also shows 
why wider scope is not necessarily preferable, especially if a theory may only function 
given such extensive domains. No general principles by which features of a task 
determine the associated ideal scope are proposed here, given the complexity of 
 
20 Besides Russell (1905), early Wittgenstein (1921) provides a relatively explicit outline by claiming 
that truth is defined relative to the world as the collection of all facts in logical space (Ibid. §2.21, 
§1.13) and that reality includes the existence and non-existence of (atomic) facts (Ibid. §2.06). In 
terms of ideal scope, then, the picture theory of truth with respect to meaning would seem to en-
compass logical space as it also includes the non-factual states of affairs relative to which false 
statements remain meaningful rather than being nonsensical. Similarly, what each true statement 
would represent is a corresponding state of affairs anywhere within a world. 
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the matter and how each identified task should be analysed separately. However, 
features requiring certain aspects to be accounted for are discussed in section 6.3.3. 
Ideal scope provides a success condition in the sense that a theory ought to 
remain consistent between predicted meaning and resulting meaning when its princi-
ples are applied to such task-based domains. Depending on the task, ideal scope 
involves a minimum required scope, a maximum available scope, or a range set by 
both. No theory’s predicted meaning is fully internally motivated, either: descriptive 
theories are subject to observation-based facts and prescriptive theories to the other 
functions their semantic pictures serve, such as enabling some epistemological po-
sition.21 Hence, resulting meaning may conflict with predicted meaning because the 
former is derivative of only the theory and the relevant facts while the latter entails 
some external obligation the theory must fulfil. Ideal scope corresponds to the range 
within which corresponding domains engender the results predicted by the standard 
the theory is applying such as dictionary definitions. 
To provide an example, consider how the inclusion or exclusion of a past-
directed temporal dimension determines whether Russellian definite descriptions 
yield the contemporaneously or historically wealthiest person as the referent of ‘the 
wealthiest person’.22 The question becomes which the theory should designate to 
fulfil its main function instead of merely acting as a selection method within prag-
matically defined, variable domains. This logic by which definite referents are denoted 
extends to domains of any scope. Minimally, though, Russellian definite descriptions 
treat worlds as their domain, as opposed to Austinian situations, as characterised by 
Barwise and Etchemendy (1987). This professed ideal constitutes a floor for the range 
of scopes at which the theory must operate successfully. Consider if applying the the-
 
21 In effect, if a function is pre-recognised, there are some standards to be met, and a theory would 
only befit an unrecognised function incidentally. This demand for applicability is also sufficient to 
weed out vacuously consistent theories with arbitrarily low threshold based on internally generated 
predictions. Such cases include the likes of a theory which predicts that no expression has a 
meaning or a rule which ensures as much, both of which could otherwise act as counterexamples. 
22 Based on current estimates, the referent would thus be either Jeff Bezos or Mansa Musa, the 
tenth ruler of the Mali Empire. If autocratic rulers are excluded, the historically wealthiest person 
would instead be John D. Rockefeller. 
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ory were to return results such as everyday mentions of ‘the tallest mountain’ having 
an indeterminate placeholder value23 instead of denoting Mt. Everest when the truth 
of any associated claims (e.g. ‘the tallest mountain lies between Nepal and Tibet’) is 
being evaluated. The acceptable answers for such cases are pre-established, and 
such deviant results would only show that the theory must at least be unsuitable for 
that specific task. Effectively, how certain words are used belongs among the sorts 
of framework beliefs on which Wittgenstein (1969, §307) muses: judgements of truth 
and falsity are based around them since the associated degree of certainty exceeds 
that of any available justification for or against. We might accept that in an absolute 
sense, there exists a mountain higher than Mt. Everest, but prescribing that mountain 
as the proper designee for assessing the truth of each mention would be inappro-
priate when ‘the tallest mountain’ is indubitably being used to denote Mt. Everest. 
Thus, consistency between expectations and results at the specified (range of) ideal 
scope makes a theory adequate24 for its purpose because it shows how the rules 
incorporate all the relevant considerations, including prior standards. 
6.2.3 Potential Scope 
Neither implemented scope nor ideal scope expresses the actual limits of a theory, 
though. Both serve various functions which help one either derive or assess the scope 
a theory affords – its full potential in this respect. Such potential scope is not subject 
to the same incidental selection effects as implemented scope. It differs from ideal 
scope in how theories may fail to meet the expectations set by ideals. While a theory 
is being formulated, pertinent considerations may go unappreciated for a variety of 
reasons such as general attentional limitations and various cognitive and cultural 
 
23 As statistically, the tallest mountain in the universe is unlikely to exist among those with already 
measured heights. 
24 The implication that theories can succeed by being good enough rather than uniquely true fol-
lows from the pragmatist aspects of the pluralist ontology at play (Goodman, 1978; Dupré, 1993). 
Technically, there would be degrees of success for each given task but succeeding in the task is it-
self a form of success to which multiple theories may lay claim. For instance, both Newtonian and 
Einsteinian physics succeed at predicting the behaviour of objects within a range of values suited 
for purposes such as architecture even if general relativity’s wider applicability makes it preferable 
in these theories’ primary field of application – physics. 
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biases.25 Nothing ensures that the promises being made are being fulfilled. Potential 
scope is left as the extent of the instantiator-centred domains at which a theory re-
mains consistent between predicted meaning and resulting meaning. In effect, when 
the principles a theory advocates are applied to identify sets of meaning-defining 
relations within particular domains, potential scope equals the range within which 
results match the standard set by the precedent the theory advocates. Assuming that 
at least some such relation types are open-ended and applicable to non-unique po-
tential influences, applying the same principles to identify matching relations within 
any wider domains would invite at least some problem cases. If the greatest allowed 
range does not remain consistent, this range ought to be linked to an applicable 
extent-adjusting principle of the kind discussed above. 
For instance, consider a theory which associates word type meaning with 
convention (e.g. Lewis, 1969). Within a materialist framework, any such convention 
would correspond to the presence of a functionally specified physical arrangement26 
whereby a part of the system of each applicable meaning-processor is primed to 
produce set activation patterns in response to the associated expression – or there-
abouts. Such theories tend to limit themselves to contemporaneous conditions and 
therefore have minimal past-oriented temporal scope. The reason can be made evi-
dent by considering what exceeding the scope a theory supports may entail. This 
may be demonstrated relative to cross-temporal or cross-modal influences both. 
The cross-temporal case would make obsolete conventions part of active meaning 
 
25 Woolard and Schieffelin (1994), for instance, review discussions of so-called language ideologies 
– the socially or conventionally self-evident assumptions about the nature of language. For an ex-
ample perhaps applicable to theorising about language, consider the following quote (Ibid. p. 63): 
‘Language mixing, codeswitching, and creoles are often evaluated as indicating less than full lin-
guistic capabilities, revealing assumptions about the nature of language implicitly based in literate 
standards and a pervasive tenet that equates change with decay […] Written form, lexical elabora-
tion, rules for word formation, and historical derivation are often seized on in diagnosing real lan-
guage and ranking the candidates […]’. In modern times prior to the normalisation of the Internet, 
often monolingual authors in position to theorise on how people acquire their ‘native languages’ 
would have limited experience of active language mixing, for instance, making them less likely to  
treat language as ecologically determined idiolects which resemble said canonical systems. 
26 In other words, it would be multiply realisable – but the presence of any exact arrangement 
matching the functional criterion would suffice to engender the related meaning. 
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– for instance, ‘success’ would still mean any outcome rather than only favourable 
ones. While the potential results might seem absurd, such theories possess some 
merit: if the sort of meaning at play is not directly tied to use, in a society with modern 
information storage capacity, such legacy meanings remaining recorded provides 
grounds to argue that they are suppressed or tacit rather than obliviated. Thus, such 
circumstances arguably afford forms of meaning unique to them and therefore could 
validate corresponding theories relative to associated tasks but they would remain 
inapplicable for the theory’s original purpose. 
Identifying modally separated convention-based influences involve a com-
parison between the distinct ways an event responsible for proper usage could real-
istically have transpired. The (non-)planetary status of Pluto offers a familiar example. 
Whether Pluto is considered a true planet or a planetary-mass object – specifically, 
a dwarf planet – is a matter of the (functional) mass-based definition of a planet and 
Pluto’s status has shifted over the years.27 A convention-based pluralist semantics 
would conceivably accept that the meaning of ‘planet’ both is and is not inclusive 
of Pluto by folding such potential definitions into the meanings of terms. Even if the 
definition being applied were treated as more important, the rest could also prove 
significant for purposes such as contrasting legitimate neighbouring options with 
inapplicable frameworks. While both forms of alternative theories of convention-
based meaning may have their applications, the meanings resulting from such scope 
expansion are clearly distinct from those usually intended and largely inapplicable 
for the same tasks. Thus, the same principle of identifying the presence of conven-
tion-matching states of affairs yields different results based on applied scope, and 
such differences may prove either helpful or problematic depending on the task the 
theory is intended to address. 
 
27 For instance, under Stern and Levison’s (2002, p. 208) minimal criterion of having shape be deter-
mined primarily by own gravity rather than mechanical strength while also not supporting internal 
fusion reactions, Pluto would qualify as a planet. However, while Stern and Levison (Ibid. pp. 210–
212) accept ability to clear planetesimals (orbital clutter) into their sub-classification of planets, 
Basri and Brown (2006) argue that such ability should be treated as a primary qualifier, making 
Pluto sub-planetary by their standards. 
Scope  182 
       
 
    
6.2.4 Purposes of Scope 
It is important not to mix these three forms of scope or ignore some of them. A pro-
fessed ideal and the reality of what a theory may support can differ, and what gets 
implemented has its own significance even when it does not cover the true potential 
of a theory. The above distinctions ought to make clear how each theory involves 
three meaningfully distinct forms of scope: Theories implement a specific scope which 
directs how they become conceived by focusing attention. Each theory is subject to 
external or self-imposed restrictions which define an ideal that must be met through 
consistent results under the circumstances domains of the associated extent entail. 
Finally, each theory has its real potential to accommodate domains of a specifiable 
extent before its principles risk entailing inapplicable results. While this sub-section 
mainly explores independent uses for information about each type of scope associ-
ated with a theory, they also relate to each other in ways which are explored in more 
detail in relation to the means of identifying each. 
 Allusions to the significance of identifying the various forms of scope asso-
ciated with a given theory above have mainly focused on intra-theoretical evaluation. 
Implemented scope acts as a minimum which a theory must support systematically. 
Ideal scope sets the threshold for adequacy for a theory’s intended purpose. Potential 
scope expresses the extent to which a theory may fulfil these two criteria. However, 
such differences also ground inter-theoretical comparisons. Specifically, when the 
implemented and potential scopes associated with a theory are either explicit or 
retroactively embraced, they act as an implicit standard for the purpose in question. 
Consider the roles these two internally determined forms of scope possess: one sets 
a minimum which the author treats as definitive through their examples while the 
other defines the limits of their theory. As such, implemented scope communicates 
an expectation which suggests norms for inclusion (but not exclusion) among the 
available scope-defining factors: dimensions, directions, and distances. Should the 
ideal scope associated with the relevant task be at all open-ended – e.g. setting a 
minimum threshold or a range rather than distinct values – the potential scope of a 
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theory provides an upper limit for what its proponents would promote as an appro-
priate ideal. If the ideal scope is less than well-defined, the potential scope of an ap-
plicable theory provides an approximation. When theories which share a purpose 
have mutually incompatible potential scopes (e.g. one includes a dimension the other 
cannot support), they provide opposed standpoints on what the ideal scope for the 
task includes. The reasoning provided to consolidate such standpoints ought to then 
advance the general understanding of which considerations are involved and why. 
Examples ought to illuminate both contributions, even if the cases are neces-
sarily hypothetical when there is limited existing data on such details for different 
theories. First, to illustrate how a theory’s implemented scope can suggest norms 
for the inclusion of specific aspects of scope, consider the future-oriented core prin-
ciple of Jackman’s (1999; 2005) temporal externalism. In this case, the involved non-
standard direction along the temporal axis is explicit when Jackman (1999, p. 161) 
makes statements like ‘The diachronic division of labor is manifested in our confi-
dence that, even if nobody knows exactly what falls under the extension of a given 
term, once somebody did, or someday somebody will.’ In fact, this quote shows that 
temporal externalism goes both ways since Jackman also accepts that meaning can 
have been settled by past usage. Such cases might involve dead languages where 
even when the archaeologist uses the terms they had identified but with which they 
associate no meaning themselves, their utterances would carry those meanings. In 
the other direction, when an ancient astronomer mentions ‘the Evening Star’, the the-
ory would attribute to that name the full meaning currently associated with Venus. 
The task Jackman sets for the theory is shared with other forms of deferential exter-
nalism: explaining the general referential meaning of terms (as opposed to subjec-
tively manifest or connotative meaning, for instance). Even if Jackson were not explicit 
about his intentions, the directions being implemented28 would constitute attempted 
norm-setting for this task since the inclusion of such considerations relative to a task 
elevates them to a position of relevance. The logic which underlies such implicit 
 
28 Jackman’s (1999, pp. 158–160) own examples also implement future-oriented scope even if they 
would have taken more space to reproduce here. 
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norms relies on the conditional rule that if there exists a particular consideration which 
has scope-involving properties (such as relative temporal direction) and which influ-
ences meaning, then some meaning-influencing factors have said scope-involving 
properties. Additionally, any scope-involving properties associated with meaning-
influencing entities ought to be integrated into the ideal scope for that task since 
the resulting domains must accommodate all relevant influences. In effect, then, since 
implemented scope corresponds to the minimal positive requirements of a theory, 
any theory presenting itself as a viable solution on an issue also presents the associ-
ated elements of scope as pertinent to that task. 
As for the limits of a theory’s potential scope acting as a guideline to the as-
sociated task’s ideal scope, any examples ought to be based on tasks with currently 
ill-defined restrictions. Anything which necessitates modal scope being involved is a 
good candidate since modal direction and distance are so hard to codify. Most tasks 
involving modal solutions such as the grammar of progressives (e.g. Portner, 1998) 
or specifying propositional content of assertions (Stalnaker, 1978; 2012) only involve 
a possible modal dimension. These cases do not suffice for the purposes of the ex-
ample. In contrast to the aforementioned tasks, a pursuit one might call speculative 
etymology – inventorising the possible developments rooted in specified terms – 
necessarily involves modality without pre-specifying an acceptable range. The ap-
proach being taken is based on cognitive linguistics since as Lakoff (1987, pp. 451–
452) emphasises, using embodiment as a foundation for linguistic research also in-
volves assuming that (folk) etymology is non-incidental and indicative of real histori-
cal connections. The possible degree of variation for an embodiment-based theory 
of speculative etymology has clear limits on the variation it would allow. The example 
can thus be based on the potential scope this framework should afford. Since the 
exact forms involved cannot be predicted, the related instantiators are specified in 
terms of their roots and their functions. Thus, a familiar term such as ‘appraise’ might 
be specified as [apprize][merit], for instance, since it derives from said root but applies 
the evaluative logic of pricing to various (dis)merits instead based on the afforded 
phonological association with ‘praise’. 
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To illustrate how embodiment would define a modal domain, consider [sous-
vide][economy]. Sous-vide is a prolonged, low temperature cooking method involv-
ing vacuum sealing, and it is becoming increasingly popular and accessible. Thus, its 
embodied associations as a user can be categorised into (1) investment, (2) conve-
nience, and (3) innovation which include aspects such as the economic commitment 
to the circulator and vacuum sealing equipment, waiting, automation, skill divest-
ment, and technological advancement. The position of the cooked also has recognis-
able embodied aspects such as (1) pressure, (2) sealing, (3) slow-cooking, (4) applied 
control, and (5) refinement. Assuming that economy involves – or is conceived as in-
volving – similar positions of a shaper and the subordinate, that side of the equation 
also affords various mappings for purposes of cognitive metaphors (Lakoff & John-
son, 1980). Below is a non-exhaustive sample of three examples of available meanings 
for [sous-vide][economy] instantiators. They each represent possible understandings 
of notions derived from ‘sous-vide’ based on mapping the base concept’s embodied 
aspects to how economics are conceived. 
First, one might consider a strategy expressed using a verb which involves 
shapers making an initial investment in apparatuses which allow repeated, largely 
autonomously developing projects that have a long yield-time. Such a scheme might 
involve establishing a market-targeted and innovation-focused educational facility 
which provides its services in return for a share in participants’ future projects. One 
marketing such an idea might (should the notion have been consolidated) propose 
that investors sous-vide29 adult education, for instance. Second, someone in an exter-
nally induced economic crisis without any elbow room and under constant heat in 
the form of precarious circumstances might be characterised as being in a sous-vide 
trap of sorts. Arguably, people forced to take multiple jobs to subsist already experi-
ence a concurrently relevant condition for which the metaphor is apt. A counterfac-
 
29 The actual term would likely morph as a part of the transition but the concurrent form is used 
for the examples for simplicity’s sake. This direct application sounds off because of the primary 
association involving literal boiling rather than the involved triad of initial investment, long wait, 
and effortless returns. Current economists might also approach the ‘sous-vide phenomenon’ mainly 
in terms of the market enablers of the popularity spike such as reliance on Youtube personalities. 
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tual economist might call them the sous-vide class in this sense. However, as the third 
example shows, the same material can lead to contradictory results since it is contin-
gent which aspects get emphasised and to which matching conditions they map. 
Should the combination of investment (time and money), convenience, and refined 
results be emphasised, ‘the sous-vide class’ might instead denote those who can 
afford the purchase and use of said equipment and similar conveniences: relatively 
well-off people with flexible schedules or home offices such as successful writers. 
Since such examples are merely mapping out the space of possibilities, the 
probability associated with any given option is a secondary consideration. While each 
of the above examples has a negligible chance of ever being actualised – requiring 
use in a pioneering work and the normalisation of sous-vide to the point the refer-
ence is self-evident – they would all follow the principles of an embodiment-based 
approach. The requisite affinity which affords such constructs is there and could be 
realised in multiple ways. Relative to the main issue of a theory’s potential scope 
acting as a standard for the ideal scope of the associated task, the example case 
would have a distinct thesis on modal scope for speculative etymology. In virtue of 
what it does, such a theory proposes that all theories of speculative etymology should 
(minimally) accommodate the modal pathways which embodiment traces. The cor-
responding principle would approximate an order to cover each pairing within the 
specified sub-domains linked by an experientially salient, shared aspect for which a 
corresponding notion with an imaginable use can be conceived. 
While relatively lenient, such a principle would introduce restrictions over 
vacuous (mere) similarity (Searle, 1977, p. 96; Davidson, 1978, p. 254): either the pre-
sent cultural context or an embodied experiential basic must highlight the relevant 
aspects of the involved entities (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 57). Thus, while effectively 
any pairing might be viable in the proper context, the facts relative to which such 
modal space is established matter, and the directions associated with the required 
routes would remain scope-defining. Since each theory implicitly asserts its own via-
bility, in the absence of established prior criteria, these sorts of principles involving 
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the potential scope of a theory become tentative standards for task-specific ideal 
scope which may get consolidated later. Unlike how implemented scope only 
grounds principles for inclusion, however, potential scope can also act to exclude 
considerations which would endanger the theory since specifies the extent of the 
widest scope within which the theory may operate. By setting itself as a standard, a 
theory therefore also excludes anything beyond said scope since were the ideal to 
include them, the theory itself would prove unfit. 
6.3 Extracting Scope 
With the nature of scope having been clarified, the time has come to address the 
means by which the different forms of scope can be extracted using the framing 
device of attributed situations. Since the different kinds of scope each correspond 
to the domain of access which defines the dimensions of an attributed situation – 
the aggregated points of access available to the specified observer – defining them 
amounts to effectively assuming different perspectives on a theory. Implemented 
scope involves the perspective the text itself already embodies while potential scope 
requires pulling further back to see if the boundaries may extend beyond that, for 
instance. The methods suitable for each of the three types are discussed in order, 
starting with implemented scope which is the most basic and ending with ideal 
scope since it has the least general advice available. As stated, the relationship be-
tween implemented scope and definition 2 is the most direct, given how models 
based on definition 2 largely apply the same evidence which is already present in 
the text such as provided exemplars – the discussed paradigmatic cases. Thus, the 
coordinates and counterparthood relations recorded using the template definition 
2 provides directly express implemented scope. Potential scope, on the other hand, 
mainly depends on what the defining relations of a theory afford and the precedent 
the exemplars set in terms of expected results. Approximating potential scope takes 
implemented scope as its starting point as accommodating at least the implemented 
domains is crucial and thus provides a guidepost. It would be possible to test 
different scopes at random to narrow the range of viable candidates but proceeding 
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from the established standard focuses such search. Finally, ideal scope’s relation to 
consensus and potential task-specific principles are discussed in brief at the end. 
6.3.1 Extracting Implemented Scope 
This discussion mainly focuses on total implemented scope rather than variable im-
plemented scope. The difference between the two has been alluded to above: total 
scope involves the highest available values whereas variable scope is regulated using 
some principle sensitive to variation between cases. Implemented scope consists of 
the ground covered by how the theory would be conceived together with universally 
available complements. Such values are available in models constructed using defi-
nition 2. Specifically, spatial and temporal scope may initially be grounded on the 
highest recorded relative values for the coordinates associated with the theory and 
the entities conceiving it involves. Implemented modal scope, on the other hand, 
relies on relations expressing sets of entities being counterparts to each other (or less 
symmetrically, the rest to those deemed ‘actual’). As such, the associated scope de-
pends on the recognised forms of difference between such counterparts: one would 
need to isolate the respects in which they differ and grade them across hypothetical 
scale of degrees of differentiation in those respects. While some – if not all – such 
variables could be scaled quantitatively (e.g. proportionate volume or relative com-
plexity) given the right specifications, few if any theories discuss differences in such 
detail. Instead, an ordinal scale is posited. Example values might include ‘indistin-
guishable’, ‘decipherable’, ‘discernible’, and ‘contentious’.30 The sources for such val-
ues include exemplars and stated principles but they also do not exhaust what im-
plemented scope encompasses. Unlisted but necessary influences for exemplars are 
also included. 
The most important detail implemented scope reveals is which dimensions 
and directions are being recognised as part of the canon of a theory without need 
for extrapolation. The information it provides on scope distance matter less since 
 
30 In other words, ‘identical but separate’, ‘requiring effort or expertise for the differences to be-
come manifest’, ‘observably different’, and ‘contestably even counterparts’. 
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distance has more range to extend beyond the examples whereas other details ex-
press types of considerations which are included or excluded. Distance is more quan-
titative. On a similar note, exemplars are the primary form of evidence for identifying 
implemented scope. In this context, while any example being used within a theory 
qualifies, the significance of these cases comes from how they anchor the theory to 
familiar, recognisable situations and form connections with the corresponding parts 
of one’s sense of the real. As Kuhn (2012, p. 187) notes, the provided applications for 
a theory ground how a person experience it since ‘[i]n the absence of such exemplars, 
the laws and theories he has previously learned would have little empirical content.’ 
The empirical content to which Kuhn is referring is understood here in cognitive 
terms: as the ability to connect the theory with the objects of experience. This 
includes having some prototypical representations for the generic entities of the 
mental model for the theory such as ‘natural kinds’.31 
For each such exemplar – and they should all ideally be accommodated to 
reach a comprehensive analysis of a theory’s implemented scope – one may identify 
both listed and unlisted but presupposed sets of influences. For instance, Sperber 
and Wilson (2012, pp. 39–43) discuss various variations of exchanges where a person 
(‘Mary’) responds to an initial question or other scenario with ‘I’m tired’ (e.g. being 
asked ‘Do you want to go to the cinema?’). The meaning they discuss is attached to 
said utterance and experienced by the other interlocutor. Relevance theory being a 
contextualist approach, it must list some contextual influences: the form of the pre-
ceding question and then the milieu (e.g. an Italian museum). Surprisingly few such 
facts are listed. The rest are left presupposed even though some such unlisted influ-
ences are necessary to reach the proposed conclusions on the meaning of the utter-
ance (e.g. ‘Mary does not want to go to the cinema.’). For instance, the interlocutor 
(‘Peter’) associating tiredness with unwillingess to partake in activities involving travel 
 
31 How Putnam (1975) grounds his conception of scientifically specifiable natural kinds to water – 
a uniform chemical element – rather than more contested categories such as biological kinds 
likely presents the implied essentialism as relatively palatable for most since they would need to ex-
trapolate to realise the implications. Even ‘rock’ encompasses countless types of minerals, some 
of which include organic elements (e.g. fossils) and includes contestable cases such as many jewels. 
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is being assumed. In an alternative scenario, if Mary stressed the ‘am’ in her response 
and Peter knew she was an insomniac who needed trashy romantic comedies to doze 
off, the same response could have expressed willingness (i.e. ‘Mary wants to go see 
something that lets her sleep.’). If such variable experiences were plotted across the 
span over which they consolidated to Peter’s present conceptions, the example would 
arguably possess a backward, past-oriented temporal aspect associated with its un-
listed influences. While this scope could be collapsed into Peter’s present state, given 
the concurrently available means of acquiring corresponding states, the first alter-
native – perhaps with an asterisked reservation included – would be more interest-
ing. Unlike the presentist reduction which applies equally across most of the board, 
the use of a temporally extended scope grounds comparisons of the associated 
principles for restricting it. Given its cognitive bent, relevance theory would likely 
associate such past-based influences with individual factors like memory rather than 
any wider societal or even metaphysical considerations which externalist theories, for 
instance, might argue to provide a better foundation. 
The actual means by which such analyses of exemplars work based on the 
suggested framework involve (1) identifying the pieces of text used in an exemplifying 
manner,32 (2) listing explicitly invoked forms of influences, (3) checking what enthy-
mematic or otherwise necessary assumptions must be being made, and (4) convert-
ing associated values to match the scope-appropriate ordinal scale. The first step is 
partly a matter of judgement but any passages acting to demonstrate how the the-
ory relates to matters external to it and treated as fact (e.g. established theories on 
other subjects) ought to register because of this functional role they play. The second 
step is relatively uninteresting. You specify the forms of influence and the relative 
coordinates associated with each at a level of specificity the details support attribut-
ing to involved entities. The third step involves comparing the listed influences with 
the listed expected results and filling in the gaps similarly to how enthymemes are 
 
32 Not all exemplars need be detailed examples such as imaginary scenarios. For example, com-
ments on the neurophysiological basis for implementing Fodorian modules forge links between 
theory and supposed reality. 
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identified in deductive arguments. If there are multiple possible sets of assumptions 
leading to the same result, one ought to record as many as they recognise but select 
one as their primary candidate. Considerations contributing to such candidacy in-
clude minimising scope – especially additional dimensions and directions – relative 
to precedent, parsimony in general, and the acceptability of the assumptions relative 
to the most charitably chosen cultural framework. Usually, this framework includes 
the best approximation of the facts at the time rather than the author’s historical 
context when theories are being assessed for their contemporary applicability. 
Finally, since the recorded influences are likely associated with values across 
a range of degrees of accuracy, the results must be normalised by mapping these 
values onto a common scale. For purposes of transferability, the range of individual 
results each nominator covers should be recorded but the recommendation pre-
sented here is that the values of the scale be linked to various means of access. In 
broad terms, one would minimally include a category for the immediately accessible 
such as the situationally perceptible, the genuinely but indirectly accessible such as 
remembered facts, and the in-principle accessible but situationally unavailable such 
as research on schizotypal personality disorder. A further category for the in-principle 
inaccessible complements this list and while it cannot be part of implemented scope 
(as every included element is accessible to at least the author), ideal scope for theo-
ries of absolute meaning might require it at times. These degrees of access belong 
to the relevant situated processors of meaning – whether individuals or even human-
ity collectively. Access being attributed this definitive role has its reasons which are 
clarified below. However, the motivation mainly depends on the relationship between 
access and manifestness, both to processors themselves and their authorial stand-in. 
6.3.2 Extracting Potential Scope 
Unlike implemented scope which is (potentially) subject to external factors, potential 
scope is motivated solely by internal considerations. Implemented scope is depen-
dent on authorial access: which considerations the author managed to accommodate 
constitute the limits of the scope present in the text. This applies to the degrees of 
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access associated with both the situated observer(s) and the detached observer 
relative to which the theory is presented. Neither may exceed the author’s own 
perspective at the level of implementation even if an author may attribute to them 
perspectives inclusive of factors they may conceptualise without truly conceiving 
them.33 This relationship provides the foundation of the proposed explanation for any 
given theory’s implemented scope having the extent it does. Beyond the incidental 
reasons associated with the exact details of included exemplars (i.e. why specific ex-
amples rather than some alternatives were used), a theory relies on the vision of its 
author for what it presents, and that realised vision cannot exceed their capacity 
which relies on available access for its scope. The transition to extracting potential 
scope highlights the externally imposed nature of such limitations. 
In contrast, potential scope relies on the interplay between available sources 
of influence given the principles a theory posits and its standard for expected re-
sults. However, there remains a methodologically important sense in which potential 
scope is not independent of the limits of an author’s imagination. Analysing such 
details relies on testing different values: there is no apparent means to directly deduce 
potential scope. As such, one needs principles to direct the search which reveals the 
limits of this combination of principles and expected results. If authorial access is 
treated as the foundation for implemented scope – which in turn acts as the baseline 
from which to expand – then considerations on how challenging conceiving a given 
aspect of scope is to a person are instructional for purposes of any attempted ex-
pansion. Harder to conceive alternatives have likely received less consideration and 
should be prioritised to establish whether the corresponding dimensions and direc-
tions are at all supported – especially if associated ideal scope involves them. 
 
33 ‘Omnipotence’ would be an example of a trait which can readily be conceptualised – people have 
no issue formally understanding the notion of being capable of anything – but which arguable 
can never be conceived successfully because no one may imagine the full extent of the involved 
scenarios. For a discussion of this difference, see Dennett’s (1991, pp. 399–401) critique of Jackson’s 
(1982; 1987) Mary the Colour Scientist thought experiment which requires readers to imagine a 
person who knows everything about the physical properties underlying colour experience. As Den-
nett (1991, p. 399) puts it: ‘The reason no one follows [Jackson’s] directions is because what they 
ask you to imagine is so preposterously immense, you can’t even try.’ 
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Potential scope being reliant on internal factors specifically involves the dy-
namic where the meanings which result from applying a theory of meaning rely on 
the set of principles specific to the theory and the relevant domains. Invariantist the-
ories will return the same answer for each scenario involving the same instantiator 
but this reliability requires that all associated domains are specified such that they in-
corporate the requisite influences. Without a domain, the relationships grounded in 
said principles would lack participants to substantiate the exact meaning the theory 
would attribute to a given instantiator. Without any principles, designated domains 
would just be sets of non-meaning defining states of affairs. If this relationship is 
treated as a function with three variables then any of the three can be specified in 
terms of the other two. While a theory standardly applies the other two factors to 
derive meanings, if the acceptable values for meaning can be approximated, then 
combining them with the invariant set of rules yields the appropriate domain for 
that result. Specifying potential scope therefore involves identifying some expected 
meaning which would be attributed to a given instantiator and reverse engineering 
the process of how said meaning would be derived by identifying the necessary influ-
ences and recording their available positions. The first task is identifying those ex-
pected meanings without them having to be systematically derived. The second task 
is identifying the requisite influences to reach that result before they can finally be 
mapped to form a domain with a distinct minimum scope. For any given example 
like this, one may also identify other compatible influences based on the principles at 
play. If their inclusion would change the resulting meaning beyond acceptable varia-
tion, the limits of the corresponding do-main must exclude said entities to retain 
the original expected meaning. Thus, one may set an upper limit for the domain in 
this manner where applicable and refine it further by analysing more cases. 
That theories of meaning rarely operate in a completely bottom-up man-
ner where a set of circumstances is related to the proposed principles and the re-
sults emerge independently of other considerations ought not be a controversial 
claim. Part of their justification comes from matching pre-existing judgements of 
meaning for familiar entities such as ‘milk’ somehow relating to the liquid mamma-
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ries secrete.34 The evaluation of any example derived using the principles a theory 
proposes is dependent on a pre-established standard, and only examples cohering 
with such standards to a satisfactory degree become included. Looking at any exam-
ple within the literature – including Travis (2008) cases – demonstrates as much: if 
the invoked meaning was without precedent (e.g. ‘therefore, “milk” denotes what-
ever a bird mother regurgitates’), the fault would be attributed to the theory. The 
question becomes how the standard a theory applies can be identified. The source 
of such evidence are still the exemplars: these cases set a precedent on which any 
extrapolation must be based. 
Cursorily, one may identify three kinds of external standards: (1) manifest, (2) 
public, and (3) formal. A theory may utilise a combination of such standards as well. 
Manifestness involves personal experience of a meaning – intuitions – and it is espe-
cially important to pragmatically oriented theories. For instance, Recanati’s (1989, pp. 
309–315) Availability Principle35 explicitly grants priority to intuitive judgements of 
manifest content as the grounds for the involved judgements (e.g. Devitt, 2012). Con-
textualist approaches are particularly reliant on standards of manifestness because 
of their use of particularised scenarios for which codified precedent is generally 
unavailable. As Bach (2002) and Devitt (2012) argue, such evidence need not be con-
sidered authoritative, though. Another substantial standard are public records: dictio-
nary definitions as standardised conventions, expert consensus, and so forth. Defer-
ential externalism (e.g. Putnam, 1975) provides an especially clear example of such 
standards being applied: understanding based on individual competence would be 
 
34 As the case of ‘almond milk’ shows, a simple definition such as ‘milk is the liquid secreted by a 
healthy and active mammary’ is insufficient since at least some uses are either derivative or other-
wise beyond the definition. The definition could of course be appended to include a disjunctive 
condition about other liquids used to serve some of the functions of the mammarian liquid in the 
relevant society. However, the need for such additions could instead be superseded by either di-
rectly functional definitions or non-definitional models of determining referents. 
35 ‘In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is part of what is 
said, that is, in making a decision concerning what is said, we should always try to preserve our 
pre-theoretic intuitions on the matter.’ (Recanati, 1989, p. 310). Recanati aims to distinguish ‘what 
is said’ from formal sentence meaning as a contextually enriched level inclusive of it, with the former 
treated as what is consciously available for inferring further pragmatic effects (Ibid. pp. 309–315). 
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irrelevant for meaning. Finally, formal standards include forms of adherence to rules 
such as propositional completion and formal logic. Some may even be proposed as 
part of the theory itself, assuming that said formalisation is presented as explanatorily 
vital for some linguistic phenomenon such as grammaticalisation. For instance, com-
binatory categorial grammar (e.g. Gildea & Hockenmaier, 2003; Steedman & Bald-
ridge, 2006) uses matrices of statistical co-occurrence as a formalised factual basis 
for identifying semantic roles like agent or patient position in a computable manner. 
In practice, then, one ought to analyse which pre-existing standard the pro-
vided exemplars are approximating. Once the underlying standard has been settled, 
one may either consider further strongly intuited cases of the kind relevant to the 
type of meaning under consideration (e.g. utterance meaning in communication) 
or check the public record for other applicable candidates depending on the stan-
dard in question. Ultimately, this process is intended to simulate generating new ex-
amples appropriate for the task the theory addresses while respecting the targets 
the author would have considered given the resources available to them. To provide 
an example, consider how exemplars within relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1996; 
Carston, 2002) often rely on two-part dialogues where the first contextualises the 
second. The first line is familiar or presumed self-explanatory within the general con-
text being invoked (e.g. asking for the time from a stranger in public) while the sec-
ond and its variants illustrate the pragmatic effect being highlighted. Being a con-
textualist theory, relevance theory primarily relies on agreement in terms of judge-
ments of manifest meaning. An additional factor which analyses of contextualist the-
ories must accommodate to avoid immunising these theories from falsification is up-
dating the context to match the preliminary scope being applied. The reason is how 
the total context shifting as a result of the scope adjustment would change the 
prediction because of contextualist theories’ high sensitivity to various factors. How-
ever, since the focus lies on a theory’s principles, one need only find the point where 
mounting disagreement with the results turns them indefensible.36 This is more akin 
 
36 Being a cognitive contextualist theory, relevance theory is actually mostly immune to effects of 
scope since all the relevant relations occur locally, within the realm of the mutually manifest (or 
Scope  196 
       
 
    
to standard use of counterexamples but scope analyses’ significance includes helping 
identify the range within which such counterexamples avoid begging the question 
in the form of applying a scope distinct from what the theory treats as acceptable. 
Once the standard a theory applies has been identified and an example 
chosen accordingly, one must identify which influences would be required to reach 
the expected result given the principles the theory includes. Uniform methodological 
principles are hard to recommend for this task given the variety of theories, but some 
common strategies apply. The most basic approach is taking the central entities in-
volved and checking whether they suffice for the result. If an explanatory gap remains, 
the corresponding complements must be added by first stating the issue and then 
shortlisting potential means of resolution within the theory’s framework. Since the 
very process of analysing meaning within default semantics (Jaszczolt, 2005; 2016) 
mirrors this task of identifying a total set of influences,37 it allows illustrating the prin-
ciple. For any given merger representation – a construct representing the total se-
mantics of a situated unit of analysis (Jaszczolt, 2016, p. 80) – one would first need 
to check which kinds of defaults inform the meaning attributed to it: world know-
ledge, linguistic features, situation of discourse, cognitive effects, or societal stereo-
types. Thus, for instance, to interpret a toddler pointing at Snoopy and excitedly mut-
tering ‘bow-wow’, one would certainly need to account for the situation (Snoopy is 
being indicated) and societal stereotypes (English uses ‘bow-wow’ to represent ca-
nine barking). However, these primary considerations are deficient and further world 
 
what is treated as such): perceptible or inferable to each participant, as far as they are aware (Sper-
ber & Wilson, 1995, pp. 39–43). However, since manifestness itself is graded and such grading can 
at least partly be correlated with forms of distance such as memory in relation to time and coun-
terfactual difference with cognitive effort, at least an optimal operating range could be defined. 
Namely, cognitive distance can be graded based on general human capacities, and the influences 
required for analysed cases can be associated with positions across that range. The optimal oper-
ating range of a cognitive contextualist theory corresponds to the spread of influences required 
for the typical cases for which people possess congruent intuitions. The more this range extends 
beyond reasonable cognitive reach, the more the required potential scope exceeds ideal scope. 
37 ‘DS focuses on identifying a unit that is most worthy of a semantic analysis, followed by identi-
fying the sources of information that provide the addressee with this unit and the processes that 
uncover the intended information or, on some occasions, co-construct the semantic content in the 
interaction.’ (Jaszczolt, 2016, p. 78, emphasis in original) 
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knowledge such as that Snoopy represents a dog and that toddlers occasionally use 
onomatopoeic sounds as nouns (or the toddler equivalents of such beliefs) would be 
required to properly represent the involved considerations. Once a satisfactory set is 
identified, these considerations can be matched with corresponding influences based 
on the types of relations the theory allows. Default semantics being a cognitive theory 
entails that the representing neural states would be included but the focus on shared 
defaults grounded in external circumstances would possibly allow extending the anal-
ysis to them similarly to the context of cognitive contextualist theories. 
Another strategy would involve first analysing the conditions for occupying 
different positions within the definitive, meaning-endowing relations a theory in-
volves. The process is similar to that recommended for identifying necessary condi-
tions for instantiators’ material identity but for different positions. Where instantiator 
identity is tied to being the recipient of influences and the signifier toward observers, 
sources of influence occupy the rest of the positions for the former type of relation 
which targets the instantiator. As recommended above, this approach involves spec-
ifying the affordances for which the relations in question are primed and then re-
cording the features required of entities which may co-instantiate said affordances 
such as how classic denoting requires existence.38 Once the relevant set of relations 
has been analysed thus, the results can be applied to the sets of entities associated 
with domains of various scopes and each applicable influence would be designated. 
One may then define the resulting meaning when accounting for the total set of in-
fluences within a given domain and check that against the identified standard. The 
furthest extent at which the results match the acceptable range of variation set by 
the standard a theory applies would provide the potential scope of the theory – or at 
least the best available approximation relative to the accounted for set of examples. 
The first strategy helps provide a minimum threshold which may well exceed 
implemented scope while the latter – when available – caps the range of potential 
 
38 Strawson’s (1950b) interpretation of Russell (1905) assumes as much, at least, whether this is ne-
cessarily true or not. Thus, claims attributing features to fictional entities (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) 
would be necessarily false under the theory of definite descriptions if this interpretation is eligible. 
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scope. In either scenario, once the relevant influences have been identified for a sit-
uation representative of the appropriate instance, they need only be mapped onto 
the scales applied to each dimension to help identify the most extreme coordinates 
relative to the scales’ functional categories. By combining the two proposed strate-
gies, one may identify required influences for each analysed case as well as allowed 
influences for said cases, assuming open-ended scope. The two are distinct. Required 
influences outline the bare minimum: at least scope wide enough to accommodate 
them across cases must be achievable using whichever principles the theory applies 
to derive scope. Allowed but not required influences each represent a risk to the the-
ory: if their effect modifies results beyond the range the applied standard sanctions, 
they effectively incur a counterexample to the theory. To limit the effects of extrane-
ous allowed influences, scope must be restricted not to include any which would 
endanger the theory. This provides an upper limit on the potential scope a theory 
supports. If one were to imagine two line graphs which result from connecting the 
outermost required influences and the outermost viable and allowed influences, 
respectively, any space between them would represent the available range for poten-
tial scope. Consequently, should the two lines ever intersect beyond coinciding, the 
theory is proven unviable: its results require scope beyond what it may support before 
incurring subversive results. Either the standard or the principles must be edited. 
This approach to scope oversimplifies matters by assuming a default scope 
across the instances a theory covers but it acts to ground a more considered atti-
tude towards scope. Without explicit or readily retrievable principles for defining 
scope, until the grounds for variation can be identified, treating scope as uniform 
across instances provides a working model to be adjusted once such grounds be-
come evident. This form of working model is relative to the earlier discussed invari-
ants characteristic of the theory itself, mainly the incorporated observer positions 
and the features of the set of defining relations. However, should a theory relativise 
the domains for specifying meaning to situational particulars, the resulting scope 
would need to be systematically adjusted for each instance. The simplest case of such 
variable scope involves linking it to the perspective of a positioned processor – not 
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only by using relations requiring their access but in principle, such as by defining a 
domain of access which accommodates more incidental variation such as attention, 
orientation, and so forth.39 Similarly, while the outermost coordinates for necessary 
influences would usually provide the means to outline minimum scope for the asso-
ciated instances, if they are outliers relative to a more standard distribution, condi-
tional solutions to accommodate them might be proposed. These values cannot be 
simply bracketed: they still contribute to understanding what the theory requires 
when applied to the associated cases, and if said cases must be accommodated, 
these values cannot be ignored. Instead, minimising their impact might involve iden-
tifying common denominators among the cases in question and forming a sub-the-
ory for their meaning which appends the main theory such as how minimal semantics 
(Borg, 2004; 2012) treats indexicals as a special case of controlled, non-pragmatic 
context-sensitivity. Should such a solution be available, one may affix a conditional 
to the required scope extension and avoid needing to accommodate influences 
within that sphere across all instances, thereby mitigating the risk of undue influences 
incurring counterexamples to the theory. 
So, to approximate the potential scope a theory of meaning may support 
given its defining principles, one should (1) identify a standard for expected results 
set by exemplars’ precedent, (2) list the influences the theory requires and those it 
allows, and (3) map the associated coordinates on the relevant axes to express the 
range of involved domains. Based on the results, further adjustments may be pos-
sible: if any outlier results are consistently associated with recognisable special 
cases, their requirements may be accommodated conditionally, and other patterns 
might be explained using situationally relative criteria for scope. The results express 
the limits of the principles a theory employs – its potential in terms of the reach 
within which it may accommodate considerations while remaining consistent with 
 
39 While no formalisation of the notion is attempted here, a factor is considered more incidental 
when the counterfactual alternatives are more manifest and immediate. The observer having looked 
one way rather than another in part defines their domain of access but it is more incidental than 
whether they were wearing infrared goggles at the time unless a pair is immediately available. 
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established precedent. Assuming that one may anticipate influences involved with 
examples while constructing the sample cases, the baseline set by the implemented 
scope can guide the search by expressing the author’s focus and potential blind 
spots. Regardless of whether the associated aspects of scope become integrated 
into the theory as a result, accounting for them helps complete the partial under-
standing provided in text. An author must divide their attention across a variety of 
considerations among which ensuring that examples provide a maximally inclusive 
impression of the limits of the theory does not rank high. Meanwhile, the analyst who 
applies these further checks has a less open-ended task which allows stricter method-
ology and a deeper focus on specific details the author might be prone to overlook. 
6.3.3 Extracting Ideal Scope 
Finally, ideal scope can be determined based on the requirements of the task the 
theory sets for itself, and it in turn provides a threshold the theory’s potential scope 
ought to meet. When the task is commonly recognised, any existing consensus on its 
requirements provides a baseline from which to proceed. While such consensus is 
fallible, applying ideal scope is limited to the best available approximation. Indepen-
dent arguments to sway the community would need to be provided separately 
when the standing opinion appears deficient or misguided, and if they are processed 
appropriately (i.e. no justifiable criticisms emerge), the results provide the new base-
line – whether changed or unchanged. The guidelines below are intended as grounds 
for such arguments in the absence of an explicit prior consensus and possibly even 
the presence of an uncritical communal perspective. They address some general fea-
tures various available tasks may involve and aspects of scope associated with said 
features. This list is by no means comprehensive. It is only intended to present an 
approach through examples which relate to each of the involved three dimensions. 
The four features addressed here are (1) detached objectivity, (2) reliance on pres-
ence, (3) non-actualism, and (4) conditionality. 
While this thesis treats the ideal of detached objectivity (e.g. Nagel, 1986) 
as problematic when it becomes privileged as a general criterion for ranking views, 
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the ideal has its proper applications. Such tasks would include tasks involving abso-
lute40 rather than relative phenomena, and in the context of theories of meaning, 
one example would be attempting to define singular referents for proper names (e.g. 
Russell, 1905; Kripke, 1981; Jackman, 1999; 2005). This kind of true-naming relies on 
detached objectivity since the inherent singularity condition requires ensuring the 
absence of multiple applicable referents which in turn requires accounting for a total 
view of the world. That a spatial dimension should be involved is mostly obvious given 
how the applicable referents themselves occupy space. While an absolute view would 
engender limitless spatial scope, this dimension would also be included for bounded 
approaches like Austinian takes (e.g. Barwise & Perry, 1999). Meanwhile, temporality 
is involved for all absolute approaches to true-naming which do not subscribe to pre-
sentism. If names were accepted to change referent based on historical context, the 
view would be time-relative rather than absolute. Thus, non-presentist absolute views 
are obligated to cover the totality of periods which they treat as existent – up to and 
including the future in some cases. Temporal externalism (Jackman, 1999; 2005) be-
ing inclusive of the future shows how this principle may be extended in that direc-
tion when the future’s metaphysical status is not treated as isolated or unidirectionally 
dependent on the present. A task being defined in terms of the sorts of absolute 
values which demand detached objectivity to be applied in order to be derived makes 
ideal scope inclusive of the spatial and temporal dimensions to the highest available 
degree considered metaphysically relevant by the consensus. Unless claims involve 
modal necessity like Kripkean rigid designators (Kripke, 1981, pp. 47–49), a modal 
dimension need not be involved but other factors other than detached objectivity 
may invite such considerations depending on the task. 
Reliance on presence is another feature a task may involve and which entails 
the involvement of both extended spatial and temporal scope. This feature involves 
accounting for factors based on their presence or lack thereof. While other features 
may entail a degree of presence (because any physical entity possesses it), reliance 
 
40 Or perhaps more appropriately ‘world-relative’ wherein the designated domain of worlds – 
mainly just actuality – yields invariant results. 
Scope  202 
       
 
    
on presence makes presence (or absence) itself a decisive factor. To illustrate asso-
ciated tasks, consider attempting to define objective context in the vein of Kaplan 
(1989) as opposed to the subjective context with which cognitive theories like rele-
vance theory41 operate. While considerations of the kinds the former involves may 
enter the latter through awareness, an objective context would exist independently 
of being recognised. Thus, under such a framework, indexical expressions such as ‘to-
day’ would reference the present day rather than the intended day when the speaker 
is confused about the date.42 Spatial and temporal scope becoming involved stems 
from relative presence being gradable but also all-inclusive in terms of spatial rela-
tions and past-oriented temporal relations when a non-positioned perspective is ap-
plied. Even for positioned perspectives, presence seems more encompassing than 
would suit such tasks: recollection makes everything in (conscious) memory available 
to a degree even when parts might be situationally inaccessible. Thus, setting thresh-
olds to restrict the associated forms of scope becomes necessary for meaningful dis-
tinctions between the present and the absent. Consider once more discussions of the 
context provided by prior discourse (e.g. Heim, 1982; Clark, 1996; Stalnaker, 1996) 
which is exemplified in defining the referents of mentions involving definite articles 
or non-demonstrative uses of indexicals.43 While immediately preceding mentions 
or referents co-presented in the same utterance only require minimal scope, not all 
cases are as simple. For instance, exchanges in person and email correspondences 
involve different degrees of delay between responses. While spatiotemporal consid-
erations might not preclude immediately preceding comments from contextualising 
the next contribution, the acceptable degree of separation in terms of turns taken 
 
41 ‘The set of premises used in interpreting an utterance […] constitutes what is generally known 
as the context. A context is a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about 
the world.’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 15, emphasis in original) 
42 A cognitive theory also allows for a similar, demonstrative sense of ‘today’ even if the mechanism 
differs from the expression itself indexing to the date. However, such theories generally also allow 
for possibilities such as ‘today’ in the utterance ‘I have a dentist’s appointment today’ designating 
an intended calendar date instead. Under such circumstances, if the person is mistaken about the 
actual date and corrected, they might well retort ‘Right, I meant it was that day but got confused.’ 
43 These cases would include mentions of ‘they’ which denote a person or people mentioned but 
not presented such as in the sentence ‘I know many dog owners and they all love their pets.’ 
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seems affected: at least in practice, slow-paced correspondence allows referencing 
fewer steps back. Without some restrictions, then, one would be forced to default 
to a position parallel to dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981; 1986) where every element of an 
utterance participates in a context defined by the trace presence of every preceding 
utterance in human history. Hence, reliance on presence tends to entail not only the 
inclusion of spatial distance and past-oriented duration but also constraints on both. 
Modal considerations needing to be addressed instead of them being extra 
or just part of a specific approach might initially seem harder to imagine than either 
of the preceding examples. The next two examples are intended to show that such 
matters are not peripheral to theories of meaning. The first feature which invites 
modal scope needing to be defined is non-actualism. This feature is shared by all 
tasks which cannot be resolved while restricting oneself only to properly actualised 
facts. Idealisation is perhaps the main form of non-actualism, and the corresponding 
modal scope concerns the degree of variation appropriately represented by the ide-
alised model. Consider, for instance, a claim about causation between two events 
such as ‘if a person utters “green” then their utterances expresses the concept of be-
ing coloured green’. While this claim would be an over-simplification since it fails to 
account for ambiguity, the general principle resembles the core tenets of invariantist 
or literalist theories like minimal semantics (Borg, 2004; 2012). The forms of difference 
involved in the example include the range of what counts as a person, which forms 
of utterances count as instances of ‘green’,44 and the subjective variation on concepts 
of green based on categorising borderline cases (e.g. shades of cyan). Should such 
considerations seem universal to theories of meaning, the conclusion ought to be 
that modal scope is implicitly present in each to this extent rather than that it cannot 
be present when not addressed. General explanatory frameworks just necessarily 
rely on a degree of idealisation since people lack access to the totality of the actual 
 
44 Especially verbal utterances, in virtue of the different medium, never contain ‘green’ but rather, 
[ɡɹiːn], [ɡɹin], possibly [ɡʁyːn], and so on. The last example is for the German ‘grün’ but whether 
cross-linguistic variation matters is another modal consideration. If the underlying concepts for 
each fall within the accepted range of variation, perhaps [ˈʋihreæ] (‘vihreä’ which is ‘green’ in Finnish) 
would also qualify. Such choices to include or exclude define the corresponding modal scope. 
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cases where the relevant dynamics apply. Meanwhile, the contrast cases without any 
such modal scope would be presented by the ideal which eliminative materialism 
propounds where explanations would eventually be based on complete knowledge 
of physically tractable processes.45 In the absence of such comprehensive models of 
the actual, general theories are forced to idealise and only explanations of particular 
instances may avoid the associated modal scope but such total access would 
potentially enable non-idealised general explanations. Therefore, as the eliminativist 
ideal shows, alternatives exist and accounting for non-actualism is not immaterial. 
In a similar vein, conditionality is a feature of tasks involving explanatory 
power beyond the actual (or known extent of it). In this context, the term refers to 
explanations which can afford inputs beyond the actual and yield systematic outputs 
for them. In effect, the core principles of theories attempting such tasks yield condi-
tionals rather than non-conditional assertions. For example, theories of meaning in-
volving embodiment can be considered a source of such conditionals where the ante-
cedent consists of a set of embodied affordances (e.g. sense of directions based on 
gravity conditions and physiology) and ecological factors based on their distribution 
(e.g. eventual resulting linguistic conventions and manufactured designs). When 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 57) invoke imagining a spherical being living outside 
gravitational fields, one may interpret this in part as the suggestion that whichever 
general principles of embodiment engender human experience would help approx-
imate the results of alternative scenarios. Even in the absence of positive predictions, 
at least negative contrasts based on absence of required conditions would be avail-
able (e.g. the sphere has no access to an invariant sense of up and down based ori-
entation). For purposes of defining associated ideal scope, modality enters the pic-
ture because the required theories are effectively of a higher order where they ex-
 
45 ‘Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our commonsense conception of psychological phe-
nomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the prin-
ciples and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, 
by completed neuroscience. Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be 
reconstituted within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience, a theory we may ex-
pect to be more powerful by far than the common-sense psychology it displaces, and more sub-
stantially integrated within physical science generally.’ (Churchland, 1981, p. 67) 
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plain how the set of rules present in actuality emerges and how counterfactual con-
ditions would affect the results. Each such theory is still grounded in actual data from 
whence they extend based on the continuity between conditions to the point where 
any required common ground breaks down.46 
As these examples demonstrate, one may infer necessarily involved aspects 
of ideal scope based on the nature of the task a theory attempts. Involved dimen-
sions and directions are more available in this manner but minimal distance ought 
to also be retrievable based on the cases considered definitive of the task. As noted 
above, ideal scope is often subject to a degree of uncertainty which allows theories’ 
potential scope to often act as a measure of the distances involved. Hence, defining 
any involved dimensions and available directions takes precedence. The general 
advice to be gleamed from these examples is to consider what features a task 
involves and then to first analyse which dimensions the feature invites. In particular, 
time tends to get involved when the required elements must occur in sequence (e.g. 
discourse context) and modularity is implicit in any aspiration to capture explana-
tions more general than required by the recognised facts. By congregating such 
results, not only would one receive a combined set of involved aspects of scope but 
also a weighing of the different dimensions and directions based on how central 
the associated features are and how often each such aspect recurs. Addressing any 
potential emergent effects from multiple features is beyond the capacity of this work. 
6.4 Takeaway 
Considering the limitations incurred by how inclusive any conception of a theory may 
be because both conceivers and texts are limited with respect to the extent of what 
they may represent guides attention to the scope they in fact manage to implement. 
However, such implemented scope is obviously not going to be representative of 
 
46 Given the associations with the name, ‘embodiment’ might appear to require some forms of 
bodies, for instance. While that example illustrates the idea, the core principles are more concerned 
with modes of being in general. The break which makes non-embodied forms of existence invite 
is more reliant on any speculation based on the relevant principles being fully non-verifiable since 
non-embodied beings are either non-existent or at least epistemically inaccessible. 
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the full potential of what the explanatory model a theory provides may successfully 
accommodate. Recognising that the versions with which people operate are limited 
in this fashion by largely incidental circumstances allows for the disparity between 
expectations and actuality to be addressed. Extracting the scope being implemented 
reveals which available directions are not represented which in turn enables testing 
whether the theory may account for such considerations (e.g. counterfactuals). Sim-
ilarly, the limitations on what different theories may account for poses the question 
of what they should account for, given these theories’ professed purposes. There 
exists no axiom stating that the more inclusive theories are inherently better. For spe-
cific tasks, it may be justified to limit the considerations being accounted for, such 
as when only the sources reliably available to actual processors of meaning matter. 
The provided model of such scope is inclusive of three dimensions: space, 
time, and modality. For each, it is possible to define both the directions being ac-
counted for and the distance in a given direction which a theory accommodates. In 
this instance, modality is measured relative to degrees of differentiation along various 
axes between the scenarios bounded relative to both spatial and temporal scope. 
Thus, for example, a theory might be suited to accounting for counterfactual scena-
rios so similar to reality that any differences can be attributed to singular decisions 
occurring during an exchange but not for the range of potential meanings related 
to realistically possible circumstances affecting choices of formal definition. 
Different forms of scope can be defined for each theory relative to said de-
tails. Among them are those discussed above: implemented scope, potential scope, 
and ideal scope. Implemented scope is the extent of the considerations being pre-
sented within a specified corpus which expresses a theory and the resulting concep-
tions. Potential scope expresses the range within which the posited principles operate 
as intended by their application resulting in meanings that match whichever standard 
the theory is using. For instance, a theory which promises to explain how meaning 
in communication approximates dictionary definitions would need the principles it 
applies not to register influences resulting in a more inclusive referent. Ideal scope 
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is defined relative to whichever task the theory is addressing such as specifying proper 
referents. It effectively consists of the agreed upon range at which all requisite con-
siderations are being accounted for without extraneous distractions being invited. 
Each form of scope associated with a theory can be extracted using a dis-
tinct method. Specifying implemented scope makes direct use of the representations 
of theories content based on definition 2: you check what elements are described 
or required to be imported and what their positions relative to the instantiator are 
on an appropriate ordinal scale. Potential scope can in part be outlined by expanding 
from this baseline and checking at which point doing so begins inviting counter-
examples where the influences aggregated over a domain of that scope no longer 
match what the theory would predict. In effect, the potential scope of a theory con-
sists of the extent of the domains wherein applying the principles of the theory re-
sults in the meanings predicted by the standard it applies. This extent may vary based 
on some independently motivated modulating principle – scope need not be treated 
as a static value in every instance. Unlike the other two types, ideal scope cannot be 
extracted from the details of a theory as such. It is negotiated relative to the task 
which the theory attempts, even if specific details embodied by such tasks can hint 
at least at necessary inclusions. The simplest example is how any theory of absolute 
meaning ought to be maximally inclusive, at least spatially. 
The considerations, models, and methods presented in this work are at best 
a tentative step in exploring the potential value of approaching theories of meaning 
as the range of conceptions afforded by specified sources. However, both instantia-
tor identity and considerations of scope are highlighted by this framing. Ideally, 
being able to recognise and systematically detail such aspects of theories of mean-
ing should help open new avenues of discussion that help settle what is considered 
acceptable in these respects. While surprising results cannot be guaranteed, at the 
very least, these methods provide the means to confirm what is the case. Yet, it also 
remains possible that such avenues do allow theories to be seen in a new light when 
differences in related presuppositions are brought to the fore. 
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Appendix 01: Formal Definitions 
The values of variables (m, n, q, x, y, z) are non-negative integers, where zero denotes 
the empty set ∅. Variables m, n and q denote the number of variations and variables 
x, y, and z arbitrary variants. Superscripts identify a related type of set and subscripts 
specific variants of elements or subsets. 
Definition 1, Constituents of Situations (General): 
Sx = {O, P, R, A, C} 
E = (O∪P∪R∪A∪C) = {e1, e2, … en│n≥0} 
O = {o1, o2,… on│n≥0} 
P = {〈p1, e1〉, 〈p2, e1〉, … 〈pm, en〉│m≥0, n≥0, {e1, e2, … en}∩O} 








x= 〈e1, e2, … en│n≥2〉, 












x = {e1, e2, … en│n≥2}} 
C = {(l1, t1), (l1, t2), … (lm, tn)│m≥0, n≥0} 
Explanation of Definition 1: 
Sx: specified situation 
E: set of elements in the situation 
 ex: element of a situation 
O: set of objects in the situation 
 ox: instantiated object 
P: set of properties 
 px: type of property 
 〈px, ey〉: px is instantiated by ey 
R: set of relations 
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 rx: type of relation 
 〈rx, E
*
y〉: rx is instantiated by the elements of E
*
y 
A: set of partial states of affairs 
C: set of spatiotemporal coordinates 
 lx: specific location 
 tx: specific time 
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Definition 1.1, Constituents of Situations (Attributed): 
Sx = {O, P, R, A, C} 






Ec = {e1, e2, … en│ n≥1, ex∈〈p
c, ey〉} 
O = {o1, o2,… on│n≥0} 
P = {〈p1, e1〉, 〈p2, e1〉, … 〈pm, en〉│m≥0, n≥0, {e1, e2, … en}∩O} 








x= 〈e1, e2, … en│n≥2〉, 












x = {e1, e2, … en│n≥2}} 
C = {(l1, t1), (l1, t2), … (lm, tn)│m≥0, n≥0} 
Explanation of Definition 1.1: 
Sx: specified situation 
E: set of elements in the situation 
 ex: element of a situation 
Ec: set of constituents of the core entity 
pc: the property of having been designated as a core entity 
O: set of objects in the situation 
 ox: instantiated object 
P: set of properties 
 px: type of property 
 〈px, ey〉: px is instantiated by ey 
R: set of relations 
 rx: type of relation 
 〈rx, E
*
y〉: rx is instantiated by the elements of E
*
y 
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A: set of partial states of affairs 
C: set of spatiotemporal coordinates 
 lx: specific location 
 tx: specific time 
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Definition 1.2, Constituents of Situations (Attributed; Observed): 
Sx = {O, P, R, A, C} 





Ec = {e1, e2, … en│ n≥1, ex∈〈p
c, ey〉} 








m, 〈W, 〈rn, E
*




W = {〈I1, 〈I2, … 〈In〉〉〉│n≥1, Ix∈I} 
I = {I1, I2, … Im│ m≥1, Ix=〈〈(l’1, t’1), D
*
1〉, 〈(l’2, t’2), D
*
2〉, … 〈(l’m, t’n), D
*
q〉│ m≥2,  
      n≥2, q≥2, 〈(l’x, t’y), D
*
z〉∈U〉} 
U = {〈(l’1, t’1), D
*
1〉, 〈(l’2, t’2), D
*
2〉, … 〈(l’m, t’n), D
*
q〉│m≥1, n≥1, q≥1, (l’x, t’y)∈N, 
       D*z⊆D, D
*
z≠Ø} 
N = {(l’1, t’1), (l’1, t’2), … (l’m, t’n)│m≥1, n≥1} 
D = {d1, d2, … dn│n≥1} 
O = {o1, o2,… on│n≥0} 
P = {〈p1, e1〉, 〈p2, e1〉, … 〈pm, en〉│m≥0, n≥0, {e1, e2, … en}∩O} 








x= 〈e1, e2, … en│n≥2〉, 












x = {e1, e2, … en│n≥2}} 
C = {(l1, t1), (l1, t2), … (lm, tn)│m≥0, n≥0} 
Explanation of Definition 1.2: 
Sx: specified situation 
E: set of elements in the situation 
 ex: element of a situation 
Ec: set of constituents of the core entity 
pc: the property of having been designated as a core entity 
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Rb: set of relations of observation 
 rbx: type of relation of observation 




x is instantiated by W relative to relation 〈ry, E
*
z〉 
W: set of layers of integration which correspond to the observer 
 〈Ix, 〈Iy〉〉: Ix is a single level higher order of integration than Iy 
I: set of layers of integration 
 Ix: specific layer of integration 
 〈〈(l’1, t’1), D
*
1〉, 〈(l’2, t’2), D
*
2〉, … 〈(l’m, t’n), D
*
q〉〉: set of inputs up to 〈(l’m,  t’n), 
D*q〉 is ordered according to the format of a layer of integration Ix 
U: set of inputs 
 〈(l’x, t’y), D
*
z〉: at (l’x, t’y), D
*
z applies 
N: set of points of access 
 l’x: specific location of access 
 t’x: specific time of access 
D: set of modes of access 
 dx: type of mode of access 
O: set of objects in the situation 
 ox: instantiated object 
P: set of properties 
 px: type of property 
 〈px, ey〉: px is instantiated by ey 
R: set of relations 
 rx: type of relation 
 〈rx, E
*
y〉: rx is instantiated by the elements of E
*
y 
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A: set of partial states of affairs 
C: set of spatiotemporal coordinates 
 lx: specific location 
 tx: specific time 
  
Appendix 01: Formal Definitions  215 
       
 
    
Definition 2, Template for Reframing Theories of Meaning: 
Sx = {O
g, Pg, Rg, Ag, Cg} 





Ei = {e1, e2, … en│ n≥1, ex∈〈p
i, ey〉} 
Epr = {e1, e2, … en│ n≥1, ex∈〈p
d, ey〉} 
Og = {o1, o2,… on│n≥0} 
Pg = {〈p1, e1〉, 〈p2, e1〉, … 〈pm, en〉│m≥0, n≥0, {e1, e2, … en}∩O
g} 








x= 〈e1, e2, … en│n≥2〉, 












x = {e1, e2, … en│n≥2}} 
Cg = {〈ra, 〈e1, 〈l1, t1〉〉〉, 〈r
a, 〈e2, 〈l2, t2〉〉〉, … 〈r
a, 〈em, 〈ln, tq〉〉〉│m≥0, n≥0, 
        q≥0, ra∈R} 













W = {〈Inw, 〈I1, 〈I2, … 〈In〉〉〉〉〉│n≥1, I
nw∈I, Inw=E, Inw⊇Ipr, Ix∈I} 
I = {I1, I2, … Im│ m≥1, Ix=〈〈e1, 〈e2, … 〈en〉〉〉│n≥2〉} 





Explanation of Definition 2: 
Sx: theory-specific schema for nature of meaning 
E: set of elements in the schema for a theory of meaning 
 ex: element of a schema for a theory of meaning 
Ei: set of constituents of the meaning-instantiator 
pi: the property of having been designated as a meaning-instantiator 
Epr: set of constituents of the processor of meaning 
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pd: the property of having been designated as part of the processor 
Og: set of generic objects in the schema 
 ox: conceived generic object 
Pg: set of generic properties in the schema 
 px: type of property 
 〈px, ey〉: px is instantiated by ey 
Rg: set of generic relations in the schema 
 rx: type of relation 
 〈rx, E
*
y〉: rx is instantiated by the elements of E
*
y 
Ag: set of generic partial states of affairs in the schema 
Cg: set of generic spatiotemporal coordinates in the schema 
 ra: relation of arrangement 
 lx: relative location 
 tx: relative time 
 〈ra, 〈ex, 〈ly, tz〉〉〉: r
a is instantiated by ex relative to ly and tz 
Rb: set of relations of observation 
 rbx: type of relation of observation 




x is instantiated by W relative to relation 〈ry, E
*
z〉 
W: set of layers of integration which correspond to the observer 
 Inw: layer of integration corresponding to detached perspective 
 〈Ix, 〈Iy〉〉: Ix is a single level higher order of integration than Iy 
I: set of layers of integration 
 Ix: specific layer of integration 
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 〈〈e1, 〈e2, … 〈en〉〉〉〉: set of inputs up to en is ordered according to the
 format of a layer of integration Ix 
Ipr: layer of integration corresponding to the positioned processor 
 ra: relation of access 
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